Go offline with the Player FM app!
- 110 - Pacific War - Landing at Cape Gloucester , December 26, 1943 - January 2,1944
Manage episode 391718417 series 3001964
Last time we spoke about the aftermath of the Arawe landing and the drive towards Sio. The Komori detachment did everything they could to bottle up the new American beachhead at Arawe. Meanwhile after the fall of Wareo, the Australians decided it was time to drive towards Sio. General Katagiri had just got his men to Sio, but would have little time to prepare defenses as the Australians were quick on their heels. Likewise the Australians were also expanding past Dumpu, seeing multiple patrols fan out, probing for where the Japanese were massing their forces. In Tokyo, Hideki Tojo invited Japan’s allies for the east asian conference, reiterating Pan-Asia unity against the west. Yet for all the talk, in reality Japan sought to dominate its Asian allies, really as a means to an end. In Cairo the allies held a conference of their own, trying to keep Chiang Kai-Shek in the fold.
This episode is Landings at Cape Gloucester
Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
General Douglas MacArthur faced daunting challenges during the Pacific War. One of these challenges was in the shape of Rabaul, one of Japan’s strong points from which she exerted force in the region. To neutralize Rabaul, MacArthur sought to seize some airfields in Western New Britain, but to do this would also require securing control over the Vitiaz strait between New Britain and New Guinea. General HQ sought to use airfields at Cape Gloucester and on the south coast to help neutralize Rabaul. Thus Operation Dexterity was born. It was to be twin landings against originally Gasmata, but then for necessity changed to Arawe and Cape Gloucester. This was but a cog in the major plan within MacArthur’s mind to return to the Philippines, one could argue within a greater plan for the white house.
The landings at Arawe were largely successful and with that in hand General Krueger felt his Alamo Force could now launch operation backhander. The battle-hardened 1st Marine division was earmarked for the landings against Cape Gloucester. It was to be their first action after a prolonged period of rest and recuperation in South Australia following their heroic campaign on Guadalcanal. The 1st marines were now under the command of Major-General Rupertus. You probably could not ask for better men for the job, they were well refreshed physically, mentally and militarily. They had acquired an enormous amount of experience on Guadalcanal and with it a high degree of morale. The marines began training with the new types of landing crafts available to them, things they did not have during the Gaudalcanal days.
Meanwhile Krueger carried out a programme of reconnaissance based on aerial photography, mosaics, older maps and some amphibious patrolling. There were 3 Australian officers who played key roles aiding in the effort. The first was Major John V. Mather, AIF, a former labor contractor in the Solomons who had been attached to the 1st Division for the Guadalcanal operation. He remained an integral component of the D-2 Section, where his proficiency with Pidgin English and grasp of native psychology proved most useful. The second was Sub-Lieutenant Andrew Kirkwall-Smith, RANVR, one of the versatile islanders who could turn his hand to nearly anything, and who had been a coastwatcher in the Cape Gloucester region at the time the Japanese first moved in. The third man and the one most more familiar with the ground and inhabitants was the Reverend William G. Wiedeman, who had operated the Anglican Mission at Sag Sag for several years prior to the war and, like Kirkwall-Smith, he was a commissioned Navy lieutenant to give military status to his present activities.
A number of amphibious patrols was performed by the Alamo scouts. The first patrol was led by 1st Lieutenant John D. Bradbeer, who set out for New Britain's western coast by PT boat on September 24th. Around midnight, he cut the motors off on his PT boat around a mile off Grass Point, and his scouts paddled in from there in an inflated rubber boat, landing on a beach at the mouth of the second stream to the south at 0100 on the 25th. After hiding their craft with great care, they proceeded inland through dense secondary jungle growth up the western slopes of Mt. Tangi. There they found enemy defenses in the vicinity of Aisega. After this they turned northward heading through heavy foliage to the upper Gima River and there interrogated the inhabitants. The natives had been excluded from the airdrome area and the coast since the previous July, but they had some information to impart. There was a motor road connected Ongaia and the airdrome, and 12 to 14 Anti aircraft guns were emplaced between these two points; radio stations were located at Aisega, the airdrome, Sakar Island and Rooke Island; barge traffic was heavy on the Itni River and along the coast. Relations between the native population and the Japanese had deteriorated to a low level, although a few quislings still operated in the area. The natives related that the enemy expected an invasion of the Cape Gloucester region. Finally, they retraced their steps; and in the early morning hours of 6 October the Alamo Scouts climbed on board the waiting torpedo boat and returned to Goodenough Island to make their report.
The next significant patrol was carried out on the night of 14 October by Captain W. A. Money, AIF, two other Australians, a Marine sergeant and six natives went ashore about one mile south of Higgins Point on Rooke and remained there until the early hours of 26 October. Captain Money reported there were few Japanese on the island, which doubtlessly influenced the later decision to defer a landing there. Shortly before midnight on November 20th two PT boats throttled down to a halt just south of Dorf Point on New Britain's west coast. Eleven men aboard had the general mission of reconnoitering the beach for an offensive landing, but more specifically they were to study beach approaches, beach conditions and inland terrain between Potni and Sumeru. They were commanded by Major Mather. With plans carefully laid the men stealthily made their way ashore, but luck under such conditions could not always hold up, and the Japanese became aware of the patrol's presence almost as soon as it reached the beach. Thirty minutes after leaving the PT boats, they were back on board, but in that time they had obtained enough information to declare the beach unfavorable for a landing operation. The significant patrol occurred on the night of 21 December, and was done to study two beaches at Tauali. Once again Major Mather acted as overall commander. Splitting the patrol into two seven-man groups, Bradbeer took the first on a reconnaissance of "South Beach" while First Lieutenant Joseph A. Fournier of the 1st Marines took the other for a look at "North Beach." The patrol recommended the latter as the more favorable of the two for a landing. It was duly labeled Green Beach, and 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, made its D-Day amphibious operation there. Such amphibious patrolling helped Krueger figure out where not to land.
Meanwhile the 7th fleet had just come under the command of Admiral Kinkaid and was assigned the naval responsibility for the Gloucester landing. Admiral Barbey would have at his disposal 12 destroyers, taking the USS Conyngham as his flagship, 3 minesweepers, 10 APDs, 16 LCIs and 24 LSTs for the main landings; with another two destroyers 14 LCMs, 12 LCTs and two rocket DUKWs for the secondary landing on Beach Green at Tauali. Covering them would by Admiral Crutchley’s task force 74 consisting of 4 cruisers, 8 destroyers and two rocket LCI’s.
The 1st echelon carried by the APDs Stringham, Crosby, Kilty, Dent and Ward was the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines; and APDs Brooks, Gilmer, Sands, Humphreys and Noa would carry the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. The 2nd Echelon of six LCIs would carry the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines; and four LCIs for the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. The 3rd Echelon was seven LSTs, each carrying 500 troops of 1st Marines and 150 tons of supply, escorted by destroyers Drayton, Lamson, Mugford and Bagley. The 4th Echelon was seven LSTs, each carrying 480 troops of 1st and 7th Marines and 150 tons of supply The 5th Echelon was five LSTs, each carrying 240 troops of 12th Defense Battalion and 250 tons of supply. And the 6th Echelon was five LSTs, each carrying 250 Marine engineers and 250 tons of supply.
For air support, General Kenney assigned Brigadier-General Frederic Smith’s 1st Air Task Force (FATF). The FATF contained about ⅓ of all the squadrons in the allied air force. It had flown fighter and bomber missions for all ground operations excluding those in the Ramu valley. To support the coming offensive, between November 19th to December 13th, 1241 tons of bombs were dropped over Brogen Bay. For the next 11 days, daylight bombings were intensified with over 1207 bomber sorties being performed, dropping more than 2684 tons of bombs.Their favored point of attack was Target Hill because it was so easily discerned. Gun positions at the airstrip were also given attention, with eighty 2,000-lb. bombs being dropped on 17 December. A few direct hits were claimed on gun positions. Bunkers and supply dumps, protected from view by the lush jungle growth, were fairly safe from air attacks, but the lines of supply suffered heavily. Daylight runs were not all that was performed, simultaneously the allies introduced harassing night tactics as well, to keep the enemy under additional mental strain. You see the Japanese anti-aircraft teams and pilots tried to sleep at night, but the B-24’s would continuously drop bombs, grenades and even beer bottles over bivouac areas simply to keep them dazed.
On December 21st, a final rehearsal was carried out at Cape Sudest and 3 days later, Colonel Julian Frisbie’s 7th marines boarded Barbey’s vessels at Buna Harbor. On Christmas day at 6am the convoy was moving. At 4pm the convoy rendezvous with Colonel William Whaling’s 1st marines at Cape Cretin while the 2nd battalion reinforced with H battery of the 11th marines proceeded to Beach Green in their own smaller convoy.
However, as they made their way towards their objective, the main convoy was spotted by a Japanese reconnaissance plane. The convoy would arrive at its destination unmolested. Commander of the southeast area fleet, Admiral Jinichi Kusaka had incorrectly assessed the convoy was bound for Arawe bearing reinforcements and as a result ordered a heavy air strike against the Arawe area instead of Cape Gloucester. At 6am on the 26th Crutchley’s cruisers and destroyers began a naval bombardment followed up an hour later with Smith’s B-24’s, B-25’s and A-20’s. The 5th air force had tossed B-24’s from Dobadura who dropped their payloads all the way from Target Hill to Cape Gloucester. The B-25 medium bombers followed this dropping their heavier loads and the A-20’s focused on the landing areas making sure to strafe the beaches until the first wave would be just 500 yards away.
For the next hour and a half the landing craft launched towards the beaches. Two LCI’s outfitted with multiple rocket launchers led the first wave. A considerable amount of smoke screen was set over the area, hindering some of the landing craft from finding their marks. One group carrying elements of the 3rd battalion, 7th marines missed their beach altogether and hit the shore some 300 yards further west. The 3rd battalion led by Lt Colonel William Williams landed at Yellow at 7:46, with Lt Colonel John Weber’s 1st battalion doing the same at Yellow 2. The men charged down the lowered ramps of their LCVP’s seeing marines find unmanned trenches, abandoned guns and a handful of scared shipping engineers cowering in dugouts, too stunned by the naval and aerial bombardments to fight or flee.
The allies had achieved tactical surprise as Matsuda was not expecting an invasion to come to these beaches. Major-General Iwao Matsuda’s had deployed his 53rd regiment around the Tsurubu airdrome and Natamo Point. Storming forward, the 3rd battalion reached a region known as the “damp plat” which according to one Marine “was 'damp' up to your neck”. To the Japanese this was known as “swamp forest” and it held some of the most treacherous terrain, thus the Japanese did not expect the enemy to come by it. The forward momentum was beginning to peter out as men were wading through thick mud, with vines tearing at their bodies. A heavy congestion hit the beaches, greatly hamping the unloading process. As the men advanced, trees literally fell around them, rotten to the core from the bombing. The first marine casualty would actually be a result of a falling tree.
Meanwhile the 1st battalion advanced towards Target Hill and Silimati Point. Company B seized their key elevation points by noon. Behind these men came the first echelon of LSTs bearing the 2nd battalion led by Lt Colonel Odell Conoley. They beached their LCI’s and drove straight inland some 900 yards through mud and water all the way up to the center of the new beachhead perimeter on a patch of dry ground. At 2:30 after the LST’s were pulling out a force of 25 Vals and 63 Zeros emerged at low altitude who made a very fast bombing and strafe run against the beaches and shipping. The back and forth firing from the Japanese aircraft and allied forces was intense. A formation of FATF B-25s, coming in at treetop level, suddenly found themselves snarled up with the Japanese flight almost directly over the beach. In the excitement, two were shot down by friendly fire and two seriously damaged before the gunners aboard the LSTs could cool their trigger fingers. Possibly because they wanted to jettison their explosives, or possibly because they mistook their target, the B-25s then proceeded to bomb and strafe the Silimati point position occupied by 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, killing one officer and wounding 14 enlisted Marines. One correspondent had this to say "the most inexcusable small scale blunder of the war." The Japanese attacked Barbey’s vessels covering the retreat of the first echelon of LSTs tangling with allied CAP. The destroyer Brownson was sunk, destroyers Lamson, Shaw and Mugford were damaged and two LSTs were driven off. 13 vals and 4 zeros were destroyed, for the allies it was 4 fighters and 3 B-25’s. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion was still securing its right flank as Whaling’s 1st Marines supported by Sherman tanks were coming up behind on LCI’s. Their commander landed at 10:15 with the division command post in operation ashore within the hour as the 1st marines drove towards the airdrome.
Lt Colonel Joseph Hankins 3rd battalion ran into one of Colonel Sumiya’s roadblocks. It consisted of 4 fortified bunkers with machine guns and a system of rifle trenches manned by 1st, 2nd and 1st Machine-Gun Companies of the 53rd Regiment. The assault was quickly shattered. K company lost its commander and executive officer in a matter of minutes. Everything seemed to go wrong. Bazooka rockets did not explode in the soft earth covering the bunkers; flamethrowers malfunctioned and an LVT carrying ammunition got wedged between two trees. The Japanese defenders were so amped up seeing the chaos, they rushed out of their bunkers trying to swarm the trapped LVT. They managed to kill two men manning its machine guns, but the driver refused to lose his head and skillfully drove the vehicle right over the nearest bunker providing infantry to storm behind him with grenades. The daring LVT maneuver allowed the men to take the bunkers, stealing victory out of the chaos.
Behind them was Whaling’s 1st battalion led by Lt Colonel Walker Reaves who were bogged down in the damp flat. Whaling quickly changed his plan of advance as a result. He ordered his 3rd battalion to advance in a column along the narrow shelf of firm ground while the 1st battalion covered their left rear, speeding up the progress. Yet as the 3rd battalion moved out to expand their perimeter westwards, Sumiya’s men began infiltrating unoccupied gaps, forcing Colonel Julian Frisbie to recall his Marines and wait for reserves to pull up. By nightfall Frisbies Marines had secured the beachhead. The landing was so well scheduled that the big LSTs began dropping their ramps on the beaches 40 minutes after the first assault waves had landed. By 1pm, they had unloaded and cleared the area to make way for the second echelon. However, close encroachment of the "damp flat" greatly curtailed the area available for dump dispersal and necessitated some hurried improvising by the Shore Party. According to an officer of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion: “The true cause of the traffic congestion can be attributed directly to Army personnel who manned 150 odd 6x6 trucks with preloaded cargo. These drivers had been scraped up from an artillery regiment in New Guinea and supplied with salvaged trucks into which had been loaded practically all the supplies. The trucks theoretically were to discharge their cargo at the dumps, return to the LSTs they had debarked from and return to New Guinea for the second load. The plan failed in one respect, as there were no immediate dump areas to unload the trucks in due to the "Damp Flat." It was decided to leave the cargo in the trucks until dump areas were established. This caused consternation in the ranks of the Army drivers, who consequently abandoned their trucks in an effort to get back on the LSTs… This naturally left 150 trucks stranded on the beach exits for quite a time. Eventually the trucks were unloaded by Marines and proved to be a big aid to transportation starved organizations.”
Meanwhile Whalings battalions set up their own perimeter for the night with both flanks on the beach, a technique they repeated each evening until the airdrome was captured. Further to the west Lt Colonel James Masters 2nd battalion, 1st marines with H battery of the 11th marines codenamed STONEFACE group landed at Beach Green at 8:35. By 10am they had established a perimeter; E company held the left, G company the center and F company the right. The H battery unit was unable to emplace its 75mm pack howitzer satisfactorily on the rugged jungle terrain so they reorganized themselves into 3 platoons of infantry and took up a mobile reserve at the front line. Stoneface’s task was to cut off the coastal road. When Masters men looked around they found the beach completely unoccupied, numerous positions had been abandoned with their weapons. Masters figured the defenders must have fled to the hills during the bombardment, so he ordered patrols to fan out. The only contact made that day was a small group roughly 1000 yards north of the beachhead near the village of Sumeru seeing a small firefight. Yet unbeknownst to Masters, Sumiya had sent a provisional unit consisting of elements of the 3rd and 4th companies, 53rd regiment with the 3rd battalion ,23rd field artillery regiment to drive out the marines via a secondary road east of Mount Talawe. The force was led by 1st Lt Takeda, and was thus called the Takeda Provisional battalion
For Barbey the first day saw 13,000 troops and 7600 tons of materials landed on either side of the cape. However many men had landed in swamps so dense and deep that maneuvering out of such areas was quite difficult. General Matsuda was well aware of this and seized the opportunity. Matsuda ordered Colonel Katayama to leave token garrisons at Aisega, Nigol and Cape Bushing while he brought the bulk of his 141st regiment to Magairapua, this would take until December 30th to occur. Yet Matsuda had made one mistake, he thought he was facing just 2500 men. How the 65th brigade staff came to this conclusion is unknown. Perhaps it was became the smoke screen during the landings had made visual observation limited; perhaps the loss of Target Hill so fast also limited further observation of the enemy. The Marines had achieve tactical surprise by landing on undefended beaches, but other than that, they did not do all that much on the first day, perhaps the lack of activity also factored in Matsuda’s head. The only real fight of the day had been a brief affair at the roadblock where the invaders, instead of throwing infantry frontally against powerful bunkers in the glorious banzai manner, had awaited supporting weapons to knock out the position. Perhaps to Matsuda this spelled weakness or timidity, or both. Regardless, like most Japanese commanders Matsuda was obsessed by the then-current Japanese doctrine of "annihilate-at-the-water's-edge," so he ordered his own major assault unit hurled in an all-out attack against the center of the invaders' perimeter.
Thus instead of reinforcing Sumiyas forces at the airdrome, or withdrawing forces to more defensible areas like Borgen Bay, or even waiting for Katayam’s troops to arrive, Matsuda decided to make a daring attack directly at the center of the marine perimeter with only his 2nd battalion, 52rd regiment.
At 3am on December 27, the Japanese attacked the sector held by the 2nd battalion, 7th marines, during one of the worst monsoon storms the Americans had ever seen. Because of the storm, many of the Japanese failed to find gaps existing on each side of the battalions flanks. Thus instead the Japanese hurled themselves frontally against very well dug in positions. By 7am, the surviving Japanese finally began to pull out, Matsuda’s men suffered 200 deaths with over 100 wounded. The Marines suffered 8 deaths and 45 wounded, added together for the day the total loss for the Americans was 28 deaths and 68 wounded. After Matsuda’s terrible defeat, Whaling’s battalions resumed their drive towards the airdrome. While they advanced in columns along the road, patrols were sent into the jungle to hunt down the enemy, but they encountered no resistance. The 1st marines were able to dig in for the night after advancing 5000 yards.
To the east, Frisbie’s 2nd battalion had expanded their perimeter towards the bank of Suicide Creek where they would continue to face short and sharp attacks by Matsuda’s 2nd battalion. Despite the heavy punishment he was served, Matsuda continued to believe in the destroyer-at-the-water’s edge tactics. His men began constructing defensive positions, bunkers, trenches, rifle pits and so forth, so close to the American lines the Americans could hear them doing it. Meanwhile the engineers of the 17th marines performed their own work, widening the Japanese coastal road to allow the movement of supplies. Despite their valiant work, the volume of traffic was immense, coupled with the storm made the narrow coastal road a logistical nightmare.
The next morning the Marines expected to encounter some heavy resistance. The marine artillery crews increased their rate of fire and General Kenney’s aircraft bombed Colonel Sumiya’s strongpoints. With tank support, Whaling resumed his advance at 11am, with Company I finally hitting the first enemy positions about 12:15. They ran into a Japanese strong point consisting of a system of mutually supporting bunkers and rifle trenches, well armed with anti-tank guns and 75mm guns. The way forward was littered with land mines and barbed wire. The defenders enjoyed an added advantage in the heavy jungle lying a short distance inland which limited the tanks' field of maneuver to the comparatively narrow area directly to their front, facing the flank of the Japanese position which thus became, in effect, a defense in depth for the entire extent of its east-west length: approximately 300 yards.
At 12:00, I Company was fired upon with small arms from the front, followed by 75mm shells along the road area. 15 minutes later the leading elements led by Captain Carl Conron began attacking the fortifications alongside the tanks. They were facing the 2nd Company, 53rd Regiment and the 1st Machine Gun Company, 53rd Regiment and the strong point was quickly nicknamed Hell’s Point. Later it would be renamed Terzi Point in honor of Company K’s commanding officer who died on the landing day. Within the heavy rain, the tanks surged forward and smashed Sumiya’s bunkers, while A company dashed to the left, emerging from kunai grass just 500 yards from the bunkers. Enjoying excellent cover, the defenders’ fire successfully stopped the American advance, although the Marines themselves also easily broke up two Japanese frontal assaults and one attempt to turn their flank.
Ammunition began to run low, forcing A company to withdraw at around 3:45. Yet K Company closer to the beach held enormous firepower in the form of Sherman tanks that obliterated 12 bunkers rather quickly. In the words of Company K’s commander: “I was given three tanks (the other two were out of action, one with engine trouble and one with a jammed breech of its 75) to accomplish this mission. I put one squad of the Second Platoon behind each tank and deployed the Third Platoon to set up a skirmish line behind the tanks. We encountered twelve huge bunkers with a minimum of twenty Japs in each. The tanks would fire point blank into the bunkers, if the Japs stayed in the bunkers they were annihilated, if they escaped out the back entrance (actually the front as they were built to defend the beach) the infantry would swarm over the bunker and kill them with rifle fire and grenades. By the time we had knocked out twelve bunkers the Second Platoon . . . were out of ammunition and had been replaced by the Third Platoon and they too were out or down to a clip of ammunition per man. I called a halt and sent for the First Platoon. By the time the First Platoon arrived and ammunition was resupplied forty-five minutes had elapsed. We continued the attack and found two more bunkers but the enemy had in the meantime escaped.” The immense power of the tanks forced the defenders to retreat.
During this action the 1st marines suffered 17 deaths and 52 wounded and claimed to have counted 300 Japanese corpses. The capture of Hell’s Point enabled the Americans to establish a position at Blue Beach to reduce the distance for supplies. General Rupertus command post was also moved there by Deemer 28th. The next day the American advance was delayed until the arrival of Colonel John Seldens 5th marines. General Rupertus feared he might be outnumbered at the airdrome so he played it safe. During the fighting at Hell's Point, a curious misadventure befell Corporal Shigeto Kashida of the 1st Machine Gun Company. The trench in which he was defending suddenly caved in, burying him helpless up to the neck. An astonished Marine, observing Shigeto's apparently disembodied head blinking at him, paused to debate whether to shoot or shovel, which dilemma was resolved by the arrival of an intelligence officer who ordered the corporal disinterred and made prisoner. Shigeto painted a depressing picture of his battalion's situation, but he mentioned the original plan for the 2nd Battalion was to reinforce the 1st, something that might still be accomplished; he also mentioned the presence somewhere in the vicinity of the 141st and 142d Regiments, possibly within striking distance. Since Colonel Sumiya had conducted withdrawals following every action to date, it could be presumed that a good part of his force remained intact. Thus Rupertus was right in his belief the Japanese may have large numbers at the airdrome.
The 1st Battalion under Major William H. Barba and the 2nd Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis W. Walt got aboard 9 APD’s at Cape Sudest and arrived off Cape Gloucester during the morning. However during the transit, there was a large storm that caused some confusion, leading some elements to land at Yellow 2 and others at Beach Blue. General Rupertus planned for the 1st Marines to continue their advance along the coastal road while the 5th Marines would perform a wide sweep on the left flank to attack airstrip No.2. At 3pm following the artillery and aerial bombardment, the Marines launched a fierce offensive. The 2nd battalion, 5th marines attacked simultaneously with the 1st Marines along the coast road and both ground immediately inland. Major William H. Barba's 1st Battalion was just struggling out of the swamp and jungle near the line of departure. The unexpected terrain difficulties, however, kept the plan from being carried out. Both battalions sent out patrols in an effort to establish contact, but a combination of darkness and unfamiliar territory prevented positive results.
Supported by tanks, artillery, mortars and rocket launchers, Whaling’s 1st Battalion successfully reached the eastern end of Strip No. 2 at 5:55 and immediately commenced setting up a defensive perimeter. The 3rd battalion followed behind and extended the perimeter to the left, with Selden’s 2nd battalion arriving at 7:25pm extending the perimeter around airstrip No 1 towards the beach. It seemed Colonel Sumiya realized the futility of attempting a defense upon the open ground against American armor, so he pulled his units away towards Razorback Hill from which they could launch harassment maneuvers against the new American perimeter. The Japanese had begun firing artillery and mortars into the airdrome. The Marines, somewhat astonished by such goings-on, called for mortar and artillery support of their own. They reported that, according to their best estimates, the enemy had reoccupied the defenses in at least full company strength.
The marines were formulating a plan to deal with the menace and the Japanese took advantage of the lull time to launch a banzai charge that failed to gain any ground. The Japanese continued their harassment, until the Marines received some tank support to launch an offensive. Platoons from different units got together to perform a sweeping maneuver, advancing 300 yards from the defensive line. They ran into bunkers, foxholes and trenches manned by Japanese. The marines mopped them up with grenades and automatic weapons, then at 11:30 suddenly all the fighting ceased. No more enemy seemed to remain near the front. The marines had suffered 13 deaths and 19 wounded, but counted 150 dead Japanese. With more tanks on hand, the Marines gradually pushed the Japanese to flee back towards Razorback Hill.
Meanwhile, because of the repeated attacks, Colonel Masters men had been patrolling, trying to pinpoint where the Japanese were concentrated. At 1:55am on December 30th, the 3rd and 4th companies of the 54th regiment had discovered an excellent approach towards the Marine perimeter. As was always the favored Japanese strategy, to concentrate force against a narrow sector, they chose to attack at this place called Coffin Corner, a natural causeway connected to ridges. The two companies attacked under the cover of a storm. The Japanese unleashed mortars and machine gun fire and quickly overran a machine gun position, but G company launched a counter attack pushing them back. The battle raged for nearly 5 hours, but by 7am it ceased. The marines had 6 deaths, 17 wounded and would count 89 Japanese dead with another 5 captured. Yet that concludes the action in Cape Gloucester for today, for now we need to jump back to New Guinea.
Back on December 8th, General Nakai commenced an offensive against Kesawai, dispatching the Saito Volunteer unit for the task. The unit had the aid of native guides who gave them detailed information on the terrain, allowing the Japanese to infiltrate behind a forward Papuan platoon led by Lt C.E Bishop. They explode all of their booby-traps, allowing the 1st battalion, 78th regiment to advance behind them into Kesawai 2 without much difficult, annihilating the Papuan platoon and securing the eastern portion of the highland. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion crossed the Boku River and captured Koropa, cutting off the commandos at Isaria; the 2nd battalion, 239th regiment crossed the Boku river and assaulted the commando position at Ketoba, but the Australians resisted until nightfall before withdrawing towards Isariba. Nakai’s enveloping maneuver was a success, forcing the commandos and Papuans to withdraw towards the Evapia River.
On December 9th, Brigadier Eather ordered A and C companies of the 2/25th battalion to advance forward as the commands pulled back towards the Mene River. Meanwhile at 7:15am at Isariba, the Japanese had begun a series of attacks. The attacks were repelled with vicker guns, grenades and a quick air strike from 20 Kittyhawks and Boomerangs that bombed and strafed the attackers. The 2/25th companies arrived at Evapia and one of their patrols managed to ambush several Japanese parties over the next few days. On December 12th, Nakai arrived at Kesawai where he ordered his 1st and 3rd battalions, 78th regiment to attack the 2/25th positions by nightfall. C Company's machine gun fire managed to halt the enemy assault from the north, but another came from the south. A Company found itself surrounded as the Japanese managed to get between the two Australian companies, firing their Woodpeckers from multiple directions. It was a 5 hour battle until the Australians repelled the enemy who gradually pulled back west.
At 5am on the 13th, the Australians were running low on ammunition and were forced to withdraw. The 2/25th advanced through think jungle and deep swamps, by 8am they had managed to get to safety after suffering 5 deaths and 14 wounded but killing an estimated 67 Japanese. The companies withdrew east of the Evapia River, rejoining the rest of their battalion. Nakai expected his enemy was attempting an offensive against Madang and ordered his men to return to their former defensive positions, leaving token garrisons at Koropa and Kesawai. Because of the heated attacked, General Vasey worried it was preliminary to something much bigger, so he ordered the 2/16th battalion to perform punitive attack along Shaggy Ridge and Eather’s 2/33rd battalion would retake Kesawai.
The 2/33rd Battalion advanced under the cover of darkness to the 5800 Feature to attack any Japanese there, and to move the Papuans across the Evapia to establish a patrol base for the Koben-Koropa-Solu River area . With three of his companies Colonel Cotton of the 2/33rd moved off an hour and a half after midnight on the 18th-19th December towards the summit of the 5800 Feature arriving just before dawn . At 2.10 p.m. a section made contact with the enemy about 700 yards south of the highest pinnacle on 5800. The patrol withdrew while the artillery fired 120 rounds. By 5 p.m. the enemy had had enough and withdrew enabling one company to occupy the pinnacle . Next day the battalion patrolled the whole area and found evidence of Japanese occupation and a hasty withdrawal.
I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.
The allies finally unleashed operation backhander, the amphibious assault of Cape Gloucester. The 1st Marines had a long rest after Guadalcanal and would now be the spearhead to reconquer New Britain. However the Japanese were not going to just roll over easily.
151 episodes
Manage episode 391718417 series 3001964
Last time we spoke about the aftermath of the Arawe landing and the drive towards Sio. The Komori detachment did everything they could to bottle up the new American beachhead at Arawe. Meanwhile after the fall of Wareo, the Australians decided it was time to drive towards Sio. General Katagiri had just got his men to Sio, but would have little time to prepare defenses as the Australians were quick on their heels. Likewise the Australians were also expanding past Dumpu, seeing multiple patrols fan out, probing for where the Japanese were massing their forces. In Tokyo, Hideki Tojo invited Japan’s allies for the east asian conference, reiterating Pan-Asia unity against the west. Yet for all the talk, in reality Japan sought to dominate its Asian allies, really as a means to an end. In Cairo the allies held a conference of their own, trying to keep Chiang Kai-Shek in the fold.
This episode is Landings at Cape Gloucester
Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
General Douglas MacArthur faced daunting challenges during the Pacific War. One of these challenges was in the shape of Rabaul, one of Japan’s strong points from which she exerted force in the region. To neutralize Rabaul, MacArthur sought to seize some airfields in Western New Britain, but to do this would also require securing control over the Vitiaz strait between New Britain and New Guinea. General HQ sought to use airfields at Cape Gloucester and on the south coast to help neutralize Rabaul. Thus Operation Dexterity was born. It was to be twin landings against originally Gasmata, but then for necessity changed to Arawe and Cape Gloucester. This was but a cog in the major plan within MacArthur’s mind to return to the Philippines, one could argue within a greater plan for the white house.
The landings at Arawe were largely successful and with that in hand General Krueger felt his Alamo Force could now launch operation backhander. The battle-hardened 1st Marine division was earmarked for the landings against Cape Gloucester. It was to be their first action after a prolonged period of rest and recuperation in South Australia following their heroic campaign on Guadalcanal. The 1st marines were now under the command of Major-General Rupertus. You probably could not ask for better men for the job, they were well refreshed physically, mentally and militarily. They had acquired an enormous amount of experience on Guadalcanal and with it a high degree of morale. The marines began training with the new types of landing crafts available to them, things they did not have during the Gaudalcanal days.
Meanwhile Krueger carried out a programme of reconnaissance based on aerial photography, mosaics, older maps and some amphibious patrolling. There were 3 Australian officers who played key roles aiding in the effort. The first was Major John V. Mather, AIF, a former labor contractor in the Solomons who had been attached to the 1st Division for the Guadalcanal operation. He remained an integral component of the D-2 Section, where his proficiency with Pidgin English and grasp of native psychology proved most useful. The second was Sub-Lieutenant Andrew Kirkwall-Smith, RANVR, one of the versatile islanders who could turn his hand to nearly anything, and who had been a coastwatcher in the Cape Gloucester region at the time the Japanese first moved in. The third man and the one most more familiar with the ground and inhabitants was the Reverend William G. Wiedeman, who had operated the Anglican Mission at Sag Sag for several years prior to the war and, like Kirkwall-Smith, he was a commissioned Navy lieutenant to give military status to his present activities.
A number of amphibious patrols was performed by the Alamo scouts. The first patrol was led by 1st Lieutenant John D. Bradbeer, who set out for New Britain's western coast by PT boat on September 24th. Around midnight, he cut the motors off on his PT boat around a mile off Grass Point, and his scouts paddled in from there in an inflated rubber boat, landing on a beach at the mouth of the second stream to the south at 0100 on the 25th. After hiding their craft with great care, they proceeded inland through dense secondary jungle growth up the western slopes of Mt. Tangi. There they found enemy defenses in the vicinity of Aisega. After this they turned northward heading through heavy foliage to the upper Gima River and there interrogated the inhabitants. The natives had been excluded from the airdrome area and the coast since the previous July, but they had some information to impart. There was a motor road connected Ongaia and the airdrome, and 12 to 14 Anti aircraft guns were emplaced between these two points; radio stations were located at Aisega, the airdrome, Sakar Island and Rooke Island; barge traffic was heavy on the Itni River and along the coast. Relations between the native population and the Japanese had deteriorated to a low level, although a few quislings still operated in the area. The natives related that the enemy expected an invasion of the Cape Gloucester region. Finally, they retraced their steps; and in the early morning hours of 6 October the Alamo Scouts climbed on board the waiting torpedo boat and returned to Goodenough Island to make their report.
The next significant patrol was carried out on the night of 14 October by Captain W. A. Money, AIF, two other Australians, a Marine sergeant and six natives went ashore about one mile south of Higgins Point on Rooke and remained there until the early hours of 26 October. Captain Money reported there were few Japanese on the island, which doubtlessly influenced the later decision to defer a landing there. Shortly before midnight on November 20th two PT boats throttled down to a halt just south of Dorf Point on New Britain's west coast. Eleven men aboard had the general mission of reconnoitering the beach for an offensive landing, but more specifically they were to study beach approaches, beach conditions and inland terrain between Potni and Sumeru. They were commanded by Major Mather. With plans carefully laid the men stealthily made their way ashore, but luck under such conditions could not always hold up, and the Japanese became aware of the patrol's presence almost as soon as it reached the beach. Thirty minutes after leaving the PT boats, they were back on board, but in that time they had obtained enough information to declare the beach unfavorable for a landing operation. The significant patrol occurred on the night of 21 December, and was done to study two beaches at Tauali. Once again Major Mather acted as overall commander. Splitting the patrol into two seven-man groups, Bradbeer took the first on a reconnaissance of "South Beach" while First Lieutenant Joseph A. Fournier of the 1st Marines took the other for a look at "North Beach." The patrol recommended the latter as the more favorable of the two for a landing. It was duly labeled Green Beach, and 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, made its D-Day amphibious operation there. Such amphibious patrolling helped Krueger figure out where not to land.
Meanwhile the 7th fleet had just come under the command of Admiral Kinkaid and was assigned the naval responsibility for the Gloucester landing. Admiral Barbey would have at his disposal 12 destroyers, taking the USS Conyngham as his flagship, 3 minesweepers, 10 APDs, 16 LCIs and 24 LSTs for the main landings; with another two destroyers 14 LCMs, 12 LCTs and two rocket DUKWs for the secondary landing on Beach Green at Tauali. Covering them would by Admiral Crutchley’s task force 74 consisting of 4 cruisers, 8 destroyers and two rocket LCI’s.
The 1st echelon carried by the APDs Stringham, Crosby, Kilty, Dent and Ward was the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines; and APDs Brooks, Gilmer, Sands, Humphreys and Noa would carry the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. The 2nd Echelon of six LCIs would carry the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines; and four LCIs for the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. The 3rd Echelon was seven LSTs, each carrying 500 troops of 1st Marines and 150 tons of supply, escorted by destroyers Drayton, Lamson, Mugford and Bagley. The 4th Echelon was seven LSTs, each carrying 480 troops of 1st and 7th Marines and 150 tons of supply The 5th Echelon was five LSTs, each carrying 240 troops of 12th Defense Battalion and 250 tons of supply. And the 6th Echelon was five LSTs, each carrying 250 Marine engineers and 250 tons of supply.
For air support, General Kenney assigned Brigadier-General Frederic Smith’s 1st Air Task Force (FATF). The FATF contained about ⅓ of all the squadrons in the allied air force. It had flown fighter and bomber missions for all ground operations excluding those in the Ramu valley. To support the coming offensive, between November 19th to December 13th, 1241 tons of bombs were dropped over Brogen Bay. For the next 11 days, daylight bombings were intensified with over 1207 bomber sorties being performed, dropping more than 2684 tons of bombs.Their favored point of attack was Target Hill because it was so easily discerned. Gun positions at the airstrip were also given attention, with eighty 2,000-lb. bombs being dropped on 17 December. A few direct hits were claimed on gun positions. Bunkers and supply dumps, protected from view by the lush jungle growth, were fairly safe from air attacks, but the lines of supply suffered heavily. Daylight runs were not all that was performed, simultaneously the allies introduced harassing night tactics as well, to keep the enemy under additional mental strain. You see the Japanese anti-aircraft teams and pilots tried to sleep at night, but the B-24’s would continuously drop bombs, grenades and even beer bottles over bivouac areas simply to keep them dazed.
On December 21st, a final rehearsal was carried out at Cape Sudest and 3 days later, Colonel Julian Frisbie’s 7th marines boarded Barbey’s vessels at Buna Harbor. On Christmas day at 6am the convoy was moving. At 4pm the convoy rendezvous with Colonel William Whaling’s 1st marines at Cape Cretin while the 2nd battalion reinforced with H battery of the 11th marines proceeded to Beach Green in their own smaller convoy.
However, as they made their way towards their objective, the main convoy was spotted by a Japanese reconnaissance plane. The convoy would arrive at its destination unmolested. Commander of the southeast area fleet, Admiral Jinichi Kusaka had incorrectly assessed the convoy was bound for Arawe bearing reinforcements and as a result ordered a heavy air strike against the Arawe area instead of Cape Gloucester. At 6am on the 26th Crutchley’s cruisers and destroyers began a naval bombardment followed up an hour later with Smith’s B-24’s, B-25’s and A-20’s. The 5th air force had tossed B-24’s from Dobadura who dropped their payloads all the way from Target Hill to Cape Gloucester. The B-25 medium bombers followed this dropping their heavier loads and the A-20’s focused on the landing areas making sure to strafe the beaches until the first wave would be just 500 yards away.
For the next hour and a half the landing craft launched towards the beaches. Two LCI’s outfitted with multiple rocket launchers led the first wave. A considerable amount of smoke screen was set over the area, hindering some of the landing craft from finding their marks. One group carrying elements of the 3rd battalion, 7th marines missed their beach altogether and hit the shore some 300 yards further west. The 3rd battalion led by Lt Colonel William Williams landed at Yellow at 7:46, with Lt Colonel John Weber’s 1st battalion doing the same at Yellow 2. The men charged down the lowered ramps of their LCVP’s seeing marines find unmanned trenches, abandoned guns and a handful of scared shipping engineers cowering in dugouts, too stunned by the naval and aerial bombardments to fight or flee.
The allies had achieved tactical surprise as Matsuda was not expecting an invasion to come to these beaches. Major-General Iwao Matsuda’s had deployed his 53rd regiment around the Tsurubu airdrome and Natamo Point. Storming forward, the 3rd battalion reached a region known as the “damp plat” which according to one Marine “was 'damp' up to your neck”. To the Japanese this was known as “swamp forest” and it held some of the most treacherous terrain, thus the Japanese did not expect the enemy to come by it. The forward momentum was beginning to peter out as men were wading through thick mud, with vines tearing at their bodies. A heavy congestion hit the beaches, greatly hamping the unloading process. As the men advanced, trees literally fell around them, rotten to the core from the bombing. The first marine casualty would actually be a result of a falling tree.
Meanwhile the 1st battalion advanced towards Target Hill and Silimati Point. Company B seized their key elevation points by noon. Behind these men came the first echelon of LSTs bearing the 2nd battalion led by Lt Colonel Odell Conoley. They beached their LCI’s and drove straight inland some 900 yards through mud and water all the way up to the center of the new beachhead perimeter on a patch of dry ground. At 2:30 after the LST’s were pulling out a force of 25 Vals and 63 Zeros emerged at low altitude who made a very fast bombing and strafe run against the beaches and shipping. The back and forth firing from the Japanese aircraft and allied forces was intense. A formation of FATF B-25s, coming in at treetop level, suddenly found themselves snarled up with the Japanese flight almost directly over the beach. In the excitement, two were shot down by friendly fire and two seriously damaged before the gunners aboard the LSTs could cool their trigger fingers. Possibly because they wanted to jettison their explosives, or possibly because they mistook their target, the B-25s then proceeded to bomb and strafe the Silimati point position occupied by 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, killing one officer and wounding 14 enlisted Marines. One correspondent had this to say "the most inexcusable small scale blunder of the war." The Japanese attacked Barbey’s vessels covering the retreat of the first echelon of LSTs tangling with allied CAP. The destroyer Brownson was sunk, destroyers Lamson, Shaw and Mugford were damaged and two LSTs were driven off. 13 vals and 4 zeros were destroyed, for the allies it was 4 fighters and 3 B-25’s. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion was still securing its right flank as Whaling’s 1st Marines supported by Sherman tanks were coming up behind on LCI’s. Their commander landed at 10:15 with the division command post in operation ashore within the hour as the 1st marines drove towards the airdrome.
Lt Colonel Joseph Hankins 3rd battalion ran into one of Colonel Sumiya’s roadblocks. It consisted of 4 fortified bunkers with machine guns and a system of rifle trenches manned by 1st, 2nd and 1st Machine-Gun Companies of the 53rd Regiment. The assault was quickly shattered. K company lost its commander and executive officer in a matter of minutes. Everything seemed to go wrong. Bazooka rockets did not explode in the soft earth covering the bunkers; flamethrowers malfunctioned and an LVT carrying ammunition got wedged between two trees. The Japanese defenders were so amped up seeing the chaos, they rushed out of their bunkers trying to swarm the trapped LVT. They managed to kill two men manning its machine guns, but the driver refused to lose his head and skillfully drove the vehicle right over the nearest bunker providing infantry to storm behind him with grenades. The daring LVT maneuver allowed the men to take the bunkers, stealing victory out of the chaos.
Behind them was Whaling’s 1st battalion led by Lt Colonel Walker Reaves who were bogged down in the damp flat. Whaling quickly changed his plan of advance as a result. He ordered his 3rd battalion to advance in a column along the narrow shelf of firm ground while the 1st battalion covered their left rear, speeding up the progress. Yet as the 3rd battalion moved out to expand their perimeter westwards, Sumiya’s men began infiltrating unoccupied gaps, forcing Colonel Julian Frisbie to recall his Marines and wait for reserves to pull up. By nightfall Frisbies Marines had secured the beachhead. The landing was so well scheduled that the big LSTs began dropping their ramps on the beaches 40 minutes after the first assault waves had landed. By 1pm, they had unloaded and cleared the area to make way for the second echelon. However, close encroachment of the "damp flat" greatly curtailed the area available for dump dispersal and necessitated some hurried improvising by the Shore Party. According to an officer of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion: “The true cause of the traffic congestion can be attributed directly to Army personnel who manned 150 odd 6x6 trucks with preloaded cargo. These drivers had been scraped up from an artillery regiment in New Guinea and supplied with salvaged trucks into which had been loaded practically all the supplies. The trucks theoretically were to discharge their cargo at the dumps, return to the LSTs they had debarked from and return to New Guinea for the second load. The plan failed in one respect, as there were no immediate dump areas to unload the trucks in due to the "Damp Flat." It was decided to leave the cargo in the trucks until dump areas were established. This caused consternation in the ranks of the Army drivers, who consequently abandoned their trucks in an effort to get back on the LSTs… This naturally left 150 trucks stranded on the beach exits for quite a time. Eventually the trucks were unloaded by Marines and proved to be a big aid to transportation starved organizations.”
Meanwhile Whalings battalions set up their own perimeter for the night with both flanks on the beach, a technique they repeated each evening until the airdrome was captured. Further to the west Lt Colonel James Masters 2nd battalion, 1st marines with H battery of the 11th marines codenamed STONEFACE group landed at Beach Green at 8:35. By 10am they had established a perimeter; E company held the left, G company the center and F company the right. The H battery unit was unable to emplace its 75mm pack howitzer satisfactorily on the rugged jungle terrain so they reorganized themselves into 3 platoons of infantry and took up a mobile reserve at the front line. Stoneface’s task was to cut off the coastal road. When Masters men looked around they found the beach completely unoccupied, numerous positions had been abandoned with their weapons. Masters figured the defenders must have fled to the hills during the bombardment, so he ordered patrols to fan out. The only contact made that day was a small group roughly 1000 yards north of the beachhead near the village of Sumeru seeing a small firefight. Yet unbeknownst to Masters, Sumiya had sent a provisional unit consisting of elements of the 3rd and 4th companies, 53rd regiment with the 3rd battalion ,23rd field artillery regiment to drive out the marines via a secondary road east of Mount Talawe. The force was led by 1st Lt Takeda, and was thus called the Takeda Provisional battalion
For Barbey the first day saw 13,000 troops and 7600 tons of materials landed on either side of the cape. However many men had landed in swamps so dense and deep that maneuvering out of such areas was quite difficult. General Matsuda was well aware of this and seized the opportunity. Matsuda ordered Colonel Katayama to leave token garrisons at Aisega, Nigol and Cape Bushing while he brought the bulk of his 141st regiment to Magairapua, this would take until December 30th to occur. Yet Matsuda had made one mistake, he thought he was facing just 2500 men. How the 65th brigade staff came to this conclusion is unknown. Perhaps it was became the smoke screen during the landings had made visual observation limited; perhaps the loss of Target Hill so fast also limited further observation of the enemy. The Marines had achieve tactical surprise by landing on undefended beaches, but other than that, they did not do all that much on the first day, perhaps the lack of activity also factored in Matsuda’s head. The only real fight of the day had been a brief affair at the roadblock where the invaders, instead of throwing infantry frontally against powerful bunkers in the glorious banzai manner, had awaited supporting weapons to knock out the position. Perhaps to Matsuda this spelled weakness or timidity, or both. Regardless, like most Japanese commanders Matsuda was obsessed by the then-current Japanese doctrine of "annihilate-at-the-water's-edge," so he ordered his own major assault unit hurled in an all-out attack against the center of the invaders' perimeter.
Thus instead of reinforcing Sumiyas forces at the airdrome, or withdrawing forces to more defensible areas like Borgen Bay, or even waiting for Katayam’s troops to arrive, Matsuda decided to make a daring attack directly at the center of the marine perimeter with only his 2nd battalion, 52rd regiment.
At 3am on December 27, the Japanese attacked the sector held by the 2nd battalion, 7th marines, during one of the worst monsoon storms the Americans had ever seen. Because of the storm, many of the Japanese failed to find gaps existing on each side of the battalions flanks. Thus instead the Japanese hurled themselves frontally against very well dug in positions. By 7am, the surviving Japanese finally began to pull out, Matsuda’s men suffered 200 deaths with over 100 wounded. The Marines suffered 8 deaths and 45 wounded, added together for the day the total loss for the Americans was 28 deaths and 68 wounded. After Matsuda’s terrible defeat, Whaling’s battalions resumed their drive towards the airdrome. While they advanced in columns along the road, patrols were sent into the jungle to hunt down the enemy, but they encountered no resistance. The 1st marines were able to dig in for the night after advancing 5000 yards.
To the east, Frisbie’s 2nd battalion had expanded their perimeter towards the bank of Suicide Creek where they would continue to face short and sharp attacks by Matsuda’s 2nd battalion. Despite the heavy punishment he was served, Matsuda continued to believe in the destroyer-at-the-water’s edge tactics. His men began constructing defensive positions, bunkers, trenches, rifle pits and so forth, so close to the American lines the Americans could hear them doing it. Meanwhile the engineers of the 17th marines performed their own work, widening the Japanese coastal road to allow the movement of supplies. Despite their valiant work, the volume of traffic was immense, coupled with the storm made the narrow coastal road a logistical nightmare.
The next morning the Marines expected to encounter some heavy resistance. The marine artillery crews increased their rate of fire and General Kenney’s aircraft bombed Colonel Sumiya’s strongpoints. With tank support, Whaling resumed his advance at 11am, with Company I finally hitting the first enemy positions about 12:15. They ran into a Japanese strong point consisting of a system of mutually supporting bunkers and rifle trenches, well armed with anti-tank guns and 75mm guns. The way forward was littered with land mines and barbed wire. The defenders enjoyed an added advantage in the heavy jungle lying a short distance inland which limited the tanks' field of maneuver to the comparatively narrow area directly to their front, facing the flank of the Japanese position which thus became, in effect, a defense in depth for the entire extent of its east-west length: approximately 300 yards.
At 12:00, I Company was fired upon with small arms from the front, followed by 75mm shells along the road area. 15 minutes later the leading elements led by Captain Carl Conron began attacking the fortifications alongside the tanks. They were facing the 2nd Company, 53rd Regiment and the 1st Machine Gun Company, 53rd Regiment and the strong point was quickly nicknamed Hell’s Point. Later it would be renamed Terzi Point in honor of Company K’s commanding officer who died on the landing day. Within the heavy rain, the tanks surged forward and smashed Sumiya’s bunkers, while A company dashed to the left, emerging from kunai grass just 500 yards from the bunkers. Enjoying excellent cover, the defenders’ fire successfully stopped the American advance, although the Marines themselves also easily broke up two Japanese frontal assaults and one attempt to turn their flank.
Ammunition began to run low, forcing A company to withdraw at around 3:45. Yet K Company closer to the beach held enormous firepower in the form of Sherman tanks that obliterated 12 bunkers rather quickly. In the words of Company K’s commander: “I was given three tanks (the other two were out of action, one with engine trouble and one with a jammed breech of its 75) to accomplish this mission. I put one squad of the Second Platoon behind each tank and deployed the Third Platoon to set up a skirmish line behind the tanks. We encountered twelve huge bunkers with a minimum of twenty Japs in each. The tanks would fire point blank into the bunkers, if the Japs stayed in the bunkers they were annihilated, if they escaped out the back entrance (actually the front as they were built to defend the beach) the infantry would swarm over the bunker and kill them with rifle fire and grenades. By the time we had knocked out twelve bunkers the Second Platoon . . . were out of ammunition and had been replaced by the Third Platoon and they too were out or down to a clip of ammunition per man. I called a halt and sent for the First Platoon. By the time the First Platoon arrived and ammunition was resupplied forty-five minutes had elapsed. We continued the attack and found two more bunkers but the enemy had in the meantime escaped.” The immense power of the tanks forced the defenders to retreat.
During this action the 1st marines suffered 17 deaths and 52 wounded and claimed to have counted 300 Japanese corpses. The capture of Hell’s Point enabled the Americans to establish a position at Blue Beach to reduce the distance for supplies. General Rupertus command post was also moved there by Deemer 28th. The next day the American advance was delayed until the arrival of Colonel John Seldens 5th marines. General Rupertus feared he might be outnumbered at the airdrome so he played it safe. During the fighting at Hell's Point, a curious misadventure befell Corporal Shigeto Kashida of the 1st Machine Gun Company. The trench in which he was defending suddenly caved in, burying him helpless up to the neck. An astonished Marine, observing Shigeto's apparently disembodied head blinking at him, paused to debate whether to shoot or shovel, which dilemma was resolved by the arrival of an intelligence officer who ordered the corporal disinterred and made prisoner. Shigeto painted a depressing picture of his battalion's situation, but he mentioned the original plan for the 2nd Battalion was to reinforce the 1st, something that might still be accomplished; he also mentioned the presence somewhere in the vicinity of the 141st and 142d Regiments, possibly within striking distance. Since Colonel Sumiya had conducted withdrawals following every action to date, it could be presumed that a good part of his force remained intact. Thus Rupertus was right in his belief the Japanese may have large numbers at the airdrome.
The 1st Battalion under Major William H. Barba and the 2nd Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis W. Walt got aboard 9 APD’s at Cape Sudest and arrived off Cape Gloucester during the morning. However during the transit, there was a large storm that caused some confusion, leading some elements to land at Yellow 2 and others at Beach Blue. General Rupertus planned for the 1st Marines to continue their advance along the coastal road while the 5th Marines would perform a wide sweep on the left flank to attack airstrip No.2. At 3pm following the artillery and aerial bombardment, the Marines launched a fierce offensive. The 2nd battalion, 5th marines attacked simultaneously with the 1st Marines along the coast road and both ground immediately inland. Major William H. Barba's 1st Battalion was just struggling out of the swamp and jungle near the line of departure. The unexpected terrain difficulties, however, kept the plan from being carried out. Both battalions sent out patrols in an effort to establish contact, but a combination of darkness and unfamiliar territory prevented positive results.
Supported by tanks, artillery, mortars and rocket launchers, Whaling’s 1st Battalion successfully reached the eastern end of Strip No. 2 at 5:55 and immediately commenced setting up a defensive perimeter. The 3rd battalion followed behind and extended the perimeter to the left, with Selden’s 2nd battalion arriving at 7:25pm extending the perimeter around airstrip No 1 towards the beach. It seemed Colonel Sumiya realized the futility of attempting a defense upon the open ground against American armor, so he pulled his units away towards Razorback Hill from which they could launch harassment maneuvers against the new American perimeter. The Japanese had begun firing artillery and mortars into the airdrome. The Marines, somewhat astonished by such goings-on, called for mortar and artillery support of their own. They reported that, according to their best estimates, the enemy had reoccupied the defenses in at least full company strength.
The marines were formulating a plan to deal with the menace and the Japanese took advantage of the lull time to launch a banzai charge that failed to gain any ground. The Japanese continued their harassment, until the Marines received some tank support to launch an offensive. Platoons from different units got together to perform a sweeping maneuver, advancing 300 yards from the defensive line. They ran into bunkers, foxholes and trenches manned by Japanese. The marines mopped them up with grenades and automatic weapons, then at 11:30 suddenly all the fighting ceased. No more enemy seemed to remain near the front. The marines had suffered 13 deaths and 19 wounded, but counted 150 dead Japanese. With more tanks on hand, the Marines gradually pushed the Japanese to flee back towards Razorback Hill.
Meanwhile, because of the repeated attacks, Colonel Masters men had been patrolling, trying to pinpoint where the Japanese were concentrated. At 1:55am on December 30th, the 3rd and 4th companies of the 54th regiment had discovered an excellent approach towards the Marine perimeter. As was always the favored Japanese strategy, to concentrate force against a narrow sector, they chose to attack at this place called Coffin Corner, a natural causeway connected to ridges. The two companies attacked under the cover of a storm. The Japanese unleashed mortars and machine gun fire and quickly overran a machine gun position, but G company launched a counter attack pushing them back. The battle raged for nearly 5 hours, but by 7am it ceased. The marines had 6 deaths, 17 wounded and would count 89 Japanese dead with another 5 captured. Yet that concludes the action in Cape Gloucester for today, for now we need to jump back to New Guinea.
Back on December 8th, General Nakai commenced an offensive against Kesawai, dispatching the Saito Volunteer unit for the task. The unit had the aid of native guides who gave them detailed information on the terrain, allowing the Japanese to infiltrate behind a forward Papuan platoon led by Lt C.E Bishop. They explode all of their booby-traps, allowing the 1st battalion, 78th regiment to advance behind them into Kesawai 2 without much difficult, annihilating the Papuan platoon and securing the eastern portion of the highland. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion crossed the Boku River and captured Koropa, cutting off the commandos at Isaria; the 2nd battalion, 239th regiment crossed the Boku river and assaulted the commando position at Ketoba, but the Australians resisted until nightfall before withdrawing towards Isariba. Nakai’s enveloping maneuver was a success, forcing the commandos and Papuans to withdraw towards the Evapia River.
On December 9th, Brigadier Eather ordered A and C companies of the 2/25th battalion to advance forward as the commands pulled back towards the Mene River. Meanwhile at 7:15am at Isariba, the Japanese had begun a series of attacks. The attacks were repelled with vicker guns, grenades and a quick air strike from 20 Kittyhawks and Boomerangs that bombed and strafed the attackers. The 2/25th companies arrived at Evapia and one of their patrols managed to ambush several Japanese parties over the next few days. On December 12th, Nakai arrived at Kesawai where he ordered his 1st and 3rd battalions, 78th regiment to attack the 2/25th positions by nightfall. C Company's machine gun fire managed to halt the enemy assault from the north, but another came from the south. A Company found itself surrounded as the Japanese managed to get between the two Australian companies, firing their Woodpeckers from multiple directions. It was a 5 hour battle until the Australians repelled the enemy who gradually pulled back west.
At 5am on the 13th, the Australians were running low on ammunition and were forced to withdraw. The 2/25th advanced through think jungle and deep swamps, by 8am they had managed to get to safety after suffering 5 deaths and 14 wounded but killing an estimated 67 Japanese. The companies withdrew east of the Evapia River, rejoining the rest of their battalion. Nakai expected his enemy was attempting an offensive against Madang and ordered his men to return to their former defensive positions, leaving token garrisons at Koropa and Kesawai. Because of the heated attacked, General Vasey worried it was preliminary to something much bigger, so he ordered the 2/16th battalion to perform punitive attack along Shaggy Ridge and Eather’s 2/33rd battalion would retake Kesawai.
The 2/33rd Battalion advanced under the cover of darkness to the 5800 Feature to attack any Japanese there, and to move the Papuans across the Evapia to establish a patrol base for the Koben-Koropa-Solu River area . With three of his companies Colonel Cotton of the 2/33rd moved off an hour and a half after midnight on the 18th-19th December towards the summit of the 5800 Feature arriving just before dawn . At 2.10 p.m. a section made contact with the enemy about 700 yards south of the highest pinnacle on 5800. The patrol withdrew while the artillery fired 120 rounds. By 5 p.m. the enemy had had enough and withdrew enabling one company to occupy the pinnacle . Next day the battalion patrolled the whole area and found evidence of Japanese occupation and a hasty withdrawal.
I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.
The allies finally unleashed operation backhander, the amphibious assault of Cape Gloucester. The 1st Marines had a long rest after Guadalcanal and would now be the spearhead to reconquer New Britain. However the Japanese were not going to just roll over easily.
151 episodes
All episodes
×Welcome to Player FM!
Player FM is scanning the web for high-quality podcasts for you to enjoy right now. It's the best podcast app and works on Android, iPhone, and the web. Signup to sync subscriptions across devices.