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It’s the very first episode of The Big Pitch with Jimmy Carr and our first guest is Phil Wang! And Phil’s subgenre is…This Place is Evil. We’re talking psychological torture, we’re talking gory death scenes, we’re talking Lorraine Kelly?! The Big Pitch with Jimmy Carr is a brand new comedy podcast where each week a different celebrity guest pitches an idea for a film based on one of the SUPER niche sub-genres on Netflix. From ‘Steamy Crime Movies from the 1970s’ to ‘Australian Dysfunctional Family Comedies Starring A Strong Female Lead’, our celebrity guests will pitch their wacky plot, their dream cast, the marketing stunts, and everything in between. By the end of every episode, Jimmy Carr, Comedian by night / “Netflix Executive” by day, will decide whether the pitch is greenlit or condemned to development hell! Listen on all podcast platforms and watch on the Netflix Is A Joke YouTube Channel . The Big Pitch is a co-production by Netflix and BBC Studios Audio. Jimmy Carr is an award-winning stand-up comedian and writer, touring his brand-new show JIMMY CARR: LAUGHS FUNNY throughout the USA from May to November this year, as well as across the UK and Europe, before hitting Australia and New Zealand in early 2026. All info and tickets for the tour are available at JIMMYCARR.COM Production Coordinator: Becky Carewe-Jeffries Production Manager: Mabel Finnegan-Wright Editor: Stuart Reid Producer: Pete Strauss Executive Producer: Richard Morris Executive Producers for Netflix: Kathryn Huyghue, Erica Brady, and David Markowitz Set Design: Helen Coyston Studios: Tower Bridge Studios Make Up: Samantha Coughlan Cameras: Daniel Spencer Sound: Charlie Emery Branding: Tim Lane Photography: James Hole…
Content provided by Meduza.io. All podcast content including episodes, graphics, and podcast descriptions are uploaded and provided directly by Meduza.io or their podcast platform partner. If you believe someone is using your copyrighted work without your permission, you can follow the process outlined here https://player.fm/legal.
Every day we bring you the most important news and feature stories from hundreds of sources in Russia and across the former Soviet Union.
Content provided by Meduza.io. All podcast content including episodes, graphics, and podcast descriptions are uploaded and provided directly by Meduza.io or their podcast platform partner. If you believe someone is using your copyrighted work without your permission, you can follow the process outlined here https://player.fm/legal.
Every day we bring you the most important news and feature stories from hundreds of sources in Russia and across the former Soviet Union.
Emboldened by support from senior law enforcement officials and a political climate more hospitable to xenophobic violence, far-right activists from “Russkaya Obshchina” (Russian Community) are increasingly involved in attacks, vigilante raids, and coordinated harassment. They typically target migrants from nations to the south or even compatriots from Russia's North Caucasus. With cells active in regions across the country, the group is now Russia’s largest far-right organization. In a new report , journalists from Mediazona examine Russkaya Obshchina’s rapid growth and its involvement in the recent death of an Armenian man outside St. Petersburg. Meduza summarizes their findings. Some power in your corner Russkaya Obshchina members rarely face criminal repercussions for their vigilantism. In fact, the group has close ties to Russia’s law enforcement establishment and regularly acts as muscle during police raids on migrant communities, when officials conduct unannounced checks of residence papers and work permits. Vera Alperovich, an expert at the Sova Center, told Mediazona that the police even welcome this assistance because of personnel shortages. When officers arrive to document incidents involving Russkaya Obshchina activists, the far-right group always manages to “impose its interpretation of the conflict,” Alperovich said. She added that victims often don’t even bother trying to explain what happened. In the summer of 2024, activists in St. Petersburg rallied alongside “Russian taxi drivers” against “southern gypsy cabbies,” leading to attacks that resulted in a rare police response: a dozen men from Russkaya Obshchina were arrested and briefly jailed. But the story didn’t end there. Soon after, Alexander Bastrykin, the head of Russia’s Federal Investigative Committee, intervened on the activists’ behalf. On his orders, the agency opened a case against the arresting officers on suspicion of exceeding their authority by detaining the Russkaya Obshchina members. State prosecutors have twice closed the case, but Bastrykin has yet to back down. In September 2024, he demanded a third time that officials move forward with a case against the arresting officers. Engaged and online Russkaya Obshchina has a large following on social media: 1.2 million YouTube subscribers, more than 750,000 VKontakte community members, and nearly 650,000 Telegram readers. On these platforms, the group mainly shares news about fighting “newcomers” from Central Asia and battling “ethnic gangs” from the North Caucasus. This includes reports about crackdowns on street trading organized by “outsider vendors” and accounts of the organization's members attacking “gay parties.” The group also operates a special helpline where users registered with Russkaya Obshchina’s official mobile app can summon the organization’s vigilantes by clicking an “SOS button.” Also online, Russkaya Obshchina figures like Andrey Tkachuk regularly live-stream, covering “major news stories” involving migrants. The group also mobilizes “cyber troops” for coordinated appeals to the police, directing complaints about comic books, live music, and other cultural content deemed to be insufficiently Orthodox. To support Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, Russkaya Obshchina activists buy equipment for Russian military personnel and even conduct training sessions where they teach men to storm buildings using small arms and grenades. Women in the organization knit wool socks for soldiers and weave camouflage nets. Further reading The Kremlin’s new ultra-nationalists Extremism expert Alexander Verkhovksy explains how far-right groups bolster Russia’s anti-migrant campaign and recruit war veterans into their ranks Not a blank check Asmik Novikova, an expert at the human rights foundation Public Verdict, told Mediazona that the Russian authorities “sometimes delegate” their monopoly on violence, allowing limited forms of “privatization.” However, Russkaya Obshchina has encountered some limits. In Magnitogorsk, the local police chief promised to “reeducate” nationalists who behave “incorrectly” during anti-migrant raids. Russkaya Obshchina responded by criticizing the local police department. In May 2025, the group drew criticism from Adam Delimkhanov, an influential State Duma deputy and a close associate of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. Commenting on Russkaya Obshchina activists attacking Ingush people in the Vladimir region, Delimkhanov called the incident “pure nationalism and lawlessness” and demanded an investigation. Within a few days, police had arrested three suspects and opened a criminal case. Russkaya Obshchina has enjoyed support not just from police officials like Alexander Bastrykin but also from cultural figures. For example, rapper Roma Zhigan recently called on the organization's activists to conduct raids in clubs and fight against “the corruption of women.” The group’s Christian fundamentalism has also won allies in the Russian Orthodox Church, particularly over their shared opposition to women’s reproductive rights. In February 2025, Archbishop Savva addressed a Russkaya Obshchina gathering in Moscow and conveyed Patriarch Kirill’s blessings. Russkaya Obshchina’s rise in popularity coincides with the state authorities’ escalating anti-migrant rhetoric in the aftermath of the March 2024 terrorist attack on a music venue outside Moscow, which killed more than 140 people. The four men charged with carrying out the massacre are all citizens of Tajikistan. “If at first there were some isolated incidents, the ‘Crocus’ [concert hall] attack served to accelerate their development significantly,” Sova Center expert Vera Alperovich told Mediazona. Public Verdict expert Asmik Novikova says that Russkaya Obshchina activists risk losing their criminal immunity when their actions become too violent. The group is permitted to carry out raids and “flex power,” explained Novikova, but “crippling and torturing people” is unacceptable. “Otherwise, we’ll start treating you like a criminal gang.” Russkaya Obshchina nearly crossed this line in early May 2025, when several activists stormed an apartment in Vsevolozhsk, leading to a skirmish and a fire that killed at least one man, a 37-year-old Armenian national named Gor Ovakimyan. At the time of this writing, there are still no suspects in his death, and officials will not even confirm that an investigation is underway. Weeks later, on May 28, federal investigators announced the arrest of three Russkaya Obshchina members in a separate case involving the kidnapping and torture of someone in a forest outside the city of Kovrov. Spokespeople for the far-right organization say the assailants were still in their “probationary period,” meaning they aren’t full-fledged members. Mediazona learned that their victim, a local teenager, is a former activist with Russkaya Obshchina. Original Mediazona report by Pavel Vasiliyev Summary by Kevin Rothrock…
The Russian advocacy group Nasiliu.Net (No to Violence) reported on May 30 that its mobile network operator suddenly terminated its service, crashing an emergency helpline available to domestic violence victims. “Previously, the service did not warn us about problems related to our ‘foreign agent’ status, which we have been forced to have since 2020. Its disconnection is already seriously affecting our work and ability to provide assistance to victims,” Nasiliu.Net said in a statement on Friday. Earlier this week, on May 26, the group reported that it had stopped receiving WhatsApp messages from domestic violence victims seeking the organization’s help. “In recent days, we have encountered a series of technical problems in different services that ensure our operations. Our technical department is working to resolve these issues,” Nasiliu.Net said in a Telegram post . Nasiliu.Net was founded in 2015 to make the problem of domestic violence more visible in Russia and to provide free help for domestic violence survivors. In November 2019, Anna Romashchenko, then the group’s regional coordinator, joined the first-ever episode of The Naked Pravda podcast to discuss how Nasiliu.Net helps to create safe spaces for women in Russia.…
On April 18, a Russian court sentenced 19-year-old activist Darya Kozyreva to two years and eight months in prison for repeatedly “discrediting” the Russian army. This week, a St. Petersburg court registered a new case against Kozyreva based on her closing statement at her previous trial. In that statement, she quoted a poem in Ukrainian by Taras Shevchenko, condemned centuries-long attempts by Russian authorities to subjugate Ukraine, and expressed hope that Ukraine “will reclaim every inch of its land, including Donbass and Crimea.” In April, Kozyreva was convicted of “discrediting” the Russian army for attaching a quatrain from Taras Shevchenko's poem “Testament” on St. Petersburg’s Taras Shevchenko monument in February 2024. In August 2024, the authorities added a second “discrediting” charge based on an interview Kozyreva gave to RFE/RL, in which she called the war in Ukraine “monstrous” and “criminal.” Background ‘They won’t shut me up’ 18-year-old arrested in St. Petersburg for taping a poem by Ukrainian writer Taras Shevchenko to his monument…
As Ukrainian officials wait for a promised memorandum on Russia’s vision for a peace treaty, Russia's permanent representative to the U.N., Vasily Nebenzya, told the U.N. Security Council on May 30 that Moscow’s “minimum” terms for a ceasefire deal are that “Western countries cease supplying weapons to the Kyiv regime” and that Ukraine end its military draft. “In principle, we are prepared to consider the possibility of establishing a ceasefire regime that would subsequently allow for a sustainable resolution of the root causes of the conflict. But for this, we must see reciprocal steps from the other side,” Vasily Nebenzya said. Russian and Ukrainian delegations met in Istanbul on May 16 for their first direct talks in more than three years, following a phone call between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. Three days later, on May 19, the Russian president announced that Moscow is “ready to work with the Ukrainian side on a memorandum concerning a possible future peace treaty.” Nine days later, on May 28, Russia proposed another round of talks in Istanbul on June 2. Ukraine’s foreign minister has welcomed continued negotiations, but the Zelensky administration says it’s still waiting for Moscow’s promised memorandum.…
Explosions in the Russian city of Vladivostok on Friday morning were the result of a “successful operation” by Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, according to RBC-Ukraine , UNIAN , and Hromadske , all of which cited informed sources. The sources said two blasts occurred in Desantnaya Bay, near the base of the 47th Separate Air Assault Battalion, which is part of Russia’s 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade. One explosion reportedly struck near a checkpoint, while the other targeted the unit’s personnel and command quarters. The attack reportedly hit personnel, military equipment, and specialized assets. The outlets noted that the 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade has been actively involved in the war in Ukraine, including in the battles for Mariupol and Vuhledar in the Donetsk region, as well as in operations in Russia’s Kursk region. Earlier, regional authorities claimed the explosions in Desantnaya Bay were caused by propane-butane canisters igniting inside a vehicle. The regional Anti-Terrorism Commission stated there were no casualties. However, media reports indicated that the road to the bay had been blocked off before the blasts, and a helicopter was seen in the area.…
Russia’s delegation addresses the media following talks with Ukraine in Istanbul on May 16. On May 19, three days after Russian and Ukrainian delegations met in Istanbul for their first direct talks in over three years, Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump held a phone call. Afterwards, Putin announced that Moscow was “ready to work with the Ukrainian side on a memorandum concerning a possible future peace treaty.” Nine days later, on May 28, Russia proposed another round of talks in Istanbul on June 2. Now, Ukraine’s foreign minister has said that Kyiv is ready to attend the talks — but it’s still waiting for Moscow’s promised memorandum. Here’s where the situation stands. Ukraine is prepared to participate in a new round of talks with Russia in Istanbul, Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha said on Friday at a press conference in Kyiv on Friday. However, he stressed that Kyiv is still waiting for Moscow to deliver the draft ceasefire memorandum it previously promised. “We are interested in continuing the talks in Turkey. We want this war to end this year. We’re ready to discuss a ceasefire. Ukraine is open to direct talks with Russia,” Sybiha said. The foreign minister emphasized that it was essential for Ukraine to receive the Russian proposal in advance to ensure that its delegation will be properly authorized to negotiate on specific points. It’s unclear how Ukraine will proceed if Russia fails to provide the document ahead of time. Moscow insists on handing over the memorandum in person — at the start of the talks — and beginning negotiations immediately. Russian officials haven’t explained their reluctance to share the document in advance. Read more about the last Istanbul talks ‘We’re prepared to fight forever. How about you?’ Moscow opens first direct talks with Ukraine in three years by threatening endless war and new land grabs Though he confirmed Ukraine’s readiness to send a delegation to Istanbul, Sybiha did not comment on a potential date. Russia has proposed June 2 for the next meeting. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed on Friday that the Russian delegation “is heading to Istanbul and will be ready to resume talks on Monday morning.” Russia’s Foreign Ministry added that Minister Sergey Lavrov had already discussed preparations for the meeting in a phone call with his Turkish counterpart. The Russian side also stressed that it views the Istanbul talks as strictly bilateral, stating that “no mediation is currently under discussion.” Meanwhile, U.S. presidential envoy Keith Kellogg said that representatives from the United States, France, Germany, and the U.K. will be in Turkey on Monday. Commenting on Kellogg’s remarks, Peskov said European involvement in consultations may be possible in the future, but not at this stage. “Of course, the future of European security must involve the Europeans — there’s no way around that. But as far as Monday in Istanbul is concerned, we’re talking strictly about direct Russia–Ukraine negotiations,” he said. Peskov also said that neither the Russian nor Ukrainian versions of the ceasefire memorandum will be made public. However, The New York Times has reported details from the Ukrainian proposal, citing a senior Ukrainian official. According to the source, the draft includes provisions for a land and air ceasefire, with monitoring by “international partners.” Later on Friday, Peskov told reporters that Putin is “ready for top-level talks on Ukraine” but that a “concrete outcome must first be reached in direct negotiations between the delegations.” That evening, Zelensky commented on the situation, writing on Telegram that “for over a week now, the Russians have failed to present the so-called ‘memorandum’ they promised to prepare immediately after the 1,000-for-1,000 [prisoner] exchange.” He accused Moscow of doing “everything it can to make the next possible meeting a failure.”…
Demonstrators in the Democratic Republic of the Congo protest a visit by French President Emmanuel Macron in 2023, using Russian flags and portraits of Vladimir Putin as protest symbols Moscow’s foreign policy has zeroed in on Africa in recent years. The shift is partially due to commercial interests, including access to resources like gold, uranium, and bauxite. But it’s also political: having broken ties with the West, Russia is rapidly trying to build up a sphere of influence. Kremlin officials frequently accuse the West of neocolonialism, yet their approach in Africa is full of its own patterns of exploitation and control. Meduza explores how Russia has managed to ramp up its influence in Africa since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Edging out France During a tour of Africa in March 2023, French President Emmanuel Macron declared , “The time of Françafrique is over.” The term “Françafrique” refers to France’s traditional sphere of influence in its former African colonies, primarily in West Africa. These are countries where French remains the official language, the CFA franc currencies are still in circulation, and many families continue to send their children to study in France. These countries’ state institutions and borders were shaped by French colonial rule. Civil wars are a recurring feature of the region’s modern history, and France has a long track record of military intervention. French companies and politicians have also repeatedly been implicated in corruption scandals in the region. Activist François-Xavier Verschave once called Françafrique “the longest-running scandal in French history.” Macron was not the first French president to promise an end to neocolonialism in Africa. His predecessor, François Hollande, also proclaimed the death of Françafrique — yet it was under Hollande that France launched Operation Serval in Mali, followed by Operation Barkhane, which extended across Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. The official aim was to fight jihadist movements in West Africa — including local branches of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and affiliated groups. Initially, the region’s governments — poor and politically fragile — welcomed French assistance and cooperated with Paris. But that dynamic has shifted dramatically in recent years. At the first Russia–Africa summit in Sochi in 2019, Guinean President Alpha Condé privately asked Vladimir Putin to support his bid to remain in power beyond his constitutional term limit. Putin agreed. A 2020 referendum reset Condé’s term count, and he was subsequently re-elected. The Kremlin crushed Meduza’s business model and wiped out our ad revenue. We’ve been blocked and outlawed in Russia, where donating to us or even sharing our posts is a crime. But we’re still here — bringing independent journalism to millions of our readers inside Russia and around the world. Meduza’s survival is under threat — again. Donald Trump’s foreign aid freeze has slashed funding for international groups backing press freedom. Meduza was hurt too. It’s yet another blow in our ongoing struggle to survive. You could be our lifeline. Please, help Meduza survive with a small recurring donation. That same year, a military junta led by Assimi Goïta came to power in Mali through a coup. In 2022, two coups took place in Burkina Faso, ultimately leading to a junta headed by Ibrahim Traoré seizing control. In 2023, a coup occurred in Niger, led by a junta under Abdramane Chiani. In all of these cases, the new authorities announced almost immediately that they were expelling the French from their countries and would establish military and economic cooperation with Russia. At pro-junta rallies, demonstrators waved not only national flags, but Russian ones as well. In Mali and Burkina Faso, operatives linked to Wagner Group mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin quickly arrived. Wagner forces provided security for the new regimes, while gold mines were nationalized and handed over to Russian companies. In Niger, the same pattern played out — but with uranium instead of gold. Guinea proved more complex. Russia’s main foothold there was the aluminum giant Rusal, which had operated in the country since 2001. Guinea holds the world’s largest reserves of bauxite — the raw material used to make aluminum. Russia, meanwhile, has little bauxite of its own. Rusal’s Australian assets are unavailable due to sanctions, and Chinese supplies mostly go to the domestic market. To help Condé stay in power, Rusal enlisted the services of Viktor Boyarkin — a former GRU officer, ex-aide to Russia’s military attaché in the U.S., one-time international arms dealer, and the ex-head of Rusal’s security division. Boyarkin had previously been linked to the Kremlin’s interference in the 2016 U.S. election and to a failed coup attempt in Montenegro in 2018. The strategy appeared to pay off — until Condé was overthrown in a military coup in September 2021. Since then, Rusal has faced mounting challenges : Guinea’s new government has accused the company of tax violations, labor abuses, and more. After Prigozhin’s attempted mutiny and subsequent death in the summer of 2023, Wagner’s operations in Africa were taken over by Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU. In Burkina Faso, Wagner forces were briefly replaced by fighters from the 81st Special Purpose Brigade — known as the “Bears” — a volunteer unit recruited through Redut, a GRU-affiliated mercenary group. Officially, they withdrew from Burkina Faso in August 2024. Read more about Redut Why does GRU need a PMC? Meet the private military company ‘Redut’ — a mercenary recruitment proxy for Russian intelligence and Spetsnaz forces The Russian Orthodox Church moves in In late 2021, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church established the Patriarchal Exarchate of Africa, appointing Archbishop Leonid (Gorbachev) of Klin as its head. The move was another consequence of the broader schism in global Orthodoxy triggered by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. For centuries, Africa had been considered canonical territory of the Patriarchate of Alexandria — one of the four ancient Orthodox patriarchates, alongside Constantinople, Antioch, and Jerusalem. But in 2019, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople recognized the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, effectively granting it independence from the Moscow Patriarchate. Patriarch Theodoros II of Alexandria was among the decision’s supporters. The Moscow Patriarchate considers the Orthodox Church of Ukraine schismatic and labels Orthodox leaders who support it as either outright schismatics or at least “on the path to schism.” In response to Patriarch Theodoros’s recognition of its autocephaly, the Russian Church withdrew all of its African parishes from Alexandria’s jurisdiction and declared it would accept any clergy who wished to break away from the Alexandrian Church. Thus, the African Exarchate was born. Archbishop Leonid — later promoted to Metropolitan — had previously served as the Moscow Patriarchate’s representative to the Alexandrian Patriarch from 2004 to 2013. He later worked in South America and the Caucasus. Novaya Gazeta reported that Leonid may have had ties to networks connected with Yevgeny Prigozhin: parishes under his exarchate often appeared in regions where Wagner forces were active, such as the Central African Republic, Congo, and Mali. Russia’s Africa operations A year after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death, Russia’s influence campaign in Africa continues apace — but it may have new competition Leonid, known for his fiery, ultra-patriotic rhetoric, soon found himself at odds with Metropolitan Antony (Sevryuk), the newly appointed head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for External Church Relations. Church conservatives saw Antony as overly liberal and too accommodating to the West. Leonid lost the ensuing power struggle. On September 8 — just two weeks after Prigozhin’s death, though whether the timing was coincidental remains unclear — he was dismissed as rector of the Church of All Saints at Kulishki in Moscow. Soon afterward, the Church’s highest court opened a case against him over alleged violations during the handover of that parish. In the following months, he was stripped of all clerical roles and sent into retirement in Krasnodar, where he had grown up and begun his church career. The new exarch became Konstantin (Ostrovskiy), Bishop (later Metropolitan) of Zaraysk, former rector of the Kolomna Theological Seminary and founder of the Moscow City Diocese’s missionary department. Though not necessarily more moderate, Konstantin is certainly more restrained and less publicly outspoken. His most high-profile moment as exarch came in April 2024, during a trip to Malawi, where he baptized nearly 1,000 people in just three days. The exarchate’s charity initiatives , primarily church construction, have focused mainly on Kenya, one of the continent’s more stable and prosperous countries. Russia’s interest in Malawi, by contrast, is largely political. In 2023, Moscow donated 20,000 tons of fertilizer to the country and explicitly asked the government to support lifting international sanctions on Russia. Malawi is a poor, agrarian nation with few valuable natural resources — unlike Guinea or Burkina Faso — so Russia’s goals there center on cultivating pro-Russian sentiment and converting it into diplomatic support. The effort has seen modest success: while Malawi voted in favor of a U.N. General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it abstained in 2025. New frontiers for Russian state-controlled media In February 2025, Sputnik — the Russian state media agency aimed at international audiences — opened a new office in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa. Dmitry Kiselyov, head of Sputnik’s parent company Rossiya Segodnya and one of Russia’s most prominent pundits, stressed that this was not just another foreign press bureau but a fully-fledged Ethiopian media outlet that would employ dozens of local journalists and report in Amharic, the country’s official language. Kiselyov also announced plans for similar outlets in South Africa and Tanzania. In addition to English, French, and Amharic, these outlets would broadcast in Hausa and Swahili — the most widely spoken languages in West and East Africa, respectively. Rossiya Segodnya General Director Dmitry Kiselyov and Federation Council speaker Valentina Matviyenko at the opening of the Sputnik office in Addis Ababa. February 19, 2025. RT (also owned by Rossiya Segodnya) is often compared to Qatar’s Al Jazeera — a channel built to Western media standards but offering a distinctly non-Western, and at times anti-Western, perspective. But there’s a fundamental difference: Al Jazeera is not just a mouthpiece for Qatar. It serves as a genuine, homegrown voice for the Arabic-speaking world, giving it real global influence and making it one of Qatar’s most powerful foreign policy tools. Its English-language service plays a secondary role to the Arabic one. RT and Sputnik do play a similar role for Russian-speaking audiences abroad. But their primary function is to serve as updated versions of Cold War-era propaganda outlets — aimed not at informing domestic audiences, but at influencing foreign ones. Ethiopia was a natural choice for Sputnik’s first editorial hub in sub-Saharan Africa. For much of the early 21st century, it was among the continent’s most stable countries. In 2018, it signed a peace agreement with Eritrea after years of conflict, and the following year, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. At the time, he was a poster child for Western-aligned African leadership: democratically elected, progressive, pragmatic, and focused on development rather than denouncing neocolonialism. Then came the Tigray War (2020–2022), which left up to 400,000 dead, displaced over three million people, and pushed 13 million into hunger, all sparked by a violent conflict over the autonomy of the Tigray region. With his relationship with the West rapidly deteriorating , Ali turned to Russia. In 2023, he attended the Russia–Africa Summit in St. Petersburg. The following year, Ethiopia joined BRICS, began receiving Russian assistance in building a navy (despite being landlocked, it had secured a naval base in Somaliland), started cooperating with Russia in the nuclear sector, and expanded bilateral trade. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali at the BRICS summit in Kazan in 2024. For Rossiya Segodnya, Ethiopia is now friendly ground. Meanwhile, in countries where it lacks such privileged access, it often relies on local partners. One key ally is Afrique Média, a French-language TV network based in Cameroon that played a central role in stoking anti-French sentiment across West Africa. The broader propaganda campaign against Françafrique — backed behind the scenes by Rossiya Segodnya and Prigozhin-linked bot farms — was timed to coincide with the arrival of Wagner Group forces in the region and a wave of military coups. The campaign was hardly subtle, but it was effective. From press conferences and interviews with new leaders to viral clips and memes, the message was consistent: the French are colonizers; the Russians are partners. This media machine shows no sign of slowing down. Among other things, it’s helping to build a full-blown cult of personality around the young president of Burkina Faso, Ibrahim Traoré — not just at home, but across the continent. Traoré’s image is modeled on that of Thomas Sankara, who seized power in a 1983 military coup at age 33, renamed the country from its colonial name Upper Volta to Burkina Faso (“Land of Upright People”), and was assassinated in a 1987 coup. Traoré also casts himself in the mold of Che Guevara: a young, charismatic, defiant military leader in uniform standing up to imperialism. Russia’s Africa pivot is already taking on the characteristics of a state-backed mega-project: seeing how important it is to Putin and his inner circle, a wide range of institutions are trying to figure out how to get involved. For example, the presidential administration’s domestic policy team is preparing to help Mali create a new electoral system, assist eastern Libya (led by military commander Khalifa Haftar) with writing a new constitution, and provide “political consulting services” to the authorities in Chad. The head of this team, Kremlin First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko, has long sought to expand his department’s influence into foreign affairs — and he’s had some success. In 2022, Putin effectively made him the “viceroy of Donbas.” In 2025, he oversaw the presidential election in Abkhazia, managed relations with South Ossetia, and played a role in Moldova, where pro-Russian forces remain a key component of the opposition. Africa may now offer him a chance to scale up his influence even further. Read more about RT’s foray into Africa Not-so-soft power Inside Russia’s campaign to turn African journalists into Kremlin mouthpieces Story by Tamid Aief…
The United States considers Russia’s concerns about NATO’s potential eastward expansion to be “fair,” U.S. presidential envoy Keith Kellogg said in an interview with ABC News on Thursday. “It’s a fair concern. We’ve said that repeatedly. We’ve said that, to us, Ukraine coming into NATO is not on the table,” Kellogg said. According to him, at least four other NATO member states share this position. As other sources have previously reported , Vladimir Putin is seeking written assurances from Western countries that NATO will not expand eastward as a condition for ending the war in Ukraine. Kellogg also urged Ukraine not to walk away from negotiations with Russia, even if Moscow fails to present its memorandum outlining terms for a ceasefire and an end to the war ahead of the two countries’ planned June 2 talks in Istanbul. “I’ve also talked to [Ukraine’s] lead negotiator, Rustem Umerov, who will be their lead negotiator in their next talks in Istanbul. He hasn’t seen it as well. I always caution him: don’t say things like that. […] Part of life is showing up. You need to show that you’re serious,” Kellogg said. He noted that neither Ukraine nor the U.S. has yet seen the Russian memorandum. Kellogg also said that security advisers from Germany, France, and the U.K. will attend the Istanbul talks. This same group, he added, was involved in drafting Ukraine’s 22-point ceasefire proposal during meetings in London and Paris. Kellogg’s remarks did not make clear whether the European officials will take part directly in the negotiations.…
Russian forces carried out a large-scale missile and drone attack on Ukraine’s Kharkiv region on Thursday night, according to local authorities and Ukraine’s State Emergency Service . In Kharkiv’s Slobidskyi district, a Russian strike sparked a fire at a municipal transport agency. One company building and a trolleybus caught fire, and 38 vehicles belonging to the company were damaged, along with nearby houses. Three civilian women were injured. In the village of Vasyliv Khutir in the Chuhuiv district, missiles and drones damaged a private home, farms, a warehouse, and agricultural machinery. Eight people were injured, including two 16-year-olds. In the village of Yavorske in the Izyum district, a drone hit a farm building. In the city of Izyum, a drone strike sparked a fire at a warehouse. No casualties were reported in these cases. In the Odesa region, a drone attack sparked a fire at a delivery service branch, damaging cargo trucks parked nearby. No one was hurt, according to local emergency services. In the city of Bilozerske in the Donetsk region, a drone struck a five-story apartment building, causing a fire, according to regional prosecutors. A woman and her 16-year-old son were injured. In Zaporizhzhia, a fire broke out at an infrastructure facility following an attack, according to Governor Ivan Fedorov. Preliminary reports indicated no casualties. According to Ukraine’s Air Force Command, Russia launched a total of 90 Shahed-type drones and decoy drones, along with two Iskander-M (KN-23) ballistic missiles. The main targets were the Kharkiv, Odesa, and Donetsk regions. By morning, Ukrainian air defenses had shot down 56 Shahed drones. “Enemy aerial attacks were recorded in 12 different locations,” the Air Force reported. Russia’s Defense Ministry, meanwhile, reported that its air defenses had intercepted and destroyed 27 Ukrainian drones overnight: 15 in the Belgorod region and 12 in the Kursk region. In the Belgorod region, a drone hit a vehicle near the village of Zozuli in the Borisovsky district, injuring the driver, Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov said. The man was hospitalized. In the Kursk region, a 27-year-old civilian was wounded while driving, said regional head Alexander Khinshtein. The man was taken to the hospital with shrapnel injuries. Drone debris also damaged the building of Kursk City Hospital No. 1 and multiple apartment buildings.…
Sanctions have significantly hindered the flow of fresh foreign currency into Russian banks, leaving both the institutions and their customers with a surplus of “old-series” dollars issued before 2009. Many foreign exchange offices reject these bills or agree to exchange them only at unfavorable rates. Even domestically, Russians are increasingly encountering problems using older greenbacks. Your money’s no good here Russians are facing rejections when trying to use older dollar bills overseas, including in Turkey, Thailand, Egypt, the UAE, and other nations. “It’s a painful subject,” Arthur Muradyan, vice president of the Association of Tour Operators of Russia, admitted to the state newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta. “In Russia, before traveling abroad, tourists are sold old-series bills, but abroad they already require new-series ones.” Based on online reviews from Russian travelers and expatriates, exchanging older U.S. currency often means extra fees or less favorable exchange rates. In some cases, people with older U.S. bills are simply turned away. Meanwhile, in Russia, banks have introduced fees for exchanging older U.S. banknotes, and major players like Sberbank, VTB, and Alfa-Bank have stopped exchanging the old bills altogether. For example, currency exchange offices in St. Petersburg charge 500 rubles (roughly $7) to accept $100 bills issued before 2007 Russians who wish to avoid fees and commissions can opt for double conversion, selling their old U.S. bills for rubles and then purchasing newer dollars. However, the loss due to exchange-rate differences can be significant. Russian lawmakers have blamed the public for the currency issue. “This is a problem for those who acquired foreign currency and suddenly realized that getting rid of it isn't so simple,” said Anatoly Aksakov, chairman of the State Duma’s Financial Markets Committee, in February 2025. The Central Bank has not publicly commented on the currency-exchange policies of Russian banks. Exchanging or accepting old-series U.S. dollars remains legal in Russia. America’s dynamic dollars In the United States, all Federal Reserve banknotes issued since 1914 remain legal tender. These bills have no “expiration date,” but the U.S. legislation requiring acceptance of any banknotes issued since 1914 applies only to government agencies. Private companies and individuals can decide for themselves whether to accept payment with old bills. According to the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing, there is more than $2 trillion worth of Federal Reserve notes in circulation in denominations ranging from $1 to $100. In 1969, the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve decided to discontinue all denominations above $100, but even these bills remain legal tender . In 2016, former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers called for withdrawing $100 bills from circulation to fight crime and corruption, warning that criminal organizations favored high-denomination bills because they’re easier to hide and transport. The U.S. Treasury continually updates the design of American banknotes to make them more difficult to counterfeit. According to the update schedule , the next redesign is slated for the $10 bill in 2026. The $100 bill’s design before 2004 The $100 bill’s design after 2009 Cash rules in Russia Banks outside the U.S. prefer to have newer bills on their balance sheets because they have better anti-counterfeiting protection. Russian banks are no exception, but U.S. sanctions have made these institutions even more selective and risk-averse, raising costs that they pass on to customers seeking the newer dollars. In spring 2022, the U.S. banned the import of cash dollars into Russia, and the previous flow of U.S. bills to Russian banks vanished almost completely. Even banks that are formally not under sanctions have few new cash dollars, since the U.S. ban on importing dollars is broader than Washington’s sanctions against specific financial organizations. Before the sanctions, Russian banks imported cash dollars independently, buying them from foreign correspondent banks. In May 2020, Moscow International Currency Association president Alexey Mamontov explained to the news outlet RBC that the Russian market's need for dollars and euros was met by 10-15 banks, primarily large state and commercial banks with extensive regional branch networks, as well as foreign bank subsidiaries. Western sanctions severed Russian banks from their foreign correspondent banks. In February 2023, a senior executive at Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank told The Financial Times that the bank had shut down correspondent accounts for all Russian banks except its own subsidiary. At the time, the source said Raiffeisen was handling 40-50 percent of all the money flowing between Russia and the rest of the world. In December 2023, U.S. President Joe Biden authorized the Treasury to impose secondary sanctions against foreign banks that even indirectly facilitated the circumvention of sanctions against Russia. For example, they could be prohibited from opening correspondent accounts in the United States or have their use restricted, while their property in the country could be frozen. In November 2024, the U.S. even imposed sanctions on Gazprombank, which had been operating as a crucial “payment gateway” for Russia's entire economy. As a result, according to Central Bank data as of April 1, 2024, correspondent relationships between Russian banks and foreign ones in “toxic” currencies decreased by 17 percent compared to October 2023, and by 55 percent compared to early 2022. Other influences on Russia’s U.S. currency supply include limits on cash withdrawals from foreign-currency accounts opened before March 9, 2022 (no more than $10,000 or the equivalent amount in euros). The remaining funds can still be withdrawn in rubles. This March, the Central Bank extended the limits until September 2025. Money deposited after September 9, 2022, is dispensed at the bank's exchange rate on the date of withdrawal. Banks are prohibited from charging fees when customers withdraw foreign currency from their accounts. Additionally, individuals can still leave Russia with up to $10,000 (or equivalent amounts in other currencies) in cash. Text by Yulia Starostina Abridged translation by Kevin Rothrock…
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has responded to accusations from Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service that Serbian defense enterprises continue to supply ammunition to Ukraine, calling some of the allegations false. In recent remarks cited by the local media, Vučić said he’s discussed the matter with Vladimir Putin privately and in the presence of the two nations’ diplomats. “We have formed a working group with our Russian partners to establish the facts [regarding the supplies]. Some of the things being alleged are simply untrue,” the Serbian president stated. Vučić added that he would order the cancellation of contracts for misuse if it became known that the final recipient of the weapons would be a warring party. At the same time, he noted that Serbian factories “must operate,” as the country employs 23,000 people in the state defense industry alone. “If we cannot export to America, Turkey, Arab countries, then excuse me, where can we export weapons?” Vučić said. On May 29, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service claimed that Serbian defense enterprises continue to supply ammunition to Kyiv “despite Belgrade’s official neutrality.” Moscow alleges that the supplies are delivered using falsified end-user certificates and intermediary countries, including the Czech Republic, Poland, and Bulgaria. In June 2024, The Financial Times reported that Serbia has been “discreetly stepping up sales of ammunition to the west that ends up bolstering the defense of Ukraine.” At the time, Aleksandar Vučić called this figure “generally accurate,” indicating to journalists that claims of 800 million euros (roughly $909 million) in ammunition exports to Ukraine were “broadly accurate.” Serbia’s president also described the sales as “a part of our economic revival,” saying that it wasn’t “his job” to worry about where the ammunition ended up.…
Zaur Gurtsiev The first deputy mayor of Stavropol was killed in an explosion on Wednesday night. Zaur Gurtsiev, 34, joined his hometown’s city government after participating in the Kremlin’s “Time of Heroes” program, which the Putin administration launched to promote war veterans to public office. In 2019, Gurtsiev headed the combat command center of Russia’s Air Force and Air Defense Forces. In early 2022, he led the air component of Russia’s capture of Mariupol in eastern Ukraine and won multiple medals and distinctions for his service in the capture of Avdiivka, another city in Ukraine’s Donetsk region. Meduza reviews what we know about his death. On Thursday, Stavropol Governor Vladimir Vladimirov confirmed Gurtsiev’s death “as a result of a nighttime incident,” noting that it might have been a terrorist attack “involving Nazis from Ukraine.” Stavropol Mayor Ivan Ulyanchenko also verified that two men died in a “boom” near a residential building at 85/19 Chekhov Street. State investigators later identified the two victims: First Deputy Mayor Zaur Gurtsiev and a 29-year-old man. Their bodies showed “injuries characteristic of an explosive blast impact.” Officials have opened a criminal case on charges of murder and illegal storage of explosive devices, and the agency is considering the possibility that the blast was a terrorist attack. Investigators believe the explosion was carried out using a homemade device. Sources told the Telegram channels Mash and Shot that the cause was presumably a grenade explosion. Footage from a security camera that captured the incident shows two men meeting near a parking lot. In the video, the explosion occurs when a man wearing a shoulder bag approaches the other man. According to the Telegram channel Baza , the explosive device was on Zaur Gurtsiev’s younger companion, a man named Nikita Penkov, who may have been “used unknowingly” by another party. Baza learned that Penkov was renting an apartment at the building on Chekhov Street. The blast reportedly killed him instantly, while Gurtsiev remained alive for some time afterward. “Penkov might not have known that the device he was carrying would eventually detonate. It could have been activated remotely,” a source told the Telegram channel. Police found no bomb-making materials when they searched Penkov’s home. Journalists at the news outlet Agentstvo found Nikita Penkov’s social media accounts and studied his personal information in leaked database records, learning that he worked as a police officer in 2023 in a special unit for the Stavropol Internal Affairs Department, guarding and escorting suspects and defendants. Reporters were unable to find data on his more recent employment. There are unverified reports that Gurtsiev and Penkov were meeting after connecting on a dating app for gay men. VChK-OGPU , a prominent anonymous Telegram channel known for leaking sensitive information concerning Russia’s security services, reported on Thursday that state investigators have obtained sexually explicit correspondence between the two men. The blast occurred when Gurtsiev and Penkov allegedly met for the first time in person. Preliminary data show that the explosive device was hidden in Penkov's shoulder bag. VChK-OGPU reports that he may have been hired by unknown persons to collect compromising material on Gurtsiev and was supplied with “video-transmitting equipment” that was actually a remote-triggered bomb.…
The first day of the prisoner exchange. May 23, 2025. Late last week, Russia and Ukraine carried out their largest prisoner exchange since the start of the full-scale war, with each side handing over 1,000 people. Moscow and Kyiv agreed to the swap during peace talks in Istanbul on May 16 — negotiations that otherwise failed to produce any results. This “1,000 for 1,000” exchange was the sixth between Russia and Ukraine this year, marking the 65th swap since 2022. It took place over three days, from May 23 to 25, with 390 people from each side exchanged on the first day, 307 on the second, and 303 on the third. Russia reported the return of 880 military personnel and 120 civilians — the same number Ukraine received, according to the Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War. And while the scale of the exchange alone made headlines, several unexpected details stood out. Who was handed over to Russia? Of the 120 civilians handed over by Ukraine, 70 were Ukrainians convicted of crimes against national security. Among them was Oleksandr Tarnashynskyi, a leader in pro-Russian politician Viktor Medvedchuk’s Ukrainian Choice movement. After the full-scale war began, he was accused of attempting to establish sham governing bodies in Ukraine — including a “Council of Elders” and a “Supreme Spiritual Council” — and was sentenced to five years in prison. Ukraine also handed over Vasyl Mekheda, a former employee in the Ukrainian Cabinet’s Secretariat who had worked as an informant for Russian intelligence for roughly 15 years. Others included Ukrainians who had collaborated with Russian-installed authorities in occupied territories, informed on Ukrainian Armed Forces positions, or posted pro-Russian content on social media. Among them, for example, was a 61-year-old resident of Kherson who had worked as a driver for the city’s police department during the occupation. Russian Human Rights Commissioner Tatyana Moskalkova said that of the 120 civilians released by Ukraine, “ 100 were political prisoners and 20 were Kursk residents.” The latter were pensioners from border areas of Russia’s Kursk region that Ukrainian forces occupied in the summer of 2024 and held until spring 2025. Asked why refugees were included in the exchange, an unnamed lawyer told Agentstvo they had likely “not returned earlier because it would have been logistically difficult without assistance.” Russian soldiers released in the exchange. Chkalovsky Airfield, Moscow region. May 24, 2025. Who was (not) handed over to Ukraine? Military personnel Among the Ukrainian soldiers freed in the exchange, 311 had been held prisoner since 2022, 122 since 2023, and 150 since 2024, according to the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs). The agency also noted that the exchange brought home troops from 46 Ukrainian Armed Forces units from which Russia had previously returned no one. However, none of the released prisoners were from the Azov Brigade , which defended Mariupol in 2022. “This feels like mockery — a cruel joke at the expense of those who have been held in Russian captivity for more than three years under the harshest conditions and inhumane pressure. A jeer at their families, loved ones, and brothers-in-arms. A show of derision towards those who were given guarantees — those who have an absolute right to be prioritized for exchange, because they went into captivity not at their own will, but by order of the High Command,” said Denys Prokopenko, commander of the Azov National Guard Brigade. Andriy Yusov, deputy head of the Coordination Headquarters, said the exchange was arranged in haste and that each side decided who they deemed necessary to return. He suggested Russia is intentionally withholding “sensitive” prisoners to sow division within Ukraine. The Kremlin has other reasons for keeping Azov fighters hidden, added Oleksandra Romantsova, executive director of Ukraine’s Center for Civil Liberties — for one, they serve as “living proof” of Russia’s war crimes. Women hold portraits of missing relatives, hoping someone among the released will recognize them. Kyiv, May 24, 2025. However, Moscow apparently sent back Anatolii Taranenko — a former Ukrainian soldier who defected to the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic in 2021 and later became a fixture in Russian propaganda. His inclusion in the exchange surprised even Oleg Tsaryov, a former Donbas separatist leader (who is wanted in Ukraine). “It’s impossible to explain why they spent so long promoting this prisoner, only to trade him back,” Tsaryov commented. Ukrainian soldiers also expressed outrage at the return of “that scumbag.” In response to the criticism, Yusov reiterated, “We could not influence the list,” and said Ukrainian law enforcement would take up Taranenko’s case. Civilians Russia’s exchange list included not only no Azov fighters but also no civilians imprisoned before 2022. “Some of these people were helping our intelligence services back when most of those who care now didn’t give a damn about what was happening in Donbas. I don’t know if there’s anyone in this 11-year war who’s been held longer. […] The length of captivity is an objective criterion. And if the state is retrieving civilians — which it is — it’s unacceptable to ignore those who’ve been imprisoned the longest,” said Ukrainian writer and journalist Stanislav Aseyev, who himself spent two and a half years in captivity in the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic. There was also disappointment that civilians detained in occupied territories after 2022 for being deemed “disloyal” were not included in the exchange. These individuals — according to various estimates between 7,000 and 18,000 — often simply vanish. They’re held in isolation and in appalling conditions, often without formal charges. They can be exchanged for Ukrainian civilians convicted of collaboration, or for Russian civilians — but both groups are rare in Ukraine, which is why, according to the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs, only 174 people in this category have been freed so far. Meduza has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from the very start, and we are committed to reporting objectively on a war we firmly oppose. Join Meduza in its mission to challenge the Kremlin’s censorship with the truth. Donate today . Of the 120 civilians handed over by Moscow, “not a single one was someone Russia wouldn’t have deported anyway,” Mykhailo Savva, an expert at the Center for Civil Liberties, told Agentstvo. According to human rights activists, those returned to Ukraine were people who had served prison sentences either in the occupied territories (and had been transferred to Russia) or in Russia itself for crimes unrelated to the war. After completing their sentences, they were slated for deportation. Before the war, they could have returned home on their own — but now, they’re held for years in Russia’s temporary detention centers for foreign nationals. Mediazona spoke with several civilians who were part of the exchange. One of them, 48-year-old Serhiy Rasputnyi, had served 13 years for murder. After his release in the fall of 2024, he was sent to a temporary detention center for foreigners in Tambov, Russia. According to Rasputnyi, Ukrainians awaiting deportation had been returned home in the past — but unofficially. They weren’t included on formal exchange lists and were released as something of an “add-on.” Why Russia chose to officially include them in this latest exchange remains unclear. the Istanbul talks ‘We’re prepared to fight forever. How about you?’ Moscow opens first direct talks with Ukraine in three years by threatening endless war and new land grabs…
China has halted drone sales to Ukraine and other European countries but continues to supply Russia, Bloomberg reported on Thursday, citing statements from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other informed sources. “Chinese Mavic is open for Russians but is closed for Ukrainians. There are production lines on Russian territory where there are Chinese representatives,” Zelensky reportedly told journalists. A European official who spoke to Bloomberg said Zelensky’s remarks align with the E.U.’s own assessments. According to the official, China also appears to have restricted deliveries of certain drone components, including magnets used in drone motors, to Western buyers, while increasing shipments to Russia. Beijing denies supplying weapons to either side and insists it maintains strict controls on dual-use goods that could have military applications. “China’s stance on Ukraine issue has been consistent and clear: we have been committed to stopping the war and promoting peace talks,” China’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement to Bloomberg.…
Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) said on Thursday that Serbian defense companies continue to supply ammunition to Kyiv “in defiance of Belgrade’s officially declared ‘neutrality.’” In a press release titled “Serbian arms industry tries to stab Russia in the back,” the SVR alleged that Serbian contributions to what it calls “the war waged by the West” amount to “hundreds of thousands of rounds for rocket artillery and howitzers, along with a million bullets for small arms.” According to the SVR, the shipments are routed through intermediary countries using falsified end-user certificates. The agency names the Czech Republic, Poland, and Bulgaria among the countries involved. “It’s hard to justify such deliveries ‘on humanitarian grounds.’ They have one obvious purpose — to kill and maim Russian soldiers and civilians,” the statement reads. The SVR also lists Serbian defense manufacturers allegedly involved in what it describes as an “assembly line of death.” “It seems that the desire of Serbian arms makers and their backers to profit from the blood of their fellow Slavs has made them forget who their real friends are, and who their real enemies are,” the agency said, adding that “Russia has stood by Serbia during the most critical moments in its history.” In June 2024, the Financial Times reported that Serbia had exported around 800 million euros’ worth of ammunition that eventually reached Ukraine via third parties. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić did not deny the shipments and said the figure was roughly accurate. He described the harms exports as “part of [Serbia’s] economic revival.” “Yes, we do export our ammunition. We cannot export to Ukraine or to Russia… but we have had many contracts with Americans, Spaniards, Czechs, others. What they do with that in the end is their job,” Vučić told the FT.…
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