#7--Michael Peznola

Controversy & Clarity

In this episode, we discuss:

*Col Peznola’s education and training as a young officer

*Col Peznola’s take on what “blocking and tackling” and “the basics” means in a tactical sense

*His experience attending the Army’s Cavalry Leaders Course and what he learned from being around soldiers

*When Col Peznola first heard about what would later be termed maneuver warfare

*His time as an instructor at The Basic School (TBS)

*Who the “maneuver warfare instigators” in the TBS bullpen were

*How the curriculum at TBS had changed since Col Peznola had been a student there

*How Peznola approached teaching lieutenants in the field

*The central role that Lieutenant Colonel Ray Cole played in the shift to maneuver warfare at TBS

*Captain Paul Kennedy’s use of BB guns in force on force training and how this inspired Peznola to create the “Zen Patrol”

*What it was like facilitating the Zen Patrol

*How patrolling seemed to “stick” more with students when taught this way

*The role of the debrief and the instructor in the Zen Patrol

*How Peznola’s experiences at TBS fostered within him an inquisitive mindset

*Why Peznola thinks the Marine Corps needs to change its manpower system and truly reward Marines who innovate

*What it was like having 2ndLt Brendan McBreen as a student

*Peznola’s thoughts on command and control

*What it was like sitting through John Boyd’s briefings and interacting with Boyd

*What it was like having now-Major General Roger Turner as a student in Peznola’s platoon at TBS

*Peznola’s interactions with John Kelly and John Allen at TBS and the impact Kelly and Allen had on the effort to infuse maneuver warfare into the curricula at TBS and IOC

*The dearth of communication that occurs today between TBS and IOC instructors and how that wasn’t the case in Peznola’s time

*What TBS and IOC would look like if Peznola were king

*Peznola’s experiences at 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

*Peznola’s deployment with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit and his time in Somalia

*His time serving in manpower at Headquarters Marine Corps

*His time as the general officer monitor officer

*Why some Marines leaders resisted maneuver warfare

*Peznola’s reaction to the publication of Warfighting

*His thoughts on and experiences with Bill Lind

*On whether the Marine Corps practiced maneuver warfare in its invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan

*What maneuver warfare looks like in garrison

*Whether the Marine Corps’ current model of recruit training helps or hinders new Marines from executing maneuver warfare

*Peznola’s thoughts on SOI-West’s inclusion of Chess in its Infantry Marine Course

*His time as the commanding officer of the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group

*His criticism of special operations in Afghanistan

*How the US created the Afghan forces in its own image

*Peznola’s time as the chief of staff of a special operations task force in Afghanistan

*His thoughts on America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan

*His thoughts on Force 2030

*His take on general officer and joint professional military education

*Who Ike Skelton was and why the US military needs another person like him

*If Col Peznola could change one thing about the Marine Corps

*What excites him most about the future direction of the Marine Corps

Links

To Lose a Battle by Alistar Horne

Organic Design for Command and Control by John Boyd

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