- 108 - Pacific War - Landing at Arawe , December 12-19, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Last time we spoke about the two pronged offensive against Wareo and the ongoing operation on Bougainville. Katagiri’s men had lost the battle for sattelberg and were performing their long retreat to Madang, but the Australians were not going to let up. Wootten immediately ordered the capture of Wareo and soon the allies were right back on the Japanese heels. General Katagiri lacked manpower, supplies and even physical strength to fight the advancing Australians off. The Australian took Bonga, Horace, the Kalueng lakes, Nongora, the Christmas hills and Kuanko during the drive to Wareo. Katagiri could do little more than order his men to continue fleeing north. 455 Japanese were killed, while the Australians suffered 47 deaths and 332 wounded. On Bougainville, General Geiger expanded his perimeter and launched a bold and dangerous amphibious raid against Koiari. Luckily for the raiders, the Japanese were taken by surprise and the Americans were able to pull out before they were annihilated.

This episode is The Landing at Arawe

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

The allies were edging ever closer to Rabaul as the Japanese were facing a long string of defeats in New Guinea and the Solomons. General Douglas MacArthur had elected to carry out two amphibious landings on western New Britain, in an effort to gain dominance over the Dampier strait. Codenamed Operation Dexterity, MacArthur was going to perform amphibious landings at Arawe and Cape Gloucester. Initially Operation Lazaretto called for an amphibious landing on southern New Britain 5km away from Gasmata in mid November. This would have been done to neutralize the Japanese base as Gasmata and protect the eastern flank for future operations, however the Japanese anticipated the attack and rapidly built up their forces there. The 7th fleet was not capable of hitting both Gasmata and Cape Gloucester simultaneously, so instead Admirals Carpender and Barbey formulated the plan to invade Arawa that was thought to not be as heavily defended. With Arawe in hand the allies could establish a PT boat base with the objective to “establishment light naval forces and to protect the southeastern flank of our forces in the impending seizure of the Gloucester Peninsula”. But Morton C. Mumma, who commanded the motor torpedo boats in the Southwest Pacific Area, would have none of Arawe. He already had all the bases he could use, and the Japanese barges used mostly the north coast of New Britain. Apparently Morton spent days “camping on 7th Fleet’s doorstep to protest against setting up a PT base at Arawe”. Morton only left after he was assured by the Admirals that he need not have one if he did not want it.

By November 22nd, MacArthur ditched Operation Lazaretto and created Operation Director. Operation Director was to land at Arawe was slated for December 15th, 11 days prior to the landings at Cape Gloucester. Operation Director would also act as a diversion for operation backhander. The operation would be performed by two squadrons of the 112th cavalry regiment combat team. This regiment had spent its time as a National Guard patrolling the Mexican border before they were shipped off to New Caledonia in July of 1942. They were assigned to General Patch’s Americal division and were deployed as a horse mounted security force on New Caledonia. General Patch initially thought horse mounted cavalry could be used in jungle warfare, but the torrential and muddy pacific weather, quickly changed his mind. The regiment was sent to Goodenough island for training and was tossed into Operation Director quite at the last minute. The regiment had not yet seen combat and was converted to an infantry units in late may of 1943.

The regiment consisted of two squadrons: the 1st Squadron of A, B and C Troops and 2nd Squadron of D, E and F Troops. For combat support there was the M2A1 howitzer-equipped 148th Field Artillery Battalion and the 59th Engineer Company. The other combat units of the Director Task Force were two batteries of the 470th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion, most of the 236th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion, A Company of the United States Marine Corps 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion and a detachment from the 26th Quartermaster War Dog Platoon. The 2nd Battalion of the 158th Infantry Regiment was held in reserve to reinforce the Director Task Force if required.

Not only was the 112th regiment's attachment to the operation rushed, its planning was as well. The allies lacked good aerial photographs and the troops would only have 10 days to practice amphibious warfare at Goodenough Island. After this the regiment would be embarking aboard the LSD Crater Hall, the LSI HMAS Westralia and the two APD’s Humphrey’s and Sands departing on December 13th. A and B of the 1st squadron would also have additional missions, A would land at Umtingalu and B would land on Pilelo island. They were going to hit the beaches in rubber boats from the APD’s while the main force would be hitting their beaches in LVT 10 Buffaloes and 29 Alligators. For those of you wondering, the Buffalo LVT were more heavily armed with 37mm, turrets from Stuart tanks and Howitzer Motor Carriages. The Alligator LVT were designed to operate in swampy areas and less armed. The LVT’s would be hitting the western shore at a place called Cape Merkus.

The original plan was devised by General Krueger’s Alamo Force and called for the 7th marines to land east of the Tsurubu airdrome, the 2nd battalions, 1st marines west of it and the 503rd parachute battalion to land in a large patch of kunai grass southeast of it. The three units would work to converge on the airdrome. The plan was heavily criticized by General Kenney and Major General Rupertus. When they looked over the operational maps it seemed to them the planners had completely overlooked the mountains, swamps and jungle terrain. The marines were expected to drive though the jungle to link up with the paratroopers and that did not sit at all well with the air commanders. The Marines hated the plan because the converging of the 3 forces over the rough terrain, against a more than likely larger enemy would also see problems telling friend from foe. In early December General Kenney added his voice to their criticism on behalf of the air forces. Kenney argued the plan intended to use piecemeal paratroops instead of performing a mass drop, the piecemeal drops would require innumerable flights of troop carriers and these flights would require approaching enemy air reaction dangerously close. In conclusion he said "Commander, Allied Air Forces, does not desire to participate in the planned employment of paratroops for DEXTERITY." On December 14th, Colonel Edwin Pollock bluntly voiced his opposition of the plan to MacArthur who apparently walked out of the meeting quite pissed off.

It is difficult to know why an invasion of the southern area was believed to be necessary. It is most likely because the Navy wanted a PT boat base at Gasmata to better operate against IJN barge traffic. However Captain Morton Mumma’s declaration of not needing a base as long as Cape Gloucester was secured made the decision to hit Arawe final. Kenney also found the Lindenhafen plantation at Gasmata unsuitable for an airfield. To twist MacArthur’s arm somewhat, an intelligence report indicated Arawa was only defended by 500 men of the 115th infantry of the IJA 51st division. MacArthur was much more worried over Operation Backhander so he agreed.

The use of paratroopers for operation Backhander was eliminated and instead they would concentrate strength for a potentially decisive stroke rather than a dispersal of forces. The 1st marines wold land immediately behind the 7th marines to hit the airdrome. Furthermore the 2nd battalion, 1st marines would make a secondary landing on the western shore of New Britain in order to block the Japanese from reinforcing the airdrome and to cut off the retreat of its garrison. After all was said and done the planning had finalized just 11 days prior to the landing date, it was quite a last minute ordeal. Given Backhander was a success, MacArthur also sought to hit Saidor on the northeastern coast of New Guinea, hopefully by the start of the new year. This would cut off General Adachi’s 18th army from retreating. Thus on December 10th, MacArthur ordered General Krueger to begin preparations for Operation Michaelmas with the 32nd division earmarked for this task.

Over on the other side, General Imamura deployed General Sakai’s 17th division in western New Britain with their command center being at Gavuvu. Units already in the region consisted of the Matsuda Detachment and the 2nd battalion, 228th regiment, both of whom would now be under Sakai’s command. The original mission of General Matsuda’s 65th mixed brigade had been maintaining the supply line to New Guinea. Thus his unit was quite topheavy with transportation personnel alongside an assortment of orphan units that had become separated from their parent units on New Guinea. Matsuda’s HQ was near Kalingi, his 4th shipping detachment were located between Tsurubu and Natamo and his 65th engineer regiment was at Tsurubu. Matsuda concentrated the majority of his strength along the south and west coasts at placed like Cape Bushing, Aisega, Nigol, Arawe and Cape Merkus.

At Tuluvu, the name the Japanese used for Cape Gloucester, the detachment had been relieved by Colonel Sumiya Koki’s 53rd regiment in early november, successfully establishing defensive positions between Mount Talawe and Borgen Bay. Colonel Sumiya had prepared several small roadblocks to cover his eastward approaches while placing the bulk of his troops and weapons in and around two main strong points. The first point was the crescent shaped Borgen Bay around 1000 yards east of the airdrome. Over there he had an elaborate system of mutually supporting bunkers with mounting weapons up to 75mm guns, connected by a network of rifle trenches. The second point was in the broken foothills of Mount Talawe, dominating the flat grounds for several hundreds of yards to the south.

Further south, Colonel Katayama Kenshiro’s 141st regiment were defending Cape Bushing; Colonel Jiro Sato’s the 51st reconnaissance regiment were defending Rooke Island; an understrength provisional company was defending Cape Merkus; and the 3rd battalion of the 141st were defending Nigol alongside a few orphan units of the 51st division. General Sakai dispatched Colonel Hirashima Shuhei’s 54th regiment were sent to reinforce Gasmata and their 7th company was detached to garrison Talasea. In early December Major Komori Shinjiro’s understrength 1st battalion, 81st regiment landed at Iboki. Sakai was concerned with the safety of the Cape Merkus Garrison, so he sent Komori’s detachment to proceed to Arawe urgently. Komori’s men would have to traverse an extremely difficult trail that saw them going through jungles, swamps, mountains and rivers over the entire width of the island.

Back over with the allies, General Cunningham’s convoy rendezvoused with Admiral Barbey’s escorting force at Buna on December 14th. From there they would head for Arawe after dusk, also accompanied by Admiral Crutchley’s supporting force. On that same day, Kenney’s 5th air force performed bombing campaigns, dropping some 433 tons of bombs against Arawe. At 3:30am on the 15th Barbey’s convoy reached the transport area and prepared their assault. To get the vulnerable rubber boats ashore, General Cunningham had to rely on the element of surprise rather than strength. So he chose to land under the cover of darkness with no forewarning. According to Barbey "Although it was considered that the moonlight might prevent surprise, the Landing Force Commander desired to attempt it without any preliminary bombardment." Unfortunately an American party of amphibious scouts had landed on that beach back on the 10th, causing the Japanese to suspect another landing would soon take place. There would be machine guns ready to hit the boys.

At 5:05 Humphrey’s launched 15 rubber boats for Pilelo island while Sands launched 15 others for Umtingalu. The landing at Pilelo went off without a hitch. Troop B landed and immediately attacked a Japanese radio station near the village of Paligmete. Troop A came under attack from a small group of Japanese hiding in some nearby caves. One american and 7 Japanese would die in the fighting. The landing at Umtingalu was another story entirely. The Japanese defenders unleashed heavy enfilading machine gun fire upon incoming rubber boats. 12 out of the 15 were punctured and sank quickly. Most of the men swam for their lives seaward and were rescued by small boats later on near House Fireman Beach. Around 12 men would die, 4 went missing and 17 were wounded. The submarine chaser SC-699 would manage to rescue 71 from the water while under fire. Between 6:10-6:25 allied destroyers bombarded the beach with 1800 5 inch shells and B-25 mitchells made a bombing pass around House Fireman Beach. The main landing force approached the area on amphibious tractors, facing slight opposition that they easily silenced using the rockets.

The first wave consisted of 10 LVT-2 Buffalos that hit the beach in a chaotic fashion at 7:28am. The other waves of LVT-1 Alligators kept stalling and this caused the landing force to be strung out in columns for a couple of miles. Once ashore the cavalrymen stormed the Arawe peninsula's base. The two understrength Japanese companies there had little hope against them and withdrew northeast towards Didmop along the Pulie river.

At 8:00am more troops aboard General Heavy’s LCVP’s and LCM’s came over with the first echelon of supplies. This time however, Japanese aircraft had spotted the convoys coming to Arawe at around 4am. Admiral Kusaka dispatched a strike force of 8 Vals and 56 Zeros to try and break the landings. 16 P-38’s intercepted the strike force, but many got through. Barbey’s flagship Conyngham and the supplies ships managed to evade the bombs. By the end of the day, 1904 troops had been landed and a new base was being constructed. Over the next following days, naval convoys would bring over reinforcements to the Arawe area. The Japanese launched multiple attacks upon them resulting in the sinking of APc-21, and APc-12, Subchaser SC-743, minesweeper YMS-50 and 4 LVT’s being damaged. Despite that minor damage, 6287 tons of supplies and 451 guns and vehicles were landed at Arawe within 3 weeks. A defensive perimeter was established behind the main line of resistance as General Cunninghumas men began sending patrols towards the Pulie and Itni Rivers to establish outposts.

General Matsuda now realized he was facing a full blown invasion. He dispatched Major Tobuse Asayaki’s 1st battalion, 141st regiment while awaiting further reinforcements from the Komori detachment. There were no trails connecting the Itni and Arawe regions, thus the men were forced to travel by landing craft from Cape Bushing over to Omoi point a few miles west of the Arawe landings. From there they would travel overland to join up with Major Komori. Yet that is it for the Arawe operation as we now need to travel over to Bougainville.

The last time we were speaking about Bougainville the raid against Koiari had been quite a blunder. Meanwhile the amtracs were busy cutting trails through the jungles and swamps to help the general advance. A small unit from the 21st marines occupied Hill 600 back on November 27th. Then on December 3rd an intense artillery duel began as the Japanese unleashed 150mm guns upon the forward slopes of Hill 600, forcing the Americans to pull back. On December 5th the general advance kicked off. Colonel Robert Williams paratroopers occupied a line stretching from the crest of Hill 1000 going across a series of ridges and ravines towards the junction of the East-West trail and the Torokina river. Now this line would begin to expand 3000 yards over a ridge named Hellzapoppin Ridge. The marines named it after the musical, because of its extremely difficult terrain. The 3rd marines captured Hill 500 with zero opposition. The American supplies lines had been extended as well, now there was a growing supply dump called Evansville established in the rear of Hill 600 to provide supply to the final defensive line.

December the 6th saw a severe earthquake hindering any advance. Commander of the 9th marines, Frazer West recalled “Being raised in Nevada I'd been through a lot of earthquakes so they were nothing new to me. We had one really severe earthquake on Bougainville. The big trees were just swaying around and we had built this fortification on this ridge, pillboxes, and such out of coconut logs and the roofs fell in on the pillboxes and some of the trenches caved in. The men got down and hugged to ground. It was impossible to stand up while it was going on. They were scared to death when these huge trees were breaking down around them. This went on it seemed for several minutes. The ground really rumbled and shook. It was the worst earthquake I'd ever been in.”

On December 7th Williams led a patrol east towards a 300 yard long spur being defended by the 23rd regiment in well dug positions. William twice attempted seizing the spur and was wounded alongside 7 of his men who had to retire back to the marine lines. On the 9th, three other patrols hit the spur again, but were likewise driven off. During the late afternoon of the 9th the Japanese launched a counterattack against the marine position on Hill 1000. The paratroopers with the support of some 105mm and 75mm howitzers managed to repel the attack which cost them 12 deaths and 26 wounded. The next day, General Geiger decided to relieve Williams with the 1st battalion, 21st marines and the 1st battalion, 9th marines. At first the Marines tried to neutralize the Japanese with artillery fire, but the reverse slopes on places like Hill 1000 made it difficult for the guns to hit their positions. On the 13th Geiger requested aerial bombardments and received 3 dive bombers and 3 torpedo bombers who hit the targets causing, but also on a marine position killing 2 men and wounded 5. The next day 17 torpedo bombers hit the ridge and the following day another 18 torpedo bombers landed some direct hits on the Japanese positions.

On the 18th, 11 torpedo bombers loaded with 100 lb bombs with delay fuses managed to pin the enemy down while 155mm howitzers cleared much of the dense vegetation covering the crest of their ridge. Immediately after the air strike, the Marines stormed the ridge from Hill 1000 in a double envelopment, finding little resistance by the dazed survivors. The artillery and aerial bombing had been so heavy, most of the Japanese company were forced to retreat, leaving 50 corpses over Hellzapoppin ridge. Hellzapoppin ridge cost the marines 12 dead and 23 wounded. Meanwhile on the 21st a patrol of the 21st marines encountered a few Japanese upon Hill 600A. One platoon ran into some heavy fire from the Japanese requiring Company I to perform a double envelopment, but they were likewise pinned down.

On the 23rd, Company K, reinforced with a heavy machine gun platoon attempted a direct assault against Hill600A, but they were driven back. The marines poured more artillery fire upon Hill600A and tossed more attacks, but still they were driven off and with heavy casualties. Then on the morning of the 24th, scouts discovered the Japanese were inexplicably abandoning the position and had begun slipping away during the night. Hill600A was to be the last offensive by the Marines on Bougainville, the army boys were soon to take over. Geiger relinquished command to General Griswolds 14th corps on the 15 and now the Americal Division would be advancing up to relieve the 3rd marine division. The Army boys would be taking control of an inland perimeter extending 23,000 yards. Over 50,000 troops would be working to expand that perimeter. Yet that is all for Bougainville as we will now be covering some events in India and Burma.

As a result of the August Quebec Conference codenamed Quadrant, the allies created the combined South East Asian Command. This new command would have Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as Supreme allied commander and General Joseph Stilwell as deputy supreme commander. They would hold overall strategic command of all air, sea and land operations for all the national contingents in the theater. Our old onion eating maniac friend Wingate had also returned from the Quebec Conference with the mission of expanding the strength of the Chindits. However Wingate refused to use Indian Army formations in his force, because he maintained that their training in long-range penetration would take longer and their maintenance by air would be difficult due to the varied dietary requirements of different Gurkha and Indian castes and religions. He couldn't get his way and was forced to accept the 111th brigade and two Gurkha battalions in the 77th brigade. Again this seems to be another point of evidence Wingate really did not like the Gurkha units.

So Wingate now had the 77th Indian brigade, led by Brigadier Mike Calvert and the 111th Indian brigade led by Brigadier Joe Lentaigne. To increase the number of Chindits the 14th, 16th and 23rd British brigades were added, breaking up the experienced 70th british division much to the misery of General Slim. The 3rd west africa brigade was also snatched up from the 81st west africa division. Through the Quebec conference, Wingate also managed to obtain a “private” air force for the Chindits, designated 1st air commando group, consisting mostly of American aircraft. The new Chindit force became officially known as the 3rd Indian division, though it would be referred to as a special force or Chindit or Long Range Penetration group. The new recruits were tossed into the rigorous training of crossing rivers, demolitions and some bivouacking at Gwalior. Calvert and Fergusson had both been promoted to brigadier and took command of two brigades. Both men were responsible for a lot of the training program and the development of tactical planning while Wingate was promoted to Major-General.

Inspired by Wingates onion force, the allied leaders during the Quebec conference decided to create an American deep penetration unit that would also harass the Japanese in Burma. On September 18th of 1943 a new American long range penetration force was announced to be created and it would be an all-volunteer unit. It received 960 jungle trained officers and men from the Caribbean defense command, 970 from the Army Ground Forces and 674 “battle tested” jungle troops from the South Pacific Command, those boys being veterans of Guadalcanal and the Solomons. General MacArthur handed over 274 Army combat experience volunteers from the Southwest Pacific command, veterans of New Guinea and Bougainville. These 3000 men were now the 5307th Composite Unit formed under the code named Galahad Project. The unit arrived to Bombay on October 31st where they were equipped and began training under the direction of Wingate at Deolali. Colonels Francis Brink and Charles Hunter trained the men from November to January of 1944. Then the 5307th moved to Deogarh where they received additional training in scouting, patrolling, stream crossing, weaponry, navigation, demolition, camouflaged, guerilla style warfare and the novel technique of airdrop supplying.

In the meantime, Stillwell was in China, so the command of the operation fell to Brigadier General Haydon Boatner who was the commanding General of the Ledo Sector and the Chief of staff for the Chinese Army in India. Stilwell had been planning an offensive codenamed Albacore while the Ledo Road was being constructed. To exercise his command, Stilwell had his small staff of American officer advisers each grab a Chinese division. They kept in touch via radio teams who spoke both American and Mandarin. However these American officers did not have real authority of command, they were merely acting through the use of persuasion. Operation Albacore was an offensive aimed at protecting the Ledo Base and securing the Shingbwiyang area. General Sun Li-Jen’s 38th division was given the task of capturing the line of Tarung Hka, then later to join with Lt General Liao Yaoxiangs 22nd division to hit the Jambu Bum ridge line. Afterwards they would proceed towards Myitkyina in December. Stilwell assumed the Japanese were not particularly strong north of Kamaing and would not be able to reinforce the Myitkyina-Paoshan area, but in fact the Japanese Burma Area Army had received a large amount of reinforcement in the area. Anxious to prevent any interference with their ongoing offensive, the Japanese Burma HQ had dispatched reinforcements all around the Burma permeer. In OCtober of 1943, the 56th division had eliminated a Chinese bridgehead over the Salween north of Teng-chung; in late September the 18th division set up positions in the Hukawng Valley; and some elements of the 56th division had taken up a position at Maingkwan.

On October 24th, General Sun Li-Jen had the 112th regiment advance forward to shield the Ledo road builders, while the 2nd battalion advanced to Sharaw Ga and Ningbyen. Defending Sharaw Ga was the 5th company, 56th regiment with one platoon securing Ningbyen. The 1st battalion attacked Shingbwiyang before advancing upon Yupbang Ga. The 2nd battalion, 56th regiment stationed at Maingkwan upon receiving word of the allied offensive began moving towards Yupbang Ga. The 3rd battalion advanced from Hkalak Ha towards Ngajatzup in the northern edge of the Taro Plain. Due to supply difficulties, the 3rd battalion were making little progress.

These Chinese forces were marching over portions of the trail that the defeated army and refugees had used in 1942 to flee Burma from the Japanese. The paths were a horrifying sight. Skeletons were found around every water hole. Groups of bones were found en masse. Dr. Gordon Seagrave, a Surgeon moving with troops, recalled seeing “hundreds and hundreds of skeletons”. The Chinese would encounter unexpected well-led and well entrenched resistance at all of their objectives. Defending Sharaw Ga was the 5th company, 56th regiment with one platoon securing Ningbyen. Two miles north of Sharaw Ga the Chinese ran into an outpost which they quickly dislodged. However when they attacked the village which lay between two hills, the Japanese fired down upon them from said hill causing 116 casualties. From november 1-3rd the Japanese inflicted 50 deaths upon the Chinese attackers receiving no casualties upon themselves. The 1st battalion had a similar experience at Yupang Ga. There they ran into a well entrenched and well led force who created roadblocks between Sharaw Ga and Ningbyen isolating them. Major Chen’s 3rd battalion while trying to clear the Taro Plain was so hampered by logistics, by November 1st he had only arrived toNgajatzup on the extreme north edge of the plain. When notified Stilwell commented “Sorry performance. Arrived about November 1. Sent one company forward. Pulled it back again. Thereafter did nothing. Maj. Ch'en cowered in dug-out. Terrific waste of ammunition. Told Sun to have him move or I would shoot or court-martial Maj. Ch'en. Sun sent [name illegible] to investigate. Ch'en killed by British grenade in his dug-out on December 27. (Report was during Japanese attack. There was none).” The Japanese resistance ground the offensive to a halt as the Chinese forces were forced to dig in. At Yupbang Ga in particular the Japanese had cut off the Chinese from the river crossing and began encirclement maneuvers. The CHinese relying on air supply were powerless to cut their way out.

In response to the Chinese offensive, Lieutenant-General Tanaka Shinichi shifted the main strength of his 18th division to the Shingbwiyang area hoping to assemble there by the 15th of December. As the Japanese presence grew in the areas so did the casualties upon the Chinese forces. The 112th regiment had one of its companies annihilated on the 2nd of november. Their regimental command post was overrun on the 3rd as their guards were digging in for the night. The regimental commander, Colonel Chen, and junior US liaison officer Major General Laughlin managed to escape, but chief liaison officer Lt Colonel Douglas Gilbert was captured by the enemy. A company of the 114th rushed to aid the situation, but were halted by the Japanese just before reaching Yupbang Ga. In late November the situation for the 112th began to improve when the 114th regiment reinforced them. However when they began attacking Yupbang Ga their artillery batteries were driven away by four Japanese machine gun positions. More attempts were made in december, but the Japanese were simply outperforming them.

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The landings at Arawe was yet again another successful allied amphibious operation, but most assuredly it would soon be met with the typical Japanese counter attack. The Bougainville operation was now under new management, and the situation in Burma was starting to heat up again.