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Ukrainian servicemen from the 24th Mechanized Brigade equip a "Kazhan" bomber drone. Chasiv Yar, Donetsk region, May 15, 2025 Ukraine’s recent sabotage operations against Russian long-range and strategic aviation bases, known as Operation Spiderweb, have renewed international focus on the capabilities of small kamikaze drones. In fact, the attacks on distant Russian airfields demonstrate what is already well-known on Ukraine’s battlefields, where drones long ago emerged as principal combat assets. The mass deployment of these weapons has not only generated new tactical doctrines but also fundamentally altered the strategic paradigm of this war of attrition. Both sides now rely less on artillery — likely hoarding scarce shells, especially Ukraine — and use fewer armored vehicles. This is particularly significant, considering that vehicle deficits previously plagued both Russia and Ukraine. Today, both armies are devising methods and tactics that enable them to conserve manpower more efficiently while expending drones without hesitation. Yet drones have not altered the fundamental dynamics of combat operations. Rapid troop advances remain as impossible as ever, and penetrating enemy defenses deeply has become far more difficult. Instead, UAVs and hopes for their game-changing power could prolong the war in Ukraine for years to come, grinding on in stalemate. Part 1: How advances in UAV technology led to drones’ dominance at the front lines The ‘Mavics’ and ‘Orlans’ phase The FPV drones, ‘Baga Yaga’ multicopterers, and guided bombs phase The ‘fiber optics’ and ‘Drone Line’ phase Part 2: Drone countermeasures, mounting attacks behind enemy lines, and UAV endgame scenarios How do you fight against drones? Passive methods and active methods The war behind enemy lines: ‘Gerans’ versus ‘Liutyis’ Is Ukraine losing the drone war? Part 1 How advances in UAV technology led to drones’ dominance at the front lines At the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, both sides viewed drones as an important but auxiliary tool for reconnaissance and strikes behind enemy lines. When the conflict proved protracted and prewar weapons doctrines failed, both Russian and Ukrainian forces — often at the grassroots level rather than the high command — simultaneously reached several conclusions: Forces needed massive, low-cost, and easily scalable reconnaissance and strike capabilities for forward units. When configured for offensive operations, these tools had to be highly accurate. The problem was that old concepts proved poorly applicable in real warfare. Without proper reconnaissance and target designation, artillery ammunition (initially the armies’ primary means of striking targets) was expended at rates exceeding global manufacturing capacity. Ukraine’s battlefields from 2022 are covered with craters from thousands of shells, most of which inflicted no enemy damage. Using the new weapons also demanded freedom from extended command chains where senior leaders have ultimate authorization. The war’s opening months demonstrated that slow-moving approval chains precluded strikes against mobile targets. Military planners sought cost-effective, mass-producible precision strike systems that could hit targets not only at the front but also behind enemy lines at typical artillery ranges of 10–25 kilometers (roughly 6–15 miles). These systems required operators who could be trained rapidly and then deployed in ways that concealed them from enemy strikes more effectively than artillery crews. These weapons also needed flexibility to overcome typical countermeasures. Military planners soon realized they needed another weapon class: cost-effective cruise missile equivalents for deep strikes behind enemy lines. Ukraine lacked cruise missiles from the start of the war, and Russia quickly grasped that its stockpiles and production capabilities would be insufficient to sustain prolonged, systematic attacks. Solutions to these challenges show parallels to biological evolutionary processes: almost all technologies currently in use predate Russia’s full-scale invasion. Some of these weapons had already demonstrated their usefulness in other wars, from Azerbaijan’s offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh to ISIS’s survival efforts under airstrikes by the international coalition. When Russia and Ukraine found themselves evenly matched, “environmental pressures” reached their apex and triggered a focused and unforgiving race to find the cheap and easy weapons described above. The pressure affected the Russian army most in the opening months of the war, when Moscow lost its numerical advantage to a rapidly mobilized Ukraine and to troop losses that included soldiers terminating their service contracts. Russia also quickly lost what experts assumed would be its main trump card: air supremacy. Despite destroying a significant portion of Ukraine’s air defense systems in its initial strikes, the Russian Aerospace Forces lost nearly a dozen modern fighters and bombers in the invasion’s first two weeks. At this rate, the Air Force would have lost its combat effectiveness within a year. As a result, Russian warplanes stopped flying beyond the front line. By the year’s end, they avoided the front entirely. Ukraine has also been forced to reassess its views on military technology. The first weapons to go were large strike drones like the Turkish Bayraktar (and their Russian equivalents), which failed in conditions of saturated medium-range air defenses. In the war’s first months, Ukraine lost almost all its Turkish-supplied Bayraktars. A Bayraktar TB2 drone at a Russian military exhibition in Moscow, displaying captured Ukrainian equipment. August 18, 2022. An air defense missile shoots down a Ukrainian Armed Forces Bayraktar TB2 drone over Kyiv after operators lost control of the aircraft. May 4, 2023. Where Russia and Ukraine found promising military concepts, their development sparked rapid evolution in equipment and tactics that changed the course of the war. To enable this transformation, Russia had to restructure aspects of its military. Before the invasion, the development of new equipment was bogged down in bureaucracy. Defense manufacturers complained about unrealistic technical requirements and the Defense Ministry’s relentless demands for modifications to prototypes. However, during the war in Ukraine, military leaders proved ready to adopt even clearly unfinished models (especially with drones) and upgrade them in the field. This has enabled the Russian army to outpace Ukraine’s forces in several key technical areas. However, inherent problems of bureaucracy and corruption still mar Russia’s efforts to evolve militarily. In their arms race, both Russia and Ukraine are dependent on China, the world’s undisputed leader in drone production. Officially, Beijing has banned the sale of weapons to both countries, along with any components that could be used for weapons production. In reality, Moscow and Kyiv use Chinese parts to build millions of drones, affording Beijing the theoretical power to shape the war’s outcome, which it might already be exercising. Further reading Eye in the sky See the Supercam S350, a drone used by Russian forces in the war against Ukraine that may contain dozens of foreign-made components The ‘Mavics’ and ‘Orlans’ phase After Russian proxy forces seized part of the Donbas in 2014, Ukrainian soldiers actively used commercial Chinese-made quadcopters (particularly DJI’s “Mavic” series). The Moscow-backed “people’s militias” in Donetsk and Luhansk employed the same technology. Both sides used the drones mainly for reconnaissance. Meanwhile, Russia was developing its own doctrine for patrol drones coordinated with air power and artillery through combat testing in Syria. At the time, Russia’s primary military drones were the “Orlan” series. The operational framework was fundamentally different from Ukraine’s approach: Russian drones had greater range and flight duration. But drone operators answered only to high command and artillery officers, while operators in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and Donbas “people’s militias” could deploy their quadcopters to support front-line units directly. Target data collected by these reconnaissance units reached artillery crews quickly through electronic command systems developed both domestically and in the West. These earlier drone approaches had drawbacks. Mavics are expensive and sensitive to electronic warfare systems. Parts of their control systems rely on civilian satellite receivers, making them relatively easy to jam. Similar vulnerabilities exist with Mavics’ radio control on manufacturer-locked frequencies. Additionally, DJI equips its drones with position-tracking features (Drone Remote ID) that compromise military operations. A Ukrainian soldier readies a DJI Mavic drone for flight. February 3, 2025. Russian technical teams were the first to resolve this vulnerability, developing “ firmware 1001 ” to modify most DJI drones. The update enables changes to the radio frequency, cancels manufacturer-locked no-fly zones, enhances GPS-free flight capabilities, and disables Drone Remote ID. The Ukrainian Armed Forces quickly replicated the firmware. Throughout the first year of the war, the number of commercial quadcopters used by both sides grew rapidly, mainly thanks to assistance from volunteers. Control of Russia's long-range “Orlan-10” and “Orlan-30” reconnaissance drones was bottlenecked in senior command structures. This arrangement existed because of earlier UAV doctrine and Russia’s relatively small arsenal. Additionally, poor optics (some drones were outfitted with cheap Canon DSLR cameras ) hampered effective surveillance, and the large, relatively scarce Orlans were vulnerable to enemy air defenses. In 2022, the Russian military was unable to monitor the entire battlefront and all its adjacent rear areas. The lack of intelligence data allowed Ukraine to mass forces in the Kharkiv region and launch a surprise counteroffensive that drove Russian troops from northeastern Ukraine, albeit at a heavy cost to Kyiv. Similarly, gaps in Ukraine’s intelligence about troop movements behind enemy lines caused the army to miss Russia’s withdrawal from the western bank of the Dnipro in November 2022 and Wagner Group’s massive buildup near Bakhmut in early winter. The proliferation of unmanned systems — both frontline quadcopters and long-range fixed-wing UAVs with upgraded capabilities — gradually rendered front-line positions and adjacent areas completely visible to reconnaissance operations. Additionally, linking drones to strike weapons in integrated systems dramatically shortened the time between target acquisition and attack, altering the course of the war. It is no longer possible to mass forces for major offensives or establish large defensive strongholds. Since mid-2023 (barring a few notable successes and failures), both sides have used relatively small infantry groups at the front, backed by artillery and drone operators positioned well behind the lines. The typical distance between opposing forces has grown dramatically. For example, in 2022, the Ukrainian military regularly attacked Russian armored vehicles with anti-tank missile systems from distances of a couple of kilometers or less. Today, however, a “gray zone” of five kilometers (about three miles) or more separates the two sides. Successful attacks require crossing this area under enemy fire. Under these conditions, in early 2023, Wagner Group mercenaries pioneered tactics using small and ultra-small infantry assault teams. Their main task was to approach enemy positions in stealth, usually at dawn, dusk, or in bad weather, when UAV visual and thermal cameras struggle. This tactic then gradually spread to both armies. Pairing reconnaissance drones with artillery proved effective, especially with expensive precision-guided rounds. By 2023, however, both sides began experiencing ordnance shortages, necessitating another rapid evolution: armies increasingly integrated strike capabilities into UAV systems. Arming drones was not new when the tactic became conventional in the Russia–Ukraine war. ISIS fighters dropped small bombs from drones in the mid-2010s. Years before Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian military and militia forces in the Donbas also experimented with such attacks. But in 2023, relying largely on modified Mavics, Moscow and Kyiv adopted widespread use of bomb-carrying UAVs. Dropping grenades worked well against infantry (including small assault teams like those Wagner Group threw at Bakhmut) but proved less effective against armored vehicles. Mavics armed with grenades mainly targeted already-disabled armor, finishing it off to prevent enemy recovery and repair. Russian forces also began a large-scale deployment of “Lancet” loitering munitions against enemy armor and artillery. This followed Azerbaijan’s successful drone strikes in the 2020 Karabakh war using Israeli-made IAI Harop UAVs. While Russia adopted the Lancet in the late 2010s and tested it in Syria, mass production began only after February 2022. In Ukraine, these weapons were first limited to select airborne and special forces units, though other units received them by late 2023. Russia relied significantly on Lancets to repel Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive. Soldiers in Russia’s 155th Independent Guards Marine Brigade prepare to launch a Lancet loitering munition, Kursk region, February 10, 2025. The main drawbacks of attack drones were their relative scarcity and inconsistent accuracy, especially when operated at long ranges. Radio-controlled drone guidance is only possible when there is a direct line of sight to the antenna; the higher a drone flies, the farther it can maintain contact. During the final approach to ground targets, maintaining control becomes difficult. These guidance obstacles would shape the next phase of the drone war in Ukraine. The FPV drones, ‘Baba Yaga’ multicopterers, and guided bombs phase Homemade first-person-view drones (the same ones civilians use for sports and racing) were used sporadically in multiple conflicts throughout the 2010s. ISIS deployed them against U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham — now Syria’s ruling faction — struck Russia’s Khmeimim base with improvised UAVs as early as 2017. By early 2023, Russia and Ukraine had developed their own kamikaze drone models, thanks largely to enthusiasts’ efforts. Within a few months, these weapons had become the dominant strike tool across almost every battlefield role at the front and in nearby areas. Today, these same drones are used in attacks on strategic targets thousands of miles behind enemy lines. The key advantage of FPV drones over industrially produced military loitering munitions is their exceptional cost-effectiveness and design flexibility. Using off-the-shelf components (mostly sourced from China), operators can build drones with varying ranges, payloads, and control systems for just a few hundred dollars. Munitions for these systems are also exceptionally cheap and readily available. Operators typically use different kinds of powerful grenades (shaped-charge for armor, fragmentation for personnel, and thermobaric for fortifications) designed for the multi-use RPG-7 anti-tank weapon system. Low costs and readily available parts have enabled the dramatic scaling up of production, allowing both Russia and Ukraine to launch more than a million drones per year. An FPV drone launched Ukraine’s 28th Independent Mechanized Brigade in the Donetsk region, May 3, 2024 The main drawback of FPV drones compared to commercial quadcopters is that most lack built-in flight assistance systems and are much harder to operate. They also become difficult to control near the ground at long ranges, where they lose contact with the transmitting antenna, just like military loitering munitions. Over-simplified, cost-reduced drone models are vulnerable to electronic warfare countermeasures — sometimes as little as a small handheld jammer. Cheaper drones are also detectable by radio frequency scanners, alerting enemy troops and giving them time to take cover. In other words, cutting costs and simplifying designs to enable mass production can backfire, giving the enemy an advantage. Soldiers using Russia’s most mass-produced FPV drone — the VT-40, manufactured under a large Defense Ministry contract — have complained through milbloggers that the system can’t switch radio frequencies when being jammed, despite the manufacturer’s claims that it can. Operators also report design flaws in the detonators that risk explosions before the drone even launches. Nevertheless, the technology is flexible and keeps advancing, preventing the emergence of dependable countermeasures against kamikaze drones. While front-line reports from both sides indicate that drone effectiveness sometimes falters (due to quality issues in specific batches or the introduction of new jamming systems), these systems prevail through sheer numbers, rapid innovation, and tactical refinements. FPV drone operators from Ukraine’s 93rd Independent Mechanized Brigade outside Kostyantynivka. Donetsk region, April 19, 2025. These developments have undermined the safety of men and materiel not only at the front but also miles behind the lines. Both Russian and Ukrainian soldiers often must cover the last few miles to the front (and back) on foot, braving potential drone strikes. This has made offensive operations incredibly costly, and similar challenges confront defensive strongholds. A few dozen drones can now destroy even a fortified, dug-in position, and armies must sometimes turn to cargo drones for resupply. Both sides also acquired powerful air-launched weapons that can be deployed without entering the range of most air defenses. Since 2023, Russian warplanes have increasingly employed glide bombs of varying sizes, equipped with guidance kits. These munitions are released tens of kilometers from targets, with ranges steadily increasing. This has rendered obsolete many of the fortifications Ukrainian troops built against FPV drones. This combination of kamikaze drones, glide bombs, and drone-guided artillery enables Russian forces to maintain their advance despite sustaining losses from Ukrainian UAV attacks. Ukraine’s Air Force also utilizes precision-guided glide munitions, which it receives from Western allies; however, it uses far fewer than Russia, as it lacks both the necessary bombs and the planes to deliver them. However, the Ukrainian Armed Forces maintain an edge in heavy multicopter drones. Their primary model, the “Valkyrie” (Russian soldiers call it “Baba Yaga”), is based on a Chinese-made farming drone. Ukrainian soldiers and supporting volunteers have experimented with these systems since the late 2010s. A Russian soldier displays a downed “Baba Yaga” Ukrainian military drone outside Avdiivka. August 6, 2024. These drones originally served two main purposes: hauling supplies and dropping large numbers of grenades. Today, Valkyries are a cornerstone of Ukraine’s drone warfare capabilities. They bomb fortifications with heavy munitions (anti-tank mines), resupply surrounded units, plant mines deep behind enemy lines, and even operate at night. But the most important capability is their use in boosting signals and carrying smaller kamikaze drones. This radically extends their range and eliminates communication blackouts on final approach to targets. Russian engineers found their own solution to this problem. Along with advances in relay systems, this breakthrough marked the beginning of the next phase in drone warfare. The ‘fiber optics’ and ‘Drone Line’ phase Russia has implemented and rapidly deployed drones linked to operators through thin fiber-optic cables unwinding from a spool — an existing technology that Ukrainian experts initially rejected. The fiber-optic cable reel is mounted directly on the drone, preventing it from getting tangled in branches or other obstacles. The advantages are obvious: such drones are largely immune to electronic warfare systems and invisible to radio scanners. Additionally, the connection is stable at ground level, enabling precision strikes even through openings in buildings and armored vehicles . The primary drawback is that fiber optic cables are relatively brittle and prone to breaking, which reduces the drones’ maneuverability. The number of strikes in Ukraine using fiber-optic drones has surged since the summer of 2024. A single “laboratory” in Veliky Novgorod provides these weapons: the Ushkuynik Research and Production Center, headed by former Kremlin political consultant Alexey Chadaev. Ukrainian specialists, citing Russian sources, say the fiber-optic drones are actually manufactured in China. Chadaev, for his part, does not deny that foreign components are used in the production process. A Russian fiber-optic drone The proliferation of this technology has led to new tactics: drones can now ambush vehicles along roads 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) or more behind front lines. The combination of flying signal repeaters and fiber-optic drones led military minds on both sides to realize that these weapons could be deployed en masse against enemy supply lines throughout their entire area of operations. With sufficient drone concentration, forces can completely disrupt enemy logistics and command structures along major stretches of the front. Ukraine’s newly established UAV forces have dubbed this concept the “Drone Line,” and military leaders hope it will halt Russia’s creeping advance. To execute these operations, the Ukrainian Armed Forces created two dedicated drone brigades. One of these brigades, working alongside other units, launched an operation in early 2025 south and west of Pokrovsk in the central Donbas, where a major Russian force was advancing. Ukrainian ground troops began mounting counterattacks in coordination with drone operators. On February 2, Vladimir Putin acknowledged that his General Staff had briefed him on “a difficult situation in one sector involving unmanned aerial vehicles.” Meanwhile, Russian troops lost ground in the towns of Udachne and Kotlyne west of Pokrovsk, and in the villages of Solone, Shevchenko, and Lysivka south of the city. A Russian brigade operating near Udachne suffered heavy losses . Further reading Meet the Palianytsia Everything we know about Ukraine’s new homegrown ‘drone-missile’ — and Kyiv’s plans to use it on Russian territory But Ukraine failed to build on these gains, and Russia countered with its own drone deployment, sending a new major UAV unit to the Pokrovsk area: the 7th Independent Reconnaissance-Strike Regiment, which reports directly to the Central Military District command. Russian forces recaptured some lost positions, advanced on Pokrovsk from the south, and threatened to cut off the city from the east, strangling Ukrainian supply lines. Russian drones reportedly flew as far as 35 kilometers (almost 22 miles) north of the city. While Ukraine tried to turn the tide in Pokrovsk, Russian forces launched their own counteroffensive near Sudzha. Using drones, including fiber-optic models, they effectively cut off Ukrainian troops in the Kursk region from their supply lines, precipitating the rapid collapse of Ukrainian defenses around Sudzha and forcing a chaotic retreat. At the same time, Russia’s successful drone attacks against Ukrainian logistics south of Sudzha relied on favorable conditions secured through months of brutal battles to reach the Sudzha-Sumy highway. The stranglehold on Ukrainian supply lines only materialized once Russian forces had fought their way to within five to seven kilometers (about four miles) of the highway. The operation also deployed ground forces that vastly outnumbered Ukrainian troops, along with aircraft dropping guided bombs. While the fighting in Pokrovsk and Sudzha demonstrates the evolving role drones play in the war, it is too early to judge the capability of these weapons to conduct independent operations (or even to spearhead larger attacks). But the capacity of drones to disrupt and complicate enemy offensive operations is now clear. The side that develops effective countermeasures against the enemy’s drones could gain a vital technological edge in this war. However, any such advantage will likely be short-lived, given how quickly Russia and Ukraine have copied each other’s innovations. Part 2 Drone countermeasures, mounting attacks behind enemy lines, and UAV endgame scenarios How do you fight against drones? The Russian and Ukrainian armies have tested various methods of passive and active counter-drone warfare. So far, even their combined effectiveness leaves much to be desired. Passive methods Camouflage and decoy targets: This was a common tactic back in the days of Mavic and Lancet drones, though it is less effective now. Camouflaging equipment often worked against early surveillance drones with poor optics. The strategy of deploying equipment decoys was to fool the enemy into wasting costly drone strikes on cheap dummy targets. Today, it is often cheaper to make FPV drones than fake equipment, and fiber-optic UAVs provide operators with enough visual resolution to identify and avoid decoys altogether. Physical equipment protection: The FPV drone age spawned monstrosities as soldiers covered their vehicles with nets and chains. Tanks with powerful engines were fitted with entire metal superstructures — tsar-mangaly (tsar-barbecues) — and equipped with electronic warfare systems. However, this extra armor comes at the cost of mobility, and tsar-mangaly defenses are less effective against drones with reliable ground-level communications. Skilled operators can target weak spots and strike repeatedly . Still, these measures can minimize strike damage and reduce the odds of a critical hit. Anti-drone nets over roads: These measures also offer minimal protection. On social media, numerous videos show fiber-optic drones flying inside protected corridors and conducting attacks. Dispersal: Scattering battle formations forces the enemy to use more drones than it would against armored vehicles packed with soldiers, but it is typically more of a problem than a solution for armies. Both Russia and Ukraine have lost the ability to punch through enemy lines, and any dreams of crushing the opponent have given way to hopes that the other side will succumb to attrition. At the same time, armies must develop new tactics that can succeed despite shortages of armored vehicles and artillery at the front lines. One of these adaptations is the growing use of motorcycles by both sides for supply missions and crossing open ground before an assault. The logic is simple: the enemy needs more drones against motorcycle targets than against infantry fighting vehicles, and it is harder to hit a nimble motorcycle. Other weapons that threaten motorcyclists can be hunted down by friendly drones. And as a bonus, you minimize the attrition of increasingly scarce armored vehicles. In the first five months of 2025, Russia’s confirmed armored vehicle losses were 50 percent lower than the same period in 2024. Meanwhile, the search for better tactical solutions continues. Active methods Small arms: Shotguns appear to be the most reliable means of self-defense for frontline troops. Military units are increasingly equipping soldiers with these weapons, though troops also fire at drones with standard assault rifles. However, individual soldiers still face long odds when confronting drone attacks alone. GPS and radio control signal suppression and interception: Jamming systems can disrupt drone operations by targeting GPS and radio communications, but no truly reliable defense against all types of drones has yet emerged. Russia and Ukraine are locked in an arms race reminiscent of trying to contain a fast-mutating pathogen. For every effective defense that emerges, drone makers develop a workaround. Meanwhile, Moscow and Kyiv are engaged in a separate battle over the satellite navigation systems that guide bombs, drones, and missiles. Both sides periodically report malfunctioning GPS-guided weapons, where even minor targeting errors of a few dozen yards can cause drones to miss their targets entirely. Military analysts say enemy jamming is a likely culprit, though a competing theory shifts the blame to the units’ own defensive electronic warfare systems. The solution typically involves upgrading to more advanced antenna designs. In fact, such anti-jamming technology emerged even before the first global satellite navigation system, Navstar (the military predecessor of civilian GPS), came online in the early 1990s. A sophisticated antenna built with this anti-jamming technology was recently discovered in the debris of a downed Russian “Shahed/Geran” long-range drone. Interceptor drones: This represents the fastest-growing area of drone warfare. Both sides now release dozens of videos each week showing large surveillance drones being shot down by smaller FPV attack drones. For every successful strike captured on camera, there are probably dozens or even hundreds of failed attempts that never make it to the Internet. Large Baba Yaga multicopter drones are shot down just as often. The trend poses serious problems for both armies’ reconnaissance and strike operations, since larger, long-endurance drones not only search for targets and identify enemy positions, but also function as signal repeaters for FPV drones and loitering munitions. Drone-versus-drone combat presents a tougher challenge when FPV drones face off. Social media is filled with videos of “drone dogfights.” To win these aerial skirmishes, drones are outfitted with various weapons, from cables and nets to grappling hooks and shotguns (despite recoil issues). Operators even resort to ramming attacks when they can line up at the right angle. Yet, on the scale of the entire front, where thousands of drones are launched daily, these dogfight intercepts do not play a significant role. More recently, pro-invasion war correspondents in Russia have actively promoted a new defensive system called the “Yolka” — a short-range kinetic interceptor, billed as the successor to shotgun-based defenses. The system is essentially a short-range drone without explosives, designed to ram into enemy FPV drones and other aircraft to destroy them. Questions remain about the effectiveness of these systems, as they have only been tested under controlled conditions. Even bigger concerns surround the economics of “trading” expensive interceptors to stop attacks by cheap, easily assembled FPV drones. Striking drone operator positions: Like traditional counter-battery warfare, where artillery units hunt enemy artillery positions, drone operators target each other. To avoid detection, operators use remote-control antennas, sometimes positioned hundreds of yards from their actual location. To find fiber-optic drone launch sites, operators follow the reflected sunlight in the fiber strands the drones drop en route to their targets. The most effective tactic has been extended aerial surveillance to track enemy operators’ movements, observing where they deploy drones, identifying their living quarters, and mapping their daily routines. For now, this tactic plays a key role in specific areas of fighting, but not along the entire front, and a massive knockout blow against these enemy “airfields” remains impossible. Automatic gun turrets and active defense systems: Likely the most promising approach to countering small kamikaze drones — and the most technically challenging. With operationally effective active defense systems, equipment mounted on armored assets intercepts incoming enemy ordnance. Today, the only country manufacturing these systems is Israel, which sells them to partners in Europe and the United States. After enemies started using kamikaze drones against Israeli tanks in Gaza and near the Lebanese border, Israel began upgrading its active defense systems to counter this new threat. The technical hurdles are substantial, as kamikaze drones strike from unusual angles, particularly from overhead. These challenges necessitated corresponding modifications to both sensors and the interceptor systems. Another complication is that active defense systems typically identify threats based on speed, raising concerns that automatic countermeasures against slower-moving drones could trigger false alarms, potentially putting friendly troops at risk. Israeli manufacturers say they have adapted the “ Iron Fist ” active defense system for drone threats, though the modification remains untested in actual combat. Meanwhile, Russia has repeatedly claimed to have developed active defense systems that can counter attacks from any direction, but such equipment has never appeared on battlefields in Ukraine. Automated anti-drone defense systems that combine detection sensors with machine gun or cannon turrets have yet to be deployed in combat anywhere in the world. Such technology will likely prove crucial for countering small drones in future conflicts, but it is unlikely that these systems will be developed in Russia or Ukraine anytime soon. Disrupting Russian oil production 81 strikes How Ukrainian drone attacks disrupted Russian oil production and fuel prices in 2024 The war behind enemy lines: ‘Gerans’ versus ‘Liutyis’ While troops on the front lines seek countermeasures against drone strikes and ways to use UAVs for their own operational and strategic objectives, a different kind of war is being waged deeper in enemy territory. For three years now, Russian and Ukrainian forces have pounded each other’s military bases and critical economic infrastructure. These strikes (more frequently but not exclusively by Russia) also kill and injure civilians. Neither side has been able to cripple the other’s economy or break its will to keep fighting. Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries have successfully reduced Russian fuel production and exports, while Russian attacks have repeatedly caused severe energy crises in Ukraine. But the impact of these attacks has been nowhere near enough to change how most people see the war. Daily life in Russia remains largely unaffected, while most of Ukrainian society still supports continuing the war until victory. However, neither side shows any intention of scaling back strikes on enemy territory, and both Moscow and Kyiv remain committed to maintaining heightened escalation levels. Russia has expanded production to avoid completely halting such strikes, but it still faces limits on its cruise and ballistic missile capabilities and has shifted much of the workload to drones acquired from Iran. Today, these attack drones bear little resemblance to their Iranian “Shahed” predecessors. Assembled at a factory in Yelabuga in Tatarstan, the systems have undergone extensive modifications and now serve as partial substitutes for Russia’s limited cruise missile inventory. However, despite upgrades to their explosive payloads, the latest Geran UAVs remain effective only against “soft,” poorly defended targets. Russia’s most devastating attacks rely on coordinated mass strikes involving hundreds of drones alongside dozens of missiles that overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems. A Russian “Shahed” drone before hitting a building in Kyiv during an attack on October 17, 2022 Ukraine has hit back with dozens of different long-range drones (though Kyiv still lacks the ability to supplement these attacks with long-range missiles). The best-known and most commonly used is the fixed-wing “Liutyi” drone. Months of long-range strikes have failed to destroy Russia’s energy and defense industries, but Ukraine’s campaign continues out of political necessity: the enemy’s attacks cannot go unanswered. Similarly, Russia has been unable to plunge Ukraine into darkness by wiping out its power grid, despite three years of targeted attacks. The ongoing exchange of strikes has sparked localized technological advances, with both sides incorporating visual guidance systems using video cameras and mobile Internet into their long-range drones to supplement unreliable satellite navigation. Engineers establish network connectivity through cellular modems and local SIM cards — technology that was later adapted to guide Ukrainian FPV drones in strikes against Russian strategic aviation facilities on June 1, 2025. Operation Spiderweb Untangling Operation ‘Spiderweb’ Arms control expert Pavel Podvig explains what Ukraine’s surprise drone strikes reveal about Russia’s strategic nuclear forces Is Ukraine losing the drone war? Recent Western media coverage suggests that Ukraine is facing a critical shortage of drones, and President Volodymyr Zelensky has accused Beijing of restricting Kyiv’s access to UAV supplies. “Chinese Mavic is open for Russians but is closed for Ukrainians,” he said in late May 2025, claiming that “there are production lines on Russian territory where there are Chinese representatives.” Ukrainian officers responsible for drone warfare operations have echoed these supply concerns. China holds a virtual monopoly on low-cost drone components. While the U.S. has provided Ukraine with American-made systems (military-grade “Switchblades” in two variants and “Phoenix Ghost” drones from a little-known manufacturer), their battlefield effectiveness remains unclear, and quantities delivered (tens of thousands) fall well short of Ukrainian military demands. At the same time, Beijing has not been caught openly leveraging its monopoly to influence the war’s outcome. Instead, Chinese officials have looked the other way as FPV drone parts are shipped to both Russia and Ukraine. The current “drone shortage” narrative looks more like an attempt to cover up organizational failures in how resources were allocated during Ukraine’s inaugural “Drone Line” operation, where the army concentrated its unmanned forces but still couldn’t dislodge Russian troops from Pokrovsk. Russian forces have gained the upper hand on other fronts, possibly explaining why Ukraine recently ousted drone commander Vadym Sukharevskyi, who created the branch, in favor of Robert Brovdi (commonly known by his call sign “Madyar”). The years between the two world wars demonstrate that the success of military innovations relies on organizational overhaul and devising new ways for different military branches to coordinate effectively. This synthesis of tanks, mobile artillery, air power, and assault infantry (all concepts developed during World War I) gave Germany’s Wehrmacht its early edge in World War II. In today’s war in Ukraine, neither Moscow nor Kyiv seems to expect such a strategic breakthrough. The Kremlin is trying to use drones and other means to convince Ukraine that Russian forces will keep grinding forward in the coming years until Russia gets all the territory it demands in negotiations. The main goal is to break Ukraine’s will to keep fighting. Meanwhile, Kyiv believes its “Drone Line” initiative will halt Russian advances and convince Moscow that further offensive operations are futile. Report by Meduza’s analysis team Translation by Kevin Rothrock…

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Waiting for Renault. After rebounding in 2024, Russia’s new car market sees yet another wartime plunge

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In 2022, when Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, new car sales in Russia plunged , falling more than 50 percent. Over the following two years, the market rebounded , and by 2024, sales had nearly returned to 2021 levels. But in 2025, the trend has reversed again: between January and May, Russians bought 26 percent fewer cars than during the same period last year. The independent outlet iStories recently dug into what’s driving the decline. Meduza has translated their report. High interest rates In the last few years, about half of all new cars in Russia have been purchased with loans — with the notable exception of 2022, when the full-scale war in Ukraine began. Between January and May 2025, the volume of car loans issued in Russia dropped by nearly 50 percent, totaling just 500 billion rubles ($6.3 billion). The decline actually began in late 2024, triggered by rising interest rates that deterred many potential buyers. According to analysts from Frank RG, the average interest rate on new car loans hovered around 14 percent in July–August 2024, but rose to 16.7 percent by the end of the year. Car loans became more expensive after the Central Bank increased its key rate (the interest rate at which it lends money to commercial banks). The current key rate is 20 percent. While banks have managed to keep car loan rates below this level thanks to subsidies from automakers, state support programs, and other measures, borrowing remains expensive. A Tesla’s incredible journey From showroom to warlord How a Tesla Cybertruck made its way from the U.S. to Ramzan Kadyrov’s driveway Another factor is the Central Bank’s move in July 2024 to tighten lending rules for high-risk borrowers — individuals already spending more than 50 percent of their income servicing debt. “This measure became the main factor cooling the [auto loan] market and excluded up to 40 percent of potential borrowers at some banks in the first quarter,” Frank RG analysts noted . That said, loan rates began to ease in 2025. By May, Frank RG reported an average rate of 13.2 percent, while the United Credit Bureau put it at 17 percent — a drop of 4.4 percentage points in just five months. The car recycling fee doubles Russia’s car recycling fee is a charge meant to cover the government’s cost of disposing of old vehicles. For individuals importing a car for personal use, the fee is nominal — just 3,400 rubles ($43) — provided the engine is no larger than three liters and the car isn’t resold to someone else within a year. For importers and manufacturers, however, the fee can run into hundreds of thousands or even millions of rubles per vehicle — a cost typically passed on to consumers. On October 1, 2024, the recycling fee rose by 70–85 percent, depending on engine size. It increased again on January 1, 2025, by another 10–20 percent — and similar hikes are now expected annually. Read more about the recycling fee The Kremlin’s new tax policy will send car prices skyrocketing but earn the government billions While importers have to pay the full amount, the government has pledged to reimburse manufacturers. The goal is to support domestic production and encourage foreign brands — especially Chinese ones — to localize assembly in Russia. But it’s not that simple, according to Avtostat analyst Igor Morzheretto. “Russian manufacturers also pay the recycling fee,” he told Kommersant. “They’re reimbursed based on their level of localization, but not immediately. That money disappears from their budget for a while, and they have to cover the gap.” Because the fee hikes were announced in advance, many buyers rushed to purchase cars in late 2024, anticipating price increases. This surge in demand contributed to the slump in early 2025. Hoping foreign brands will return The sharp decline in new auto sales in Russia came as a surprise even to industry insiders. “No experts expected sales to fall more than 10–15 percent. For anything beyond that, we can thank the ‘waiters,’” said Avtostat head Sergey Tselikov in March, using his term for consumers who have delayed buying in hopes that familiar car brands would return. Reports out of Germany and South Korea have fed speculation about such comebacks. Even if those brands do return, analysts say it could take months or even years. According to the car magazine Za Rulem , South Korean and some Japanese brands could resume sales within six months, since they kept their dealership networks intact despite suspending new car sales. Western automakers, by contrast, may need at least three years to reestablish operations, according to analysts at Rolf. Sales are down — but what about prices? Despite the buying rush ahead of the recycling fee hike, new car prices rose only modestly overall. According to Avtostat, the average weighted price of a new car in Russia increased just six percent in 2024, reaching 3.12 million rubles ($39,000). Auto.ru reported that the average price barely changed at all. Prices began falling in March 2025, especially for Chinese cars. Discounts ranged from 300,000 to 500,000 rubles ($3,750–$6,260), with some models marked down by as much as one million rubles ($12,500). Dealers were then forced to cut prices due to oversupply, since too many vehicles were imported before the tax hike. “Each car sitting in the showroom loses at least 2.5 percent of its value per month. And profit margins are only 5–6 percent,” the Rolf dealership group explained in March. “After just two months in storage, the profit’s gone.” As of May, inventories remained high. Another reason for the deep discounts is the strengthening ruble, especially against the yuan, which made imported Chinese cars cheaper. Many dealers are using anticipated future profits to fund aggressive price cuts now. Sellers of Russian-made cars also began offering discounts in March, typically between 150,000 and 350,000 rubles ($1,880–$4,380). On June 6, AvtoVAZ announced markdowns on all Lada models through the end of the month. But according to a Lada dealer, even with the discounts, Chinese brands often offer more appealing and affordable options. “A modern Chinese car packed with electronics — even a basic crossover — can cost the same as a Lada Vesta,” noted Igor Morzheretto. Dealers are expected to clear out overstocked inventory by summer, after which prices will inevitably rise, experts say . Discounts may disappear entirely or remain available only on select models. Analysts surveyed by Autonews expect car prices to increase by 3–15 percent over the summer. How luxury cars still make it to Russia Hot rods, cold trails A new joint investigation reveals how luxury cars reach Russian buyers through Kyrgyzstan despite international sanctions…

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Putin holds phone calls with leaders of Israel and Iran

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Russian President Vladimir Putin has spoken by phone with both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, the state news agency Interfax reports. In his conversation with Netanyahu, Putin stressed that “Russia condemns Israel’s actions, which were carried out in violation of the UN Charter and international law.” In his call with Pezeshkian, the Russian president offered condolences to the Iranian leadership and people “in connection with the heavy loss of life caused by Israeli strikes,” Interfax writes. Early on Friday morning, the Israeli Defense Forces carried out strikes on Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure. The attacks killed senior military officials, scientists, and civilians. Russia and Ukraine react to Israel’s attack on Iran Moscow and Kyiv react as Israel attacks Iran’s nuclear sites and military command…

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Moscow court bans two websites offering Instagram verification services, citing Meta’s ‘extremist’ designation

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A Moscow court has declared the websites of two companies offering Instagram profile verification services “extremist” and banned them in Russia. The court rulings were discovered in the case archive by Verstka . Prosecutors requested the ban on the websites of RosMedia and Aura, arguing that their services bore “signs of financing extremist activity.” They noted that Instagram is owned by Meta, which was designated an extremist organization in Russia in 2022, and that verifying an account on Instagram — obtaining a blue checkmark — requires a subscription to Meta Verified. “Providing services for verifying online accounts on Instagram […] by transferring funds to pay for a Meta Verified subscription is criminal in nature and may contribute to the financing of an extremist organization,” the prosecutor’s filing stated. As Mediazona reported , neither company offered Meta subscriptions directly but instead provided “full support” services to help clients obtain Instagram verification. RosMedia reportedly charged around 300,000 rubles (about $3,750) for the service. In March 2022, a Moscow court declared Meta an “extremist organization” at the request of the Prosecutor General’s Office. The court also ordered Facebook and Instagram, both owned by Meta, to be blocked in Russia.…

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Remains of 1,200 Ukrainian service members returned as part of exchange with Russia

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Ukraine has received the bodies of 1,200 fallen soldiers as part of an ongoing repatriation effort, the country’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War said on Friday. “According to the Russian side, the bodies belong to Ukrainian citizens, primarily military personnel. The repatriation was carried out in accordance with agreements reached in Istanbul,” the agency said in a statement. Update: Russian news agencies Interfax and TASS, citing informed sources, report that during the June 13 exchange, the Ukrainian side did not transfer any bodies to the Russian side. The Russian Defense Ministry has not issued an official comment. At those talks, Russian and Ukrainian delegations agreed to a large-scale exchange of prisoners, including the wounded and servicemen between the ages of 18 and 25. The two sides also committed to returning the remains of 6,000 dead. The exchange began on June 9. On June 11, the remains of 1,212 Ukrainian soldiers were returned to Ukraine, while Russia received the remains of 27 of its soldiers.…

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‘If all those soldiers drop dead tomorrow, I’ll pour a glass of wine’. Siberia woman arrested over video slamming ‘Russia Day’ and public support for war

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The Russian authorities arrested a woman in the Irkutsk region on Friday over a video on Instagram in which she criticized the country’s Russia Day holiday and the ongoing invasion of Ukraine. A day earlier, 35-year-old Maria Makhmutova had posted a clip of herself calling Russian soldiers “murderers” and criticizing her compatriots for celebrating the June 12th holiday amid falling living standards and an unprovoked war against their neighbor. Here’s what we know about Makhmutova’s case. Officers from Russia’s Center for Combating Extremism (Center “E”) in the Irkutsk region have arrested 35-year-old Maria Makhmutova over what they called an “offensive video” about Russia Day and the Russian military, according to the regional police press office. A video released by the agency shows emergency responders breaking down the door to Makhmutova’s apartment. Police said she had refused to open it, claiming the lock was broken. They also reported that she behaved “inappropriately” during the arrest and told officers she might harm herself. She was ultimately taken to a psychiatric facility for drug and alcohol testing. “The woman’s actions are being legally assessed,” the Interior Ministry said. As of this writing, it’s unclear whether authorities have pressed charges against Makhmutova. On June 12, Makhmutova posted an Instagram story criticizing both Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Russia Day, which was being celebrated that day. “What fucking holiday is it? A fucking amazing one — Russia Day,” Makhmutova said in the video, according to Mediazona. She continued: And what, you people are proud of this shit? Proud of what? That you’re barely scraping by? That you have to kill people to afford cars and apartments? That you drink like it’s your last day on Earth? That you wear those fucking medals? Your medals today are a mark for life, a brand for life, showing that you’re fucking murderers. […] If all those ‘ special military operation ’ soldiers drop dead tomorrow, I’ll pour myself a glass of wine. After the video spread on social media, members of the pro-war group The People’s Call filed complaints with the Investigative Committee and the Prosecutor General’s Office. Investigative Committee head Alexander Bastrykin ordered a formal inquiry. According to the outlet 7x7, Makhmutova said on social media that she had contacted the police herself after receiving threats. In another video, she attempted to cut her wrist on camera. When officers arrived, Makhmutova reportedly told them she couldn’t open the door because it had been “sealed shut.”…

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Moscow and Kyiv react as Israel attacks Iran’s nuclear sites and military command

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People inspect damaged buildings following Israeli airstrikes on June 13, 2025. Tehran, Iran. In the early hours of June 13, Israel carried out airstrikes on Iran, hitting nuclear sites and killing top Iranian military officials. In the aftermath, Russia — whose military-industrial ties with Iran have deepened in recent years and which is a major buyer of Iranian Shahed drones for its war in Ukraine — condemned the strikes in strong terms, while Ukraine struck a more measured tone, warning of broader risks to global security. Here’s what the foreign ministries of both countries had to say. Russia’s Foreign Ministry issued a sharp rebuke of Israel on Friday, condemning the country’s June 13 airstrikes on Iranian territory. In a statement, the ministry called the strikes “unprovoked” and “categorically unacceptable,” accusing Israel of violating international law and threatening global stability. “Unprovoked military strikes against a sovereign U.N. member state — its citizens, its peaceful sleeping cities, and its nuclear energy infrastructure — are categorically unacceptable,” the Foreign Ministry said. “The international community cannot remain indifferent to such acts of violence.” The statement comes as Russia continues its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including frequent missile and drone attacks on civilian infrastructure in cities far from the front line. The ministry expressed “deep concern” over what it described as a “dangerous escalation of tensions in the Middle East.” “We have repeatedly warned of the dangers of military adventurism,” it said, adding that “responsibility for the consequences of this provocation will rest squarely with the Israeli leadership.” It also accused Israel of undermining fragile diplomatic efforts to “ease tensions and address suspicions and biases surrounding Iran’s peaceful nuclear program.” The strikes, the ministry noted, coincided with a session of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Board of Governors and came just ahead of a planned new round of indirect talks between Iran and the United States — “making this episode especially cynical.” The Foreign Ministry also blamed Western countries, accusing them of fueling “anti-Iranian hysteria” and of pushing a “politically motivated” resolution through the IAEA without broad support. Moscow, which has recently sought to position itself as a mediator in the region, reiterated that there is “no military solution” to the Iranian nuclear issue. “We remain firmly convinced that […] these challenges must be resolved solely through peaceful, political, and diplomatic means,” the statement read. The ministry called for “restraint” to “avoid further escalation that could push the region toward full-scale war.” The Kremlin crushed Meduza’s business model and wiped out our ad revenue. We’ve been blocked and outlawed in Russia, where donating to us or even sharing our posts is a crime. But we’re still here — bringing independent journalism to millions of our readers inside Russia and around the world. Meduza’s survival is under threat — again. Donald Trump’s foreign aid freeze has slashed funding for international groups backing press freedom. Meduza was hurt too. It’s yet another blow in our ongoing struggle to survive. You could be our lifeline. Please, help Meduza survive with a small recurring donation. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry also weighed in on the Israeli strikes, expressing concern over the risk of further destabilization in the Middle East and warning of potential harm to international security and the global economy. The ministry said it was “essential to avoid further destabilization of the region and prevent civilian casualties.” The statement also pointed to Iran’s role in supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The ministry said the Iranian regime “supports Russia in its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and provides Moscow with weapons to kill Ukrainians,” and described Tehran as “the source of numerous problems in the Middle East and beyond.” It added that restoring peace in the region would serve the interests of the entire international community, stressing that “security in Europe and the Middle East are directly linked.” Ukraine called for a unified global response, urging the international community to take “joint and decisive actions” to address “today’s security threats and coordinately deter a group of aggressive regimes — Russia, Iran, and North Korea.” Putin, the mediator Trump says Putin offered to broker a new U.S.–Iran nuclear deal. Could the Russian president really help? And what’s in it for him?…

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Russia bans domestic airlines from flying to or over Israel and Iran as hostilities escalate

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Russia’s Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsiya) has issued guidance for domestic airlines “in connection with the sharp escalation of the situation in the Middle East.” Under the directive, Russian carriers are prohibited from operating flights to airports in Israel and Iran, and from flying through the airspace of Israel, Jordan, Iraq, and Iran. The restrictions, introduced “to ensure flight safety,” will provisionally remain in effect until June 26, 2025. In the early hours of June 13, Israel carried out strikes on Iran, targeting nuclear infrastructure and ballistic missile production facilities. In response, Iran launched at least 100 drones at Israel.…

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Kremlin ‘strongly condemns sharp escalation’ following Israeli airstrikes on Iran

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Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Friday that Moscow was “concerned” and “strongly condemns the sharp escalation of tensions,” following Israel’s strike on Iran, Interfax reported. “At the president’s direction, the Foreign Ministry will issue a detailed statement in the very near future, which will then be sent to the United Nations,” Peskov added. Israeli warplanes carried out strikes on Iranian territory in the early hours of June 13. The operation, called Operation Rising Lion, reportedly killed several high-ranking officials, including Hossein Salami, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Mohammad Bagheri, the chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces, as well as a number of nuclear scientists. In a televised address, Brigadier General Abolfazl Shekarchi, a spokesman for Iran’s armed forces, vowed that Iran’s military would respond to the Israeli operation. On Friday morning, the Israel Defense Forces said dozens of drones had been launched from Iran toward Israeli territory and that Israeli forces were prepared to intercept them.…

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‘You Are Not Alone’ campaign raises over $150,000 for Russian political prisoners in a single day

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The “ You Are Not Alone ” fundraiser, held on June 12 by independent Russian media outlets in partnership with the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), raised more than 12 million rubles ($150,000) to support Russian political prisoners and their families. By the end of the broadcast, donations had reached 12,429,395 rubles (about $155,000) — and fundraising is still ongoing. Proceeds will help cover essential expenses for political prisoners and their families — from food and medicine to legal defense and travel for prison visits. The campaign included a 12-hour live broadcast, streamed on the organizers’ websites, the TV Rain television channel, and the YouTube channels Popular Politics and Navalny Live. Guests included independent journalists, bloggers, opposition figures, politicians, and human rights advocates. People facing political persecution in Russia — and their families — need your support. If you live outside Russia, please consider contributing to the fundraiser here . Because it’s not safe for people inside Russia to donate, support from abroad is essential. This marks the third annual “You Are Not Alone” solidarity fundraiser. As in previous years, the drive will continue through the summer. For example, a memorial concert for Alexey Navalny will take place in Berlin on June 28. And on June 7, the FBK raised 1.9 million rubles ($24,165) during a live-streamed badminton match on the Navalny Live YouTube channel. Last year’s campaign raised over 24 million rubles ($305,248) on June 12 alone. By the end of the year, the total had surpassed 45 million rubles ($572,352). In 2024, 7,900 people donated, with 1,033 signing up for recurring contributions. More than 300 political prisoners and their families received support — and over 100 of them now receive regular assistance thanks to ongoing donations. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, nearly 20,000 people have been detained for anti-war protests, according to the human rights group OVD-Info. At least 1,171 individuals have faced criminal charges, and more than 11,000 misdemeanor cases have been opened under laws against “discrediting” the Russian military.…

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A new ‘buffer zone’? Russia advances in east-central Ukraine, pushing toward territory it does not already claim

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Like our earlier reports on the combat situation in Ukraine, this article takes stock of the recent developments on the battlefield based on open-source information. Meduza has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from the very start, and our detailed military analyses are part of our commitment to objective reporting on a war we firmly oppose. Our map is based exclusively on open-source photos and videos, most of them posted by eyewitnesses on social media. We collect available evidence and determine its geolocation markers, adding only the photos and videos that clear this process. Meduza doesn’t try to track the conflict in real time; the data reflected on the map are typically at least 48 hours old. Key updates as of June 12, 2025 The Russian army’s offensive has accelerated simultaneously along several fronts. Russian forces deployed significant troops to the northern part of Ukraine’s Sumy region after several Ukrainian brigades were redeployed away from the area to other parts of the front. While the advance doesn’t currently pose a direct threat to the city of Sumy, Ukraine’s military command will need to find reserves to stabilize the situation. The redeployed Ukrainian brigades, which had already sustained losses in fighting near Sudzha, have been sent to the area around Kostiantynivka in central Donbas to try to stop a Russian breakthrough. So far, they haven’t succeeded. Russian forces are advancing on Kostiantynivka from three directions: from Chasiv Yar in the east, from the south from the direction of Toretsk, and from the west along the road to Pokrovsk. Farther west along the same road, Russian troops are attempting to break through to the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, another Russian group southwest of Pokrovsk has reached the border of the Dnipropetrovsk region and is preparing to maneuver around the city from the west. Asked if Russia’s aim was to create a “buffer zone” in the area, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told journalists on Monday, “Without a doubt that is part of it.” Meduza has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from the very start, and we are committed to reporting objectively on a war we firmly oppose. Join Meduza in its mission to challenge the Kremlin’s censorship with the truth. Donate today . Kostiantynivka, Toretsk, and Chasiv Yar After heavy fighting, Russian forces from the 8th Combined Arms Army, redeployed this spring from near Kurakhove to the Toretsk metropolitan area, have broken through Ukrainian lines to both the west and east of Toretsk. The 8th Army’s 150th Guards Motor Rifle Division managed to break through along the Nelipivka–Dyliivka axis, but only after repelling multiple counterattacks, during which Ukrainian forces twice reached central Toretsk. The division has now almost reached the eastern edge of the Kleban-Bykske Reservoir, putting Ukraine’s northern supply route at risk. However, the Kryvyi Torets River still separates Russian forces from the reservoir. The division’s units are continuing to push toward Kostiantynivka, threatening to advance directly on the city and cut off Ukrainian forces defending positions near the Siverskyi Donets–Donbas Canal. Troops from the 150th Division are also storming the Saint Matrona Mine — the last major Ukrainian stronghold in northern Toretsk. The breakthrough toward the Kleban-Bykske Reservoir, effectively to the rear of the mine’s defenders, has made their position increasingly difficult to hold. To the west of Toretsk, units from the 20th Guards Motor Rifle Division — also part of the 8th Army — have pushed deep into Ukrainian defenses along the Pokrovsk–Kostiantynivka road and farther south, nearly reaching the western edge of the Kleban-Bykske Reservoir near the village of Yablunivka. The main Ukrainian grouping in the area, composed of National Guard units, is currently positioned on Toretsk’s western outskirts, in the settlements of Leonidivka and Shcherbynivka. If Russian forces succeed in fully capturing Yablunivka, these Ukrainian troops risk being cut off from the rear. Russian attacks near Toretsk are likely to soon force Ukrainian army and National Guard troops to retreat toward Kostiantynivka. Meanwhile, Russian troops have launched a new offensive on Kostiantynivka from the direction of Chasiv Yar, capturing part of a key Ukrainian stronghold in the village of Stupochky, which lies along the Bakhmut–Kostiantynivka road. North of the Pokrovsk–Kostiantynivka road, near the village of Popiv Yar, Russian forces continue efforts to bypass Kostiantynivka from the north — advancing toward Druzhkivka and the southern outskirts of the Kramatorsk–Sloviansk agglomeration. That agglomeration appears to be the primary target of Russia’s 2025 offensive. Pokrovsk and the border of the Dnipropetrovsk region Contrary to the expectations of many experts, the Russian army once again did not attempt to storm Pokrovsk, a key defensive hub for Ukraine in western Donbas. Instead, they’re trying to seize positions on the flanks of Ukraine’s defense, with the apparent aim of eventually bypassing the city from two sides. To this end, Russian forces are likely planning to break through to the north on one side, from positions on the Pokrovsk–Kostiantynivka highway near the village of Novoekonomichne, and through Novopavlivka, a village to the southwest of Pokrovsk in the Dnipropetrovsk region, on the other. A Russian offensive in early June stopped on the outskirts of Novoekonomichne, where their path remains blocked by the Kazennyi Torets River and some of the Ukrainian reserves transferred from the Sumy region and Toretsk itself. Southwest of Pokrovsk, Russian troops from the “Tsentr” contingent broke through the village of Horikhove to the border of the Dnipropetrovsk region. Their forward positions are now located five kilometers (three miles) from Novopavlivka. If Russian troops capture this village, they’ll be able to advance north and cut off the highway that connects Pokrovsk to the city of Dnipro. At the same time, Russian troops from the “Vostok” contingent, which previously seized the district centers of Velyka Novosilka and Kurakhove, are breaking through to the Novopavlivka area from the south. Troops from the two groupings have closed their flanks, capturing the villages of Oleksiivka and Bahatyr. Vostok units have also approached Komar, a village further west along the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia highway. All of these attacks could lead to a situation where the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) are forced to retreat to Novopavlivka and deep into the Zaporizhzhia region, along the Donetsk–Zaporizhzhia highway. Sumy region Russia has returned rested units that took part in the battle for Sudzha to the front on the border between the Kursk region and Ukraine’s Sumy region. Earlier, some experts predicted that these troops would be sent to central Donbas or to other areas in Ukraine. Instead, fresh Russian troops, as well as forces transferred from the Kharkiv area, crossed the border to the west of an existing bridgehead in the Sumy region, located near the village of Yunakivka on the Sumy–Sudzha highway. In this new sector, Russian forces advanced five to eight kilometers (three to five miles) into the Sumy region, reaching Yunakivka from the west. There are also Russian troops located on the northern outskirts of the village. Given the Russian army’s obvious numerical advantage in the Sumy region, the AFU may be counting on difficult terrain to halt their advance. To the south of Yunakivka is a large forested area, through which flows the Psel River and its swampy banks. The Oleshnya River also cuts off Russian troops from Sumy from the north. Though Russia has more troops than Ukraine in this section of the front, it’s clearly not enough to storm a city as large as Sumy. That said, the AFU can’t afford to let Russian troops approach the city. Both the example of Pokrovsk in 2024–2025 and the northern outskirts of Kharkiv in 2022 show that frontline cities can be quickly reduced to ruins even without being stormed. As the situation in Pokrovsk also shows, the defense of a city with the front line running along its outskirts, and which must not be surrendered under any circumstances, will continuously “eat up” a large number of reserves, leaving other areas exposed. What the Ukrainian command needs right now is to find forces to contain the Russian offensive on the far approaches to Sumy. Meduza is careful in working with data, but mistakes are still possible, and perhaps even inevitable. If you spot one, please let us know by sending an email to reports@meduza.io . Thank you! Read our previous combat map On the move again Russian forces break through Ukrainian defenses in major Donbas offensive Meduza’s Razbor (“Explainers”) team…

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Chats and punishment. Journalists and rights groups accuse Telegram of FSB ties and exposing user data — just how worried should users be?

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In recent days, the messaging app Telegram has come under scrutiny in two high-profile investigations. On June 6, the human rights group Department One reported that Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) has charged people with treason for contacting bots or feedback accounts linked to Ukrainian Telegram channels. Then, on June 10, the investigative outlet iStories reported ties between Russian intelligence agencies and individuals responsible for Telegram’s server infrastructure — and raised concerns that they may have access to sensitive user data. Meduza reviewed both investigations and gathered expert commentary to understand what this could mean for user privacy on the platform. What did the investigations reveal? A new investigation by the human rights group Department One found that, as part of a criminal case opened by Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) in the spring of 2022, security agents have been intercepting Telegram messages. In connection with the case, which concerns the alleged collection of information by Ukrainian intelligence that “threatens the security of the Russian Federation,” the FSB has been monitoring communications between Russian users and bots or feedback accounts linked to Ukrainian Telegram channels. It’s not clear how exactly the FSB is gaining access to these private messages. However, human rights advocates note that at the time individuals are arrested and charged with treason, the authorities already have copies of their conversations with Ukrainian channels. “This may point to the use of undisclosed cyber-espionage tools or cooperation between Telegram and the Russian authorities,” said Department One head Dmitry Zair-Bek. In a separate investigation, iStories found that a significant portion of Telegram’s server infrastructure is maintained by a company called Global Network Management (GNM), which is registered in Antigua and Barbuda — but also has a physical presence in Russia. The company also owns a router within Telegram’s server infrastructure — a critical piece of network hardware through which messenger traffic flows. GNM is owned by Vladimir Vedeneev, who also served as Telegram’s chief financial officer as of 2018. The IP addresses of Telegram’s servers, which the investigation found are currently controlled by GNM, previously belonged — until 2020 — to GlobalNet, a backbone telecom operator based in St. Petersburg. Vedeneev is a co-owner of GlobalNet alongside Roman Venediktov, a former military officer and longtime business associate of Telegram founder Pavel Durov. In 2022, Vedeneev and Venediktov’s company — which had previously described itself as the only provider offering direct access to Telegram in Russia and the CIS — deployed Deep Packet Inspection ( DPI ) technology to monitor user traffic. Among its clients is GlavNIVTs , an analytics center that unofficially spies on citizens on the Internet for Russian law enforcement and security agencies. Vedeneev is also linked to Electrontelecom, another company that works with the FSB. iStories also flagged a Telegram feature that, while not hidden , raises serious concerns. Whenever the app generates an encrypted message on a user’s phone or computer — whether in a regular or “secret” chat — it automatically includes an unencrypted device identifier at the beginning of the message, known as “auth_key_id.” This vulnerability was analyzed by digital security expert Michał “rysiek” Woźniak (his detailed report on auth_key_id is available here ). As Woźniak explained, any intermediary routing Telegram traffic could potentially track these device identifiers. Combined with other metadata — like IP addresses and timestamps — this might make it possible to determine a user’s location or link devices exchanging messages. Durov’s own legal issues Pavel and Tucker, together again Telegram founder Durov returns for hour-long interview with Carlson to discuss France’s criminal charges How did the companies respond? Pavel Durov’s company offered only a few brief statements. In a comment to the outlet Vot Tak, Telegram’s press office said that “all Telegram servers are owned by Telegram and maintained by Telegram staff” and that “unauthorized access is not possible.” The company added, “Telegram has no employees or servers in Russia. In the entire history of Telegram, not once has it handed over private messages to third parties, and its encryption has never been broken.” In a separate comment to BBC News Russian, Telegram stated that it “has contracts with dozens of different service providers around the world,” but that none of them “has access to Telegram’s data or confidential infrastructure.” GNM told Varlamov News that its owner, Vladimir Vedeneev, has never held any official position at Telegram, and that references to him as chief financial officer in past documents were “technical and formal in nature.” GNM emphasized that it “does not have access to Telegram data, encryption keys, or message content.” As for the device identifier auth_key_id, the company said it “does not contain any unique user identifier.” The company also said, “Even if network traffic is intercepted, it is impossible to determine who is communicating with whom or to decrypt messages without the encryption key. […] No GNM equipment has been used to analyze, filter, or monitor Telegram traffic. […] [GNM] does not cooperate with Russian state agencies, does not engage in surveillance, has no ties to intelligence services, and strictly complies with the laws of the countries where it operates.” The Kremlin crushed Meduza’s business model and wiped out our ad revenue. We’ve been blocked and outlawed in Russia, where donating to us or even sharing our posts is a crime. But we’re still here — bringing independent journalism to millions of our readers inside Russia and around the world. Meduza’s survival is under threat — again. Donald Trump’s foreign aid freeze has slashed funding for international groups backing press freedom. Meduza was hurt too. It’s yet another blow in our ongoing struggle to survive. You could be our lifeline. Please, help Meduza survive with a small recurring donation. What do experts and activists have to say? The investigations into Telegram prompted responses from several well-known experts who study the platform’s technical infrastructure and the broader landscape of Internet censorship in Russia. Here’s what some of them had to say: Investigative journalist Andrey Zakharov Through SORM , the FSB can see who in Russia is connecting to Telegram (as long as the person isn’t using a VPN). Based on packet size, it can tell whether they’re making calls or sending messages — but it can’t read the content or listen in, since those are encrypted. That said, Telegram has many vulnerabilities, which in its case often aren’t bugs but features — like the lack of end-to-end encryption, which allows users to access their chats on a new device. One such vulnerability is the open auth_key_id included at the beginning of every message. Telegram doesn’t even try to hide this — it’s clearly spelled out in the MTProto encryption protocol documentation by Nikolai Durov. Auth_key_id is also visible through SORM, and Russian authorities may have used it to track people in occupied parts of Ukraine (credit to David Frenkel from Mediazona for pointing out this 2022 publication ). It’s important to clarify: all telecom operators [in Russia] are required to install SORM equipment, regardless of whether they hold contracts with the FSB or privately oppose Putin. Mediazona journalist David Frenkel If someone — like the Russian authorities — is monitoring all Internet connections in a region, then it’s easy to track when a specific user sends or receives messages [using the auth_key_id]. These auth_key_ids can also be visible to someone with access to Telegram’s servers — like Vedeneev. In 2022, this method of surveillance was described in a case involving partisans in Kherson. Russian security agents told one detainee they would release him on the condition that he send them screenshots of any new conversations with his associates. They also said they would know if he received a new message but didn’t send a screenshot. Based on Telegram’s technical documentation, this is entirely possible: the server sends messages tagged with a fixed device number. So, it’s possible to see that a device is sending or receiving messages, and where the person is located (the IP address), but not what the message says or who it’s for. However there are also other methods — beyond the obvious vulnerabilities — that can be used to deanonymize users or even determine whether someone is in a specific chat. These rely on statistical traffic analysis, and in that sense, Telegram is no different from other messengers. There’s plenty of academic research on this — here’s one recent paper. There are also simpler explanations [for how the authorities might have gotten access to the messages mentioned in the Department One investigation]: “honeypots” (fake resources, which independent researchers recently wrote about), software vulnerabilities, or just carelessness and mistakes by correspondents — mistakes they don’t always want to admit. Former Telegram manager Anton Rosenberg User chats are stored in Telegram’s proprietary non-relational database management system called text-engine. The data files on disk are encrypted, and the disks themselves are also encrypted. But of course, Telegram itself has both sets of encryption keys (and Pavel [Durov] confirmed this in his August 2017 article, Why Isn’t Telegram End-to-End Encrypted by Default? ). A third party who removes a disk from the server wouldn’t be able to decrypt the data — but at the level of the running database, the messages are, in fact, unencrypted. Since I worked on anti-spam efforts, I had access to them. Anti-Corruption Foundation political director Leonid Volkov I was deeply disappointed both by the iStories piece on Telegram and by the way people uncritically amplified it. That’s not how this should be done. Turning it into a scandal — “ahhh Telegram is handing everything to the FSB” — just because (a) the LIR from which Telegram buys its IP addresses was founded by a Russian national, and (b) that Russian also owns a small provider that, like every single provider in Russia, has installed SORM — is, frankly, an unprofessional and sensationalist stretch. There’s no evidence that the company providing Telegram with server infrastructure has access to user messages, let alone that it passes them to the FSB. Claims like that require evidence that’s an order of magnitude more compelling than what iStories presents. Spreading panic based on shaky (and inaccurate) accusations is just foolish. And most importantly — there’s the elephant in the room, holding Occam’s razor in its trunk. The FSB doesn’t need any technological backdoors into Telegram’s infrastructure when there’s Durov, who, as we’ve seen time and again, is clearly willing to make sweeping compromises, fulfill Kremlin demands, and play behind-the-scenes games with Putin and other dictators. telegram and the Kremlin Telegram’s abandoned legal battle How Pavel Durov walked away from a landmark case against Russian censorship at Europe’s highest human rights court The Bell [What does the iStories investigation mean for the safety of Telegram users?] In practical terms — not much. Even if we assume that the FSB has access to the infrastructure handling Telegram’s Russian traffic (the servers in question are located outside Russia), this alone doesn’t give them any surveillance capabilities beyond what they already have through the SORM system installed at all Russian Internet providers. If Vedeneev’s company controls only the IP addresses through which Telegram traffic passes (as iStories proved), it would be able to manage the routing of that traffic. But that only provides access to the same data available to an Internet provider — and thus, to the security services via SORM — or to a VPN service, a technical expert from [the digital rights group] Roskomsvoboda explained to The Bell. That’s not a huge amount of information: just your IP address, your session duration on Telegram, and the volume of traffic. To access the rest of the data — for example, the contents of messages — you need encryption keys that only Telegram itself could provide. But that’s not what’s being discussed here. Even if we assume that all Telegram traffic passes through this infrastructure, and that the FSB has unrestricted access to it (neither of which the investigation claims), the most it would give the security services is the same kind of metadata on Telegram’s international users that they already collect on Russian users through SORM. It would not allow the FSB to read any messages. Lawyer Sarkis Darbinyan There is something new in this investigation — namely, that a certain Mr. Vedeneev (and his LIR structure) is the main contractor working with Durov, and that Vedeneev had ties to government contracts and the FSB. That’s a key point, because up until now, Durov has repeatedly emphasized that Telegram — even without end-to-end encryption in regular chats like WhatsApp — is a more secure option precisely because it doesn’t cooperate with government agencies, doesn’t collect metadata, and doesn’t have backdoors. Durov has said that the absence of end-to-end encryption in Telegram’s standard chats isn’t due to any malicious intent, but rather for user convenience — so people can transfer their chat history between devices. As for message protection, Durov has claimed that it’s ensured in part by a distributed data storage architecture, with servers located in different countries supposedly making it impossible for any one government to access them all at once and thus gain access to users’ conversations. Of course, Durov never mentioned that [Telegram’s] IP addresses are supplied by Mr. Vedeneev, a figure who, given his background and business activities, seems a dubious one. You can connect the dots from there. The facts we now have certainly cast a shadow over the messenger and raise doubts about Durov’s credibility. It’s possible that someone does have access to these chats. We know that Vedeneev is a trusted party. But we don’t know whether he or his company actually understand Telegram’s internal encryption algorithms. In short, there are reasonable doubts about all this. At the same time, to be fair, no one has yet proven that Telegram regularly collaborates with Russian security agencies or that anyone has access to all users’ messages. The iStories investigation doesn’t directly prove any leaks or cooperation. Even if we assume that the FSB has full access to the entire infrastructure through which Telegram traffic passes, this alone wouldn’t give them any surveillance capabilities beyond what Russian special services already have through the SORM system installed at every telecom node. SORM’s own issues Suspicious sniffers Programmer discovers thousands of phone numbers, addresses, and geolocations apparently leaked by Russia’s ‘SORM’ surveillance tech Mikhail Klimarev , director of the Internet Protection Society So far (and I stress SO FAR), we haven’t seen a single message that was actually leaked from Telegram [to the FSB, as Department One reported]. But as Andrey Zakharov wrote — this isn’t a bug, it’s a feature. Telegram isn’t really a messaging app anymore. It’s more like a social network. And yes — it’s true that users can be identified in Telegram through their TelegramID, a unique number assigned to every user upon registration. Otherwise, how would one user be able to message another without some kind of identifier? And yes — if you post in public chats or comment on posts, that TelegramID becomes visible. From there, someone can search for that ID in other public chats, compare it against leaked data, and do a whole lot more. But that’s not really an issue if you’re just messaging someone you know and they’re replying. Your TelegramID remains unknown to anyone else, and all messages are encrypted in transit against interception by third parties. And if you enable “secret chats,” even Durov himself can’t read them. It’s basically like Signal — just without all the preaching about “protection.” So how is the FSB catching people [in the cases mentioned by Department One]? The answer is simple: it’s called a honeypot. Or bait. Or whatever else you want to call it. FSB agents just create bots themselves and spread them everywhere as supposed “contact bots” for the SBU or the Russian Volunteer Corps. Then people write to them, and the agents either trick them into setting themselves up — giving up a phone number, a bank card — or they use OSINT tools through bots [like] “ Eye of God ,” of which there are now a million. That’s how they catch people. Blaming an operator [as iStories does in its investigation] for having something to do with traffic just because that traffic passes through their infrastructure is, to put it mildly, a stretch. Accusations about who worked where a hundred years ago won’t hold up in court either. Lots of people have worked all over the place — I’ve been in tech for 35 years, and I’ve worked everywhere. And most importantly — [the iStories investigation] mentions something about user IDs leaking in plaintext. That’s something that needs to be double-checked — a vulnerability like that wouldn’t go unnoticed by the legion of hackers out there. […] But right off the bat, my gut tells me this is a bit of a reach — like they’re forcing the facts to fit the narrative. Overall, I expected more evidence and fewer emotions from the investigation. Why does the Russian army use Telegram? Telegram has become a key tool for the Russian military. Why does Moscow continue to rely on a Dubai-based civilian messaging app?…

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Russia and Ukraine conduct new prisoner swap involving wounded soldiers

3 days ago

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Russia and Ukraine carried out another prisoner exchange on June 12, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced . “Today, soldiers from our army, the National Guard, and the border service are back home,” Zelensky wrote on Telegram. “All of them require medical treatment, and they will receive the care they need. This is the second stage in the return of severely wounded and seriously ill servicemen.” Russia’s Defense Ministry also confirmed that the exchange had taken place. Neither country disclosed how many prisoners were transferred. A large-scale exchange, agreed upon by Russian and Ukrainian delegations during talks in Istanbul, began on June 9, when the two sides exchanged prisoners of war under the age of 25. On June 10, they exchanged wounded soldiers who had been taken captive. On June 11, Ukraine received the bodies of 1,212 fallen servicemen, while Russia received the bodies of 27.…

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Marco Rubio issues first Russia Day greeting by a U.S. secretary of state since 2022

3 days ago

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The U.S. State Department has published a Russia Day greeting from Secretary of State Marco Rubio, written “on behalf of the American people.” “The United States remains committed to supporting the Russian people as they continue to build on their aspirations for a brighter future. We also take this opportunity to reaffirm the United States’ desire for constructive engagement with the Russian Federation to bring about a durable peace between Russia and Ukraine. It is our hope that peace will foster more mutually beneficial relations between our countries,” the message reads. The last time a U.S. secretary of state issued a Russia Day greeting was in 2022, when Antony Blinken held the post. At the time, he wrote that Russians, “like people everywhere, deserve to live their lives free of repression and to be able to exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms without fear of retribution.” “Too many Russian citizens are behind bars for the ‘crime’ of speaking truth to power about their government’s actions. This internal repression is occurring as the Kremlin is waging an unprovoked and unjustified war against a sovereign, neighboring state,” Blinken wrote. “Russia’s government is attempting to keep its citizens in the dark about the atrocities it is committing against the people of Ukraine.”…

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Russian forces launch second consecutive night of drone strikes on Ukraine’s Kharkiv, injuring 14

3 days ago