Noshing With David Prentice – August 31, 2023

Ira's Everything Bagel

Author, Unwilling to Quit, The Long Unwinding of American involvement in Vietnam

This week, Ira Sternberg, host of Ira’s Everything Bagel Podcast, welcomes David Prentice, the acclaimed author of Unwilling to Quit: The Long Unwinding of American Involvement in Vietnam (published by University Press of Kentucky). In this escalating episode, David Prentice discusses his journey in writing this comprehensive book, his interest in the Vietnam War, and the profound insights he gained from his research. This episode offers a deep dive into the complexities of the Vietnam War and the intricate details that shaped American involvement.

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David Prentice: An Authority on the Vietnam War

David Prentice is an award-winning lecturer and historian whose work has been featured in renowned publications such as Diplomatic History, the Journal of Military History, and Cold War History. He is also a contributor to several edited volumes. David’s expertise and extensive research make him a respected voice in the field of military history. His dedication to uncovering the nuanced aspects of the Vietnam War is evident in his meticulously researched book, Unwilling to Quit.

The Genesis of Unwilling to Quit

In his conversation with Ira Sternberg, David Prentice reveals why he decided to write Unwilling to Quit. His interest in the history of the Vietnam War was sparked by the conflict’s profound impact on American society and politics. David aimed to provide a detailed account of the war, focusing on the prolonged nature of American involvement and the complex decisions made by political leaders. His book sheds light on the internal conflicts and external pressures that influenced U.S. policy during this turbulent period.

Surprising Discoveries in Research

David Prentice shares some of the most surprising discoveries he made during his research. One of the key revelations was the stark contrast between leaders’ private doubts and their public pronouncements. This dichotomy played a significant role in the decisions that prolonged American involvement in Vietnam. David’s research uncovered documents and personal accounts that highlighted these discrepancies, offering a deeper understanding of the motivations behind U.S. policy.

The Hope for Vietnamization

The concept of “Vietnamization” was a significant policy aimed at transferring the responsibility of the war to South Vietnamese forces. David Prentice explains why there was hope for this policy and the challenges it faced. He delves into the strategic and political considerations that underpinned Vietnamization, as well as the reasons for its eventual failure. This analysis provides a comprehensive look at one of the key strategies of the later stages of the Vietnam War.

Pivotal Figures in American Policy

David Prentice identifies the most pivotal figures who influenced American policy towards Vietnam. His book highlights the roles of key individuals who shaped the course of the war through their decisions and actions. Understanding these figures’ contributions and perspectives offers valuable insights into the broader dynamics of American involvement in Vietnam. David’s detailed profiles of these leaders bring a human element to the historical narrative.

David Prentice’s Approach to Writing History

David Prentice discusses his approach to writing history, emphasizing the importance of thorough research and balanced analysis. He strives to present a nuanced view of historical events, considering multiple perspectives and sources. David’s commitment to accuracy and detail ensures that his work is both informative and engaging. His methodical approach to documenting the Vietnam War provides readers with a comprehensive understanding of this complex conflict.

David Prentice’s Background and Personal Life

David Prentice’s background as a historian and lecturer has greatly influenced his writing. His work has appeared in prestigious journals and edited volumes, showcasing his expertise in military and diplomatic history. David lives on a farm in Oklahoma with his wife and kids, where he continues to write and research. His personal experiences and academic achievements enrich his historical narratives, making them relatable and insightful.

Engaging with David Prentice’s Work

For those interested in exploring more of David Prentice’s work, there are several ways to stay connected. You can follow David Prentice on LinkedIn. Additionally, you can read more about his book and other contributions through various platforms:

• Alumni News: Alumni News: David Prentice’s Book About Vietnam
• Amazon Author Page: David Prentice on Amazon
• Oklahoma State University Library News: Celebrating Books: 2024 Honorees – David Prentice

David Prentice’s Influence and Impact

David Prentice’s work has had a significant impact on the field of military history. His detailed analysis and engaging writing style have provided valuable insights into the Vietnam War. David’s ability to connect historical events with contemporary issues makes his work relevant and thought-provoking. His contributions to academic journals and edited volumes highlight his influence in the scholarly community.

David Prentice’s Personal Life

Beyond his professional achievements, David Prentice enjoys a fulfilling personal life. Living on a farm in Oklahoma with his wife and kids, David balances his academic pursuits with family life. This rural setting provides a peaceful backdrop for his writing and research. Understanding the personal side of David Prentice adds depth to his professional persona, offering a more complete picture of the man behind the scholarly work.

David Prentice’s Academic Contributions

David Prentice’s academic contributions extend beyond his book on the Vietnam War. His articles in Diplomatic History, the Journal of Military History, and Cold War History reflect his extensive research and expertise. David’s ability to analyze complex historical events and present them in an accessible manner has earned him recognition and respect in the academic community. His contributions to several edited volumes further showcase his versatility as a historian.

Uncovering Historical Truths

David Prentice is dedicated to uncovering historical truths and presenting them with clarity and accuracy. His work on the Vietnam War is a testament to this commitment. By examining primary sources, personal accounts, and official documents, David provides a comprehensive and balanced view of the events that shaped American involvement in Vietnam. His dedication to historical accuracy ensures that readers gain a deep understanding of this pivotal period.

The Future of Historical Writing

David Prentice shares his thoughts on the future of historical writing. He believes that the field will continue to evolve with new technologies and methodologies. Digital archives and advanced research tools have made historical research more accessible and efficient. David emphasizes the importance of adapting to these changes while maintaining rigorous standards of accuracy and analysis. His perspective on the future of historical writing highlights the ongoing relevance of the discipline.

David Prentice’s Online Presence

David Prentice actively engages with his audience through various online platforms. His LinkedIn profile is a great place to connect with him professionally and learn more about his academic and professional achievements. You can also explore his Amazon Author Page for a comprehensive list of his publications and reviews. Additionally, the Oklahoma State University Library News provides updates on his latest works and contributions to the field of history.

Connecting with David Prentice

David Prentice’s work is not only influential in academic circles but also resonates with a broader audience interested in military history and the Vietnam War. His detailed research and engaging writing style make his books and articles a valuable resource for students, historians, and anyone interested in understanding the complexities of historical events. By following David on LinkedIn and exploring his Amazon Author Page, readers can stay updated on his latest publications and insights.

David Prentice’s Family Life

David Prentice’s family life in Oklahoma provides a serene environment that complements his rigorous academic pursuits. Living on a farm with his wife and children, David finds a balance between his professional and personal life. This setting not only offers him tranquility but also serves as a source of inspiration for his writing. Understanding this aspect of David’s life gives readers a more holistic view of the man behind the scholarly achievements.

David Prentice’s Insights on Modern Warfare

In addition to his work on the Vietnam War, David Prentice provides valuable insights into modern warfare and its implications. His articles in prominent journals offer a comparative analysis of historical and contemporary military conflicts. By examining the evolution of warfare, David highlights the lessons learned and the recurring themes in military strategy and policy. These insights are crucial for understanding current global conflicts and their historical roots.

Jon Ralston and the Nevada Independent

While David Prentice focuses on historical conflicts, it’s interesting to note the parallels with Jon Ralston’s work in political journalism. Jon Ralston, CEO of The Nevada Independent, has also delved into the intricacies of political decisions and their impact on society. Both David Prentice and Jon Ralston emphasize the importance of thorough research and unbiased reporting in their respective fields. To learn more about Jon Ralston and his work, you can visit The Nevada Independent’s YouTube channel and follow their Facebook page.

Conclusion

This episode of Ira’s Everything Bagel Podcast offers a comprehensive look at David Prentice’s career and his contributions to the field of military history. David’s detailed exploration of the Vietnam War in his book Unwilling to Quit provides valuable insights into American involvement in the conflict. His expertise, combined with his engaging writing style, makes this episode a must-listen for anyone interested in history and military affairs.

For more engaging content and insightful discussions, be sure to subscribe to Ira’s Everything Bagel Podcast. Stay connected with David Prentice and his work through the various links provided.

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Talking with David Prentice Full Transcript
Ira Sternberg: Welcome to Ira’s Everything Bagel, where I talk with intriguing people about everything: their passions, pursuits, and points of view. My guest today decided to pursue a subject that has divided Americans for decades: the Vietnam War. David Prentice is the author of Unwilling to Quit: The Long Unwinding of American Involvement in Vietnam, published by the University Press of Kentucky. David looks at the Nixon administration’s Vietnamization policy by drawing on newly declassified documents and international archives. He provides domestic and foreign contexts for America’s withdrawal from the conflict. The book is available on Amazon, Barnes & Noble, and all the usual places. And David, welcome to the show.
David Prentice: Thank you. Thank you for having me.
Ira Sternberg: Why did you decide to focus on Vietnam? We obviously have had so many wars over the centuries here. What was it about the Vietnam War particularly that, I don’t know if the right word is “appealed” to you, but certainly piqued your interest?
David Prentice: So, it’s a bit of a curious back story. I was actually a graduate student in chemistry and chemical biology at Cornell University, and they just happened to have located Fred Logevall and Keith Taylor’s Vietnam War class in the chemistry building at the same time I was there. I wandered in one morning for the class around about the ’68 Tet Offensive and was immediately hooked by the story, diplomatic history, doing diplomatic history as a field as well. I just fell in love with the subject and the hard questions and decisions that studying Vietnam invites. So I switched out of chemistry into history and immediately just took to answering questions about how, when, and why America chose to end its war in Vietnam.
Ira Sternberg: Well, the book focuses on Nixon, but really it had its genesis in Eisenhower first, then Kennedy. The escalation came out in Lyndon Johnson’s regime, and I think that’s where the protests started and a lot of opposition. Then it went to Nixon, who promised he had a peace plan, and it went on even longer. As you mentioned, along the winding road here sounds like a Beatles song, but, were you surprised about anything you found? I’m going to ask it from a non-historian point of view. If you lived during that era, there was plenty of governmental disinformation and misinformation about the war, including such things as body counts. A lot of that had to do with what Halberstam used to call the best and the brightest. Some of these people were, I don’t know whether they were delusional or egotistical or what the issue was with all of them, but nobody seemed to have a clear view of what the reality was during that time. I don’t want to get too far afield, but I’d like to cover that part of it first, and then we can get into the Nixon administration and their approach to it.
David Prentice: Certainly. I think as historians have started really digging into declassified material, we also benefit from presidential tapes from Kennedy, Johnson, as well as Nixon. Usually, we think of presidential tapes in terms of just Nixon, but other presidents kept tapes and recordings as well. Surveying all of this new information, one of the things that stands out to me is the doubts presidents and other leaders had about Vietnam as they were escalating that conflict and as they were winding down that conflict. There’s not the clear optimism that they’re projecting to the public. Often, you know, you’re speaking of the best and the brightest, there’s also, by the start of the Tet Offensive, a pretty significant presidential credibility gap that widens over time both in the Johnson era as well as the Nixon era. Just having these doubts in many ways muddies the water on what presidents knew or what they thought they knew and what the public was being told. The further the war continued on, this gap widened. It made it even more difficult for American presidents to find a way out of Vietnam that could secure the aims they sought as well as keeping general support at home.
Ira Sternberg: Did you get any insight into that dichotomy between what the public was being told and the private doubts of these politicians and how it affected their psyche in the sense that, if you are unsure, why are you selling this war to the general public when you realize it’s going to result in the deaths of many Americans? This is not to obviously disrespect those who served in Vietnam and died or were maimed or have other issues. They served their country, but I’m talking about the leadership. If you had internal doubt, how did that not affect you in terms of saying, why did not any of those best and brightest say, “You know what, maybe we need to de-escalate. Maybe we need to, our rationale doesn’t make sense here. Why can’t we get away from this and focus our energies and time and resources in other areas?”
David Prentice: So, in thinking about the best and the brightest, the private doubts the presidents and a lot of officials increasingly had about the war and its ultimate outcome, on the one hand, there are issues of American credibility. Nixon believes that securing détente in an era of rising isolationism, that all of these things together dictate that America pull out some semblance of “peace with honor” in Vietnam. The second thing I would add to that, though, is that it’s a contingent moment, especially in ’68 and ’69 and early 1970. There’s a chapter in the book which I dubbed “The New Optimists,” which is a contemporary phrase that emerges around the early 1970s to describe official pronouncements about the war. Indeed, as the second Republic of Vietnam begins to get some military strength back after the Tet Offensive, some level of political stability and legitimacy, there is, in addition to the doubts which are still there within the official memos and debates within the Nixon administration, there are also those that are saying, “You know what, maybe the war has turned a corner.” I think this is where adding Vietnamese sources and archives from the North as well as the South is important. It gives a sense of, yes, there is this contingent moment, but there are also structural forces and factors working against the Republic of Vietnam and perhaps also in the North Vietnamese favor that Nixon is choosing to ignore and at least bury and keep out of high-level conversations and certainly public pronouncements during that time.
Ira Sternberg: When there was sufficient intellectual opposition to the Vietnam War on college campuses, not just from students but professors and historians, and some professors who are historians, but the point is that there was a, it wasn’t just an emotional response in opposition to the Vietnam War. There were reasoned arguments about, why are we, questions, why are we there? The government response at the time seemed to be, rather than listening to any of these people, even though you said earlier that government leaders had private doubts, was it taken, in essence, an offensive against those people in terms of spying and intimidation, etc., to dissent? I just have trouble reconciling that in my head. Did you have trouble with that when you did your research?
David Prentice: On the one hand, intellectual dissent, especially legitimate dissent, is present at the start of the war, the Americanization, and you’re right, it’s just anyway, it’s building throughout time. I think one of the things that amazed me as I’m looking at the presidential record, especially in the Nixon administration, is how seriously they take that dissent, not necessarily the arguments behind it, but certainly the power of this growing grassroots movement to shape opinion in Congress, shape opinion on campuses, to shape opinion in living rooms. You see this particularly borne out in the October 1969 moratorium, one of the largest anti-war protests in history. All of this powerfully limits Nixon and his options. He believes that to over-escalate the war or to pursue the sort of bombing campaigns that he would like to embrace in 1969, but that would only make the anti-war movement much more powerful, thereby undermining the support in Congress he needs to get Vietnamization the money that it will depend upon to survive and sort of mobilize in real terms the Vietnamese economy and its military. But as far as grappling with the anti-war arguments, I don’t see much in the way of that in terms of the record.
Ira Sternberg: Yeah, it’s a fascinating period of time. When you went and researched both, not just American archives but you mentioned earlier Vietnamese archives, both South and North, what was the most surprising thing or things you found out that you didn’t know, you might have suspected or you might not have suspected, but all of a sudden here’s this document or here’s this recording that reveals something to you that you’ve never realized was there?
David Prentice: One of the surprising things, and perhaps it shouldn’t have been surprising, is I found was how quickly and how enthusiastically the South Vietnamese government embraced Vietnamization. Even going back to 1968 in the Lyndon Johnson administration, the South Vietnamese state is overwhelmingly supportive of something like Vietnamization. As they look at the American domestic front, they believe that the only way to continue to get the American aid and support they need is for the U.S. to start withdrawing its troops. Now, they want a slow and steady withdrawal program, but they still believe that this is fundamental and perhaps the only thing they can be doing that will get them the ongoing U.S. air support or the ongoing U.S. economic support they need to fight the North Vietnamese, deal with the National Liberation Front, and ultimately survive. In many ways, it’s a long shot, but by the end of 1968 or early ’69, they say it is the only path forward, and they embrace Vietnamization far in advance of Richard Nixon.
Ira Sternberg: Now, that is surprising. I didn’t realize that. Your book again is called Unwilling to Quit: The Long Unwinding of American Involvement in Vietnam. Why was there an unwillingness to quit? Is that just the hubris of the American government at that time, or the administration? And I don’t think it was just Nixon. I mean, everyone wants to just pile on Nixon, but frankly, it was Johnson that escalated the war, and then when he realized he couldn’t run for re-election, he didn’t. Then it fell to Nixon. So, Nixon may have made major decisions that didn’t help matters, but it still comes down to not just one administration. Again, it started under Eisenhower, was there under Kennedy, escalated under Johnson, and then continued and eventually ended under Nixon.
David Prentice: I think there’s something to be said about seeing it in this wider context from Kennedy through Nixon, if not even Ford as well. In the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, it seems to me that they’re trying to postpone making any hard, real decisions about Vietnam. They’re trying to avoid a larger American commitment, but in trying to avoid that commitment, they sort of slowly sleepwalk into it. And not just, you know, you’re talking about not just the Nixon administration, I think that’s quite right. By 1969, public opinion polls, pollsters and the like, are all indicating to the White House and others that Americans, by and large, are opposed to a precipitate U.S. withdrawal. They’re opposed to allowing or taking any action that would cause the Republic of Vietnam to collapse or to feel abandoned by the United States. And so, the title of the book, Unwilling to Quit, actually comes out of a Time magazine article that was published in the wake of the moratorium protest. The full title of it was “Americans on the War: Divided, Blamed, Unwilling to Quit.” So, then on one hand, you’ve got Nixon’s concerns about credibility, about détente, about America’s role in the world as the 1960s winds up, but he also is looking at polling, the silent majority, which he’ll speak to on November 3rd, 1969, that is also disinclined to quickly leave Vietnam and allow South Vietnam to collapse. So, what comes out of this political diplomatic process and context is a slower withdrawal schedule than we might otherwise expect if we’re just looking at this growing anti-war movement in the late 1960s.
Ira Sternberg: How much of an impact did the elimination of the draft have on the continuation of the Vietnam War? Because a lot of the protests at the time were led by, for example, kids of college age, I’ll say young adults of college age, who are subject to the draft. You had the working class, young men who were drafted, and you had those in college who could get a deferment. So the protests, a lot of it had to do with personal danger in the sense of being drafted against your will because of the draft, and then the draft was eliminated. I don’t know that it muted the opposition to the war, but it certainly helped take some of the tension out of it, if that’s a way of saying it.
David Prentice: I think that is a fair way of saying it. I think that’s how architects of the all-volunteer force and then the draft lottery before that saw it. People like Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense, believed that the draft was one of these issues that could be both a moral issue, an ethical issue, and together it quickens the intensity of the anti-war debate. As you indicated, for college students, people about to graduate from college, then face the prospect of the draft, it made the anti-war movement a very real necessity for many of them. So for Laird and Nixon, then, moving to an all-volunteer force was perhaps a way of taking the tempo down on the anti-war movement, removing the draft as an issue, trying to make it more fair through the lottery system, and then eventually through an all-volunteer force. In some ways, yes, take the wind out of the sails of the anti-war movement and buy the Nixon administration a little bit more time at home.
Ira Sternberg: From your perspective, and this is a non-academic question, but I’m going to ask it anyway, and that is, you know, you have heroes and you have villains. Based on your research and your writing of this book, again, it’s called Unwilling to Quit: The Long Unwinding of American Involvement in Vietnam, was there a hero or two? Was there, from your perspective, again, as an academic researching this, was there a villain or two that you came across that you didn’t realize were either heroes or villains? And I know that’s an emotionally laden word, “hero” and “villain,” but in the context of your research and writing of the book, were there a couple of people there that you said, “Oh, okay, this guy deserves some plaudits, and here’s a couple of people that deserve some condemnation”?
David Prentice: The way I deal with history, the way I approach history, is I try to avoid sort of villainizing one person or lauding other people as heroes. If anything, I think throughout the book, there are moments where I’ll say, you know, this or that policy might have been good or well-intended, and I try to give every individual a fair take. I usually assess them in their own terms. So, Nixon’s being assessed by what were Nixon’s goals, what was he trying to achieve, did he achieve that, and it’s the same for the North Vietnamese leaders as well as those in the South. Evaluating them on their own terms, while at times also now that we have this larger historical record, being able to evaluate those goals and statements against perhaps bits of information they chose to disregard or ignore, and thus bring a bigger picture. But as far as heroes and villains, not so much, sorry.
Ira Sternberg: That’s okay. From a historical perspective, how about this? We’ll rephrase it, Your Honor, the question. That is, who was, aside from Nixon, possibly Kissinger, who was the most pivotal figure in changing American policy towards Vietnam?
David Prentice: I think without question it has to be Mel Laird, Secretary of Defense. The reasons why I settled on him is the book project began with the questions, well, how, why, and when did America choose to get out of Vietnam? As I’ve surveyed the Kissinger record, Nixon’s record, and the thought process and strategies Nixon came into the White House with, you don’t see Vietnamization, you don’t see troop withdrawal factoring hardly anywhere at all beyond perhaps an occasional token withdrawal from time to time. Lyndon Johnson left his successor no blueprint, no promise of U.S. troop withdrawal, which meant Nixon had relative freedom, if we remove and sort of ignore the domestic context, but had relative freedom to pursue whatever path he wanted in Vietnam. So I had to ask myself, okay, where did U.S. troop withdrawal come from? What was the impetus behind that? Once I began digging into the historical record, Melvin Laird loomed as the only real advocate of U.S. troop withdrawals. As an individual, he often chose to ignore presidential orders if he thought the president was going to do something too reckless in Vietnam or in Korea or elsewhere. He would just flatly ignore the order. Now, I got to know Melvin Laird just a little bit toward the end of his life. He found my phone number when I was starting the project and would call me randomly from time to time and share bits and pieces that he thought I should know. It was always clear that he never meant to directly defy a presidential order, but that the policies he was embracing and the things he was choosing to ignore, he argued were always in the president’s best interest. For a political operator like Laird, that almost had U.S. elections and domestic politics in mind. Nevertheless, it’s his voice and his role that I think got the troop withdrawal started at a date and time and pace far faster than the military, Kissinger, or Nixon would have tolerated.
Ira Sternberg: In your research, I know that it’s publicly known that McNamara had serious misgivings after he left public office. Were there any other key figures that had some introspection at some point about their role in the Vietnam conflict?
David Prentice: I think quite a few did. The original book project began around 1967, so it followed the Johnson administration. Unwilling to Quit is the second half of that total book project, so hopefully one day soon there’ll be a second book on Lyndon Johnson and his decisions before Nixon. His second Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, was in many ways influenced by Robert McNamara and his doubts and introspection. So that by the time Clifford’s leaving office in ’68 or early ’69, he himself is having a lot of these same doubts. Melvin Laird always struck me as too confident or perhaps unwilling to concede that Vietnamization had problems or flaws. But I believe for him, the overriding factor was getting America out of Vietnam as quickly and as honorably as possible, while allowing that a quick and honorable end might be impossible. But regardless, the U.S., for matters of national interest and domestic politics, had to get out.
Ira Sternberg: When you look at the overall arc of history, it seems to me it’s ironic that we were being sold the old dominoes falling issue during the Vietnam War, that if we didn’t save Vietnam, other countries would fall. Yet now, we go into 2023, and Vietnam is, if not an ally, certainly working with us against China, in a sense. Are you surprised about that, and whether there was real justification for the Domino Theory?
David Prentice: Given Vietnam’s complicated relationship with China and some of its other allies, and its ability to always act almost independently throughout the Vietnamese war, it’s dependent upon China and the Soviet Union for arms, for aid, for advisors, but it manages that relationship with a spirit of independence that serves North Vietnam’s aims in that conflict. As for the Domino Theory, it gets rather complicated. There’s a lot of counterfactuals involved. What would have happened had the U.S. not intervened in Vietnam? From my perspective, though, I take just a very narrow glance at it in the context of the book, which is, how do America’s allies feel about U.S. troop withdrawal from Vietnam? It’s clear in 1969 that America is choosing to slowly extricate itself from Vietnam without a clear victory. Now, for America’s allies, the Domino Theory is less and less and less of a concern from ’69 through to the opening of China in ’71 and ’72. Nevertheless, there are U.S. allies who communicate to Nixon that they still feel the Domino Theory is important and that they still feel that America’s stand in Vietnam is the right stand. Australia, in particular, which has troops on the ground in Vietnam alongside the Americans, is viewing Vietnamization in the context of its own security concerns. What does Vietnamization say about America’s commitment to the ANZUS pact? What does it say about America’s commitment to NATO? So, I should add, to complicate this narrative somewhat, the late ’60s and early ’70s is also a period of rising isolationism within the United States. It’s something that, in looking at foreign archives, U.S. allies are concerned about.
Ira Sternberg: Did you still come across some archives that are classified, or is everything unclassified at this point? From your perspective as a researcher and writer of this book, did you come across things that you just couldn’t get access to?
David Prentice: Certainly, there are lots and lots and lots of boxes both in U.S. presidential archives but also abroad that are still classified. You fill out Freedom of Information requests, hope that eventually you might get some documents. My generation’s benefited from a large effort to declassify a lot of the Nixon years, and so we know a lot more now than we did 20 years ago. But there’s probably a lot still left to be declassified. In terms of the Vietnamese papers that I went through and South Vietnamese archives, what would have been the South Vietnamese papers, it was hit or miss on what I could get access to. They gave me quite a bit to go through, certainly more than I expected, but there was probably still a lot of other government of Vietnam papers and documents that I did not yet have access to.
Ira Sternberg: What’s the biggest takeaway that you would like to share with us from the book that you’ve written, and what readers will be most surprised about?
David Prentice: One of the things for me that was both the most rewarding part of the book but also the most difficult was focusing on this human element with all of the different groups, from the anti-war protesters to the North Vietnamese, the South Vietnamese, White House, and just the hard decisions all of these sides are grappling with. It takes a very real toll on the policymakers on all sides of the conflict. So, there’s always throughout the book this human element of missed opportunities, perhaps, or things they didn’t know or things they should have thought more about. But beyond that, there’s just the weight of trying to make difficult decisions, trying to end an inconclusive war on the part of the United States, or win what had already been a very long and bloody war between the Vietnamese.
Ira Sternberg: Well, that’s a great way to leave it. My guest has been David Prentice. He’s the author of Unwilling to Quit: The Long Unwinding of American Involvement in Vietnam. It’s published by the University Press of Kentucky. And David, thanks for being on the show.
David Prentice: Thank you. Thank you for having me.
Ira Sternberg: And join us every Thursday for our new smear on Ira’s Everything Bagel.
[Music]

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