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How Can One and the Same Thing be Subject to Different Theories? On the Proper Logic for Non-Reductive Monism

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Thomas Müller (LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP conference "Reduction and Emergence in the Sciences" (14-16 November, 2013) titled "How Can One and the Same Thing be Subject to Different Theories?? On the Proper Logic for Non-Reductive Monism". Abstract: The aim of this paper is to shed light on a neglected issue in the field of intertheoretic relations: How is it that properties belonging to different theories apply to one and the same thing? What does that teach us about the notion of being one and the same thing, and what could an adequate formal representation of sameness look like? What about the controversial thesis of constitution as identity that seems to be required for a monistic (e.g., physicalistic) metaphysics? By discussing a simple example—physical and biological properties applying to a cat—we argue that standard logical resources of predicate or quantified modal logic are inadequate for the task. We finally describe case-intensional first order logic, which provides an adequate formal framework for non-reductive monism.
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70 episodes

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Archived series ("Inactive feed" status)

When? This feed was archived on June 24, 2018 13:56 (6y ago). Last successful fetch was on April 13, 2018 10:40 (6y ago)

Why? Inactive feed status. Our servers were unable to retrieve a valid podcast feed for a sustained period.

What now? You might be able to find a more up-to-date version using the search function. This series will no longer be checked for updates. If you believe this to be in error, please check if the publisher's feed link below is valid and contact support to request the feed be restored or if you have any other concerns about this.

Manage episode 113963287 series 91394
Content provided by MCMP Team. All podcast content including episodes, graphics, and podcast descriptions are uploaded and provided directly by MCMP Team or their podcast platform partner. If you believe someone is using your copyrighted work without your permission, you can follow the process outlined here https://player.fm/legal.
Thomas Müller (LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP conference "Reduction and Emergence in the Sciences" (14-16 November, 2013) titled "How Can One and the Same Thing be Subject to Different Theories?? On the Proper Logic for Non-Reductive Monism". Abstract: The aim of this paper is to shed light on a neglected issue in the field of intertheoretic relations: How is it that properties belonging to different theories apply to one and the same thing? What does that teach us about the notion of being one and the same thing, and what could an adequate formal representation of sameness look like? What about the controversial thesis of constitution as identity that seems to be required for a monistic (e.g., physicalistic) metaphysics? By discussing a simple example—physical and biological properties applying to a cat—we argue that standard logical resources of predicate or quantified modal logic are inadequate for the task. We finally describe case-intensional first order logic, which provides an adequate formal framework for non-reductive monism.
  continue reading

70 episodes

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