EA - Carl Shulman on the moral status of current and future AI systems by rgb

The Nonlinear Library

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Carl Shulman on the moral status of current and future AI systems, published by rgb on July 2, 2024 on The Effective Altruism Forum. In which I curate and relate great takes from 80k As artificial intelligence advances, we'll increasingly urgently face the question of whether and how we ought to take into account the well-being and interests of AI systems themselves. In other words, we'll face the question of whether AI systems have moral status.[1] In a recent episode of the 80,000 Hours podcast, polymath researcher and world-model-builder Carl Shulman spoke at length about the moral status of AI systems, now and in the future. Carl has previously written about these issues in Sharing the World with Digital Minds and Propositions Concerning Digital Minds and Society, both co-authored with Nick Bostrom. This post highlights and comments on ten key ideas from Shulman's discussion with 80,000 Hours host Rob Wiblin. 1. The moral status of AI systems is, and will be, an important issue (and it might not have much do with AI consciousness) The moral status of AI is worth more attention than it currently gets, given its potential scale: Yes, we should worry about it and pay attention. It seems pretty likely to me that there will be vast numbers of AIs that are smarter than us, that have desires, that would prefer things in the world to be one way rather than another, and many of which could be said to have welfare, that their lives could go better or worse, or their concerns and interests could be more or less respected. So you definitely should pay attention to what's happening to 99.9999% of the people in your society. Notice that Shulman does not say anything about AI consciousness or sentience in making this case. Here and throughout the interview, Shulman de-emphasizes the question of whether AI systems are conscious, in favor of the question of whether they have desires, preferences, interests. Here he is following a cluster of views in philosophy that hold that consciousness is not necessary for moral status. Rather, an entity, even if it is not conscious, can merit moral consideration if it has a certain kind of agency: preferences, desires, goals, interests, and the like[2]. (This more agency-centric perspective on AI moral status has been discussed in previous posts; for a dip into recent philosophical discussion on this, see the substack post ' Agential value' by friend of the blog Nico Delon.) Such agency-centric views are especially important for the question of AI moral patienthood, because it might be clear that AI systems have morally-relevant preferences and desires well before it's clear whether or not they are conscious. 2. While people have doubts about the moral status of AI current systems, they will attribute moral status to AI more and more as AI advances. At present, Shulman notes, "the general public and most philosophers are quite dismissive of any moral importance of the desires, preferences, or other psychological states, if any exist, of the primitive AI systems that we currently have." But Shulman asks us to imagine an advanced AI system that is behaviorally fairly indistinguishable from a human - e.g., from the host Rob Wiblin. But going forward, when we're talking about systems that are able to really live the life of a human - so a sufficiently advanced AI that could just imitate, say, Rob Wiblin, and go and live your life, operate a robot body, interact with your friends and your partners, do your podcast, and give all the appearance of having the sorts of emotions that you have, the sort of life goals that you have. One thing to keep in mind is that, given Shulman's views about AI trajectories, this is not just a thought experiment: this is a kind of AI system you could see in your lifetime. Shulman also asks us to imagine a system like ...