- 100 - Pacific War - Defense of Finschhafen, October 17-24, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Last time we spoke about the ongoing operations around Finschhafen. The Japanese had technically lost Finschhafen in a rather quick fashion when the allies landed, but they had not given it up. General Katagiri was preparing a massive counter offensive against the allies while a large defensive effort was made at Sattelberg. Meanwhile the Australians and Americans had underestimated what it would take to secure the region and required time to reinforce themselves. Some ground was still gained and much patrolling was done, but the real battle for Finschhafen was just about to be let loose. We also spoke about the terrible situation in Bengal where a man made famine was not only hurting the people of Bengal but also bolstering the Free India Movement, led by Subhas Chandra Bose. Today we are going to continue these stories and more!

This episode is the defense of Finschhafen

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

Episode 100, oh my god how time flies by! Just wanted to say a huge thanks from myself and KNG for continuing to listen to me ramble on, you guys are awesome. We are going back to Finschhafen, which was described by Australian Historian Garth Pratten "to be one of the largest bases in the Southwest Pacific Area". Its certainly a true statement, Finschhafen would act as an enormous staging camp with a divisional capacity, a wharf for LSTs, several airfields and fuel dumps. General Wootten’s 9th division had finally arrived to help bolster Brigadier Windeyer’s 20th Brigade, just in time to meet the increasing Japanese attacks. Simultaneously General Katagiri managed to bring the bulk of his 20th division to Sattelberg and was now ready to unleash his strong counteroffensive. Katagiri’s officials orders read "After dusk on X Oct, the main strength of 79th Infantry Regiment will attack the enemy in Arndt Point area from the north side. The assault boat Butai will penetrate through the north coast of Arndt Point on the night of X-day. Instructions to this "Boat Penetration Tai" were that "ammunition dumps, artillery positions, tanks, enemy H.Q., moored boats, barracks, etc. should be selected as objectives". "X-day," will be decided on X-minus-1-day at 2200 hrs and a fire will be seen for 20 minutes on the Sattelberg heights. When the fire is seen answer back at a suitable spot (by fires)."

Katagiri’s plan was for the Yamada detachment to perform a surprise attack against Jivevaneng while the 79th regiment led by Colonel Hayashida Kaneki would attack in the direction of Katika with three companies of the 2nd battalion and another company of the 3rd battalion kept in reserve, while the rest attacked Scarlet beach in the northern part of Arndt Point. Additionally the 2nd battalion, 26th field artillery regiment and two companies of the 1st battalion, 79th regiment would perform a diversionary attack north of the Song river against Bonga, and the 10th company of the 79th regiment would join a detachment of engineers with explosive and demolition charges to make a seaborne attack against Scarlet Beach. This unit was called the "Boat Penetration Force", under Lieutenant Sugino, the commander of 10 Company.

The counteroffensive was set to kick off on October 16th with the signal being a large fire lit at sattelberg. Now Wootten was aware there was something big coming, but he was unsure the direction of the offensive. Australian intelligence believed the enemy would counterattack towards Finschhafen airfield, Langemak bay or perhaps both. So Windeyer was ordered to coordinate the defense of Langemak Bay while Brigadier Evans would command the defenses of scarlet beach. On October 15th, a patrol of the 2/28th managed to capture a Japanese officer’s satchel in the wareo-Gusika area, containing a copy of Katagiri’s operation order for the offensive. The document was readily translated and reported back to Wootten. The Australian eyes were thus all turned west towards Sattelberg. Wootten instructed everyone "All units whose location permits will establish lookouts to report immediately… the lighting of any fires at night on Sattelberg heights and any answering fires.” Wotten believed that October 16th had to be X day and wondered why there was no sign yet of the diversion attack from the north. Wootten reaffirmed his orders to Evans to hold the site at Wareo at all costs as he believed the enemy would be advancing through there. Unbeknownst to Wootten, the bulk of the 79th regiment had already begun infiltrating the Katika track and the Yamada detachment were in position to hit Jivevaneng.

Just before dawn on the 16th, the Japanese counteroffensive kicked off, as 3 companies of the 3rd battalion, 80th regiment launched their attack against the 2/17th battalions positions. The 2/17th were taken completely by surprise as many Japanese had crawled within 20 yards of their battalions HQ sitting on the eastern edge of Jivevaneng. Most of the attacks wre beaten back by components of Major Maclarns HQ company as well as the battalion HQ staff. For 2 hours after 7:30am the main track and positions occupied by a platoon of machine gunners and one mortar crew were subjected to sever shelling from a 70mm and 75 mm gun. The day would see 4 major attacks against the defensive positions, but all would be repulsed. At 3:15pm the battalion HQ was heavily damaged by mortar fire and grenades from cup dischargers. They suffered 19 casualties including 5 deaths. Yamada had also sent a small decoy unit of 150 men who raised cooking smoke in front of Kumawa trying to ruse the enemy over and prevent reinforcements going to Jivevaneng.

Meanwhile the 79th regiment infiltrated the widely dispersed companies of the 2/3rd Pioneer battalion and the 155 man Boat Penetration force of Lt Sugino departed Nambariwa at dusk in four barges, successfully repulsing the interference of enemy PT boats on the way. General Adachu wrote of these actions in great detail "The above units, having received orders to prepare to attack the enemy's rear by boat in connection with the division's operations to annihilate the force which has landed north of Finschhafen, undertook intensive training for about 20 days under command of company commander 1st-Lieutenant Sugino at Nambariwa base. The men all awaited the appointed day firm in their belief of certain victory. On 16th October 1943, at the time of the attack by the division's main strength to annihilate the enemy north of Katika, the unit received orders to penetrate the shore south of the mouth of the Song River. After drinking the sake graciously presented to the divisional commander by the Emperor, the unit vowed anew its determination to do or die and departed from the base boldly at dusk on the same day. Repulsing the interference of enemy PT boats on the way, the unit arrived at the designated point at 0230 hours on the 17th.”

As night time came, so did torrential rain. The Australians anxiously watched sattelberg for the signal fire to emerge. It seemed impossible for a large fire to be lit with such rain, but a company of the 22nd battalion over at Logaweng reported seeing a large fire emerge on Sattelberg’s crest at around 8:30pm. Unfortunately this report failed to reach the divisional HQ. None the less the Australians expected a seaborne attack at any minute. At 3:15 am on October 17th a heavy Japanese bombing raid hit Heldsbach and Arndt point. 66 bombs were dropped over the course of two hours, producing little damage and few casualties. At 3:55am Australian coastwatcher Captain D. C Siekmann at Gusika reported seeing 4 Japanese barges heading south. Nearly an hour later another 3 barges hiding in rain squalls approached Scarlet beach.

Evans prepared his 2/43rd and 2/28th battalions for battle. At 4:10am the barges were approaching the north end of Scarlet Beach as companies A and D of the 2/28th, Captain Harris’s 10th light anti-aircraft battery, a detachment of the 2/28th anti-tank platoon and a detachment of the 532nd EBSR were sitting on Bofor guns, two pounders, 37mm and Browning .50 caliber waiting for them. When the barge were 50 yards from the shore the Bofors were the first to light them up followed by the rest. However the Bofors were aimed to high to effectively fire on the barges allowing 2 barges to hit the beach. The 37mm, small arms and .50 Brownings fired upon the Sugino’s raiders. Meanwhile Private Nahan Van Noy withheld two flamethrower units to wait for the enemy to approach. The Japanese came surging out of their barges tossing grenades and as they closed in, Van Noys flamethrowers jumped up and fired upon them. The flamethrowers stopped the Japanese charge in its tracks as the Brownings cut them to pieces. Van Noy’s legs were nearly blown off by multiple grenade hits. Sugino’s raiders were pinned downed in the mayhem but they continued to lob grenades in the cover of darkness. The grenade onslaught destroyed 3 anti aircraft guns, 4 fields guns, two ammunition deports, two machine guns and two pom-pom automatic cannons and numerous small arms. As light began to emerge the Japanese were becoming more and more exposed so Sugino ordered the men to crawl north along the split across the Song. 40 Japanese dead littered the beaches out of an estimated 100 who landed. 60 managed to escape north, but 24 of them would be killed by hunters of the 2/43rd battalion later.

The raiders had not been able to disable the allied guns, but much akin to how pilots exaggerate their kills, so to did the raiders. General Adachi wrote in his report “Defying fierce artillery crossfire, the troops landed from the boats immediately. Taking up positions indicated beforehand the three platoons advanced in columns in different directions. The infantry and engineers advanced as one body creeping through the jungle. They annihilated the panic-stricken enemy everywhere, and achieved glorious and distinguished success. They killed more than 430 of the enemy, destroyed seven AA guns, five machine-cannons and MG's and five ammunition and supply dumps. Moreover they blew up the enemy headquarters and bivouac tents, thus destroying the center of command [these were in fact the tents of the casualty clearing station]. Raiding the area at will and with raging fury, they surprised and overwhelmed the enemy. By disrupting his command organization they established the foundation for the victory of the division's main strength. With the company commander as the nucleus, the entire group put forth a united effort and demonstrated the unique and peerless spiritual superiority of the Imperial Army… All those who fell severely wounded committed suicide by using hand grenades, and, of the total of 186 men, all except 58 became guardian spirits of their country.”

By the late morning, the Japanese had assembled around one mile west of Katika just behind the three Pioneer battalions, finally unleashing their attack directed at Lt Colonel Alfred Gallasch’s HQ. The Australians fought like lions, repelling 3 consecutive attacks before the enemy managed to capture a steep hill overlooking their entire position by nightfall. In the end the Pioneers HQ laden with the bulk of reserve ammunition and rations had to withdraw back towards Katika proper, leaving its dispersed companies behind enemy lines without a secure supply route. But Gallasch’s men’s determined efforts had gained valuable time for Brigadier Evans to redispose his forces and for General Morshead to call in the urgent movement of the 26th brigade to Finschhafen. Evans was forced to abandon the Bonga area so he could reinforce the Song river mouths area. Meanwhile Admiral barbey provided 14 LCI’s and 6 LST’s to carry the urgent reinforcements. Colonel Norman’s 2/28th were ordered to recapture the Pioneer HQ position in order to re-establish communications and a supply route to the now isolated companies.

The next morning, the Australians prepared their counterattack, but they were met with an attack against Katika and around the Siki creek. The Australians managed to repel the initial assaults thanks to artillery of the 2/12th regiment which Katagiri had no answer for as the Sugino raiders were supposed to have taken them out. However the Japanese soon gained momentum as Evans tried to strengthen Scarlet Beachs defenses by arranged a semicircle of infantry companies between the Song and Siki. By midday an Australian platoon led by Lt Wedgewood gained a position north of the Katika track who reported killing 33 Japanese and suffering 11 casualties in the process. Norman ordered Wedgewood to get his men out of there, but the platoon commander asked permission hold the position which he thought was critical. It seems Wedgewood was correct in his assessment, as his platoons little position on the track caused Hayashida to pause his attack.

Meanwhile Katagiri launched his diversionary attack north of the Song at 3:30pm. This effectively held up the 2/43rd battalion over at North Hill. Simultaneously Hayashia ordered some troops to advance south of Siki Creek to try and outflank the 2/28th’s position and they remarkably made it all the way to Siki Cove doing so. This breakthrough threatened the entire Australian defensive position, effectively creating a wedge between the 24th and 20th brigades. Wootten ordered Evans to hold his lines at all cost, including at North Hill and between Scarlet beach to Siki Creek. The Japanese now threaten Scarlet beach from both the west and south, forcing Evans to order a withdrawal of the 2/28th from Katika. It was a controversial decision that would anger Wootten. Norman bitterly pulled out of his dominating position at Katika and likewise the gallant Wedgewood platoon were forced to depart their isolated forward position to maintain a tighter defensive perimeter around scarlet beach. Wootten then ordered half of the 2/13th to defend Heldsbach plantation and protect the supply area at Launch Jetty. To make sure to contain the threat, Wootten placed this unit directly under Windeyer and ordered him to move into the south bank of the Siki.

Hayashida’s men found Katika abandoned by dusk and proceeded south of it to hit Heldsbach and then Finschhafen. Yet just in the nick of time, Windeyeres troops arrived to prevent the 79th regiment from crossing the creek during the night. Meanwhile the 80th regiment continued their assault against Jivevaneng. The assault was that of a static fight along the Sattelberg road and Kumawa track. Some infantrymen who fought there wrote this in their diaries "I eat potatoes and live in a hole, and cannot speak in a loud voice. I live the life of a mud rat or some similar creature.” Another diary read “What shall I eat to live? What has happened to the general attack… the enemy patrol is always wandering around day and night." A third diary read "Heard that [79th Regiment] has forced the enemy in the sector of Arndt Point to retreat. This is the first good news I have heard since I left for the front."

The 2/17th were completely surrounded, the 80th regiment had effectively raised a siege of Jivevaneng. On the 18th the 2/17th’s diarist wrote this "this morning revealed that the enemy had cut the main Sattelberg Road to our east and was sitting astride the track". Japanese sniper rounds, mortars and grenades from cup discharges reigned hell upon the trapped defenders. With the enemy advancing along the Sattelberg road, Windeyer ordered the isolated Pioneer companies to hold the road in front of Zag. With so many allied units isolated behind enemy lines, emergency air drops of ammunition were flown by pilots of the No. 4 Squadron. On October 19th after repelling an enemy attack against Scarlet Beach, Colonel Norman moved in to hit back at Katika surprising the Japanese. aT 3:50pm Coppocks company of the 2/28th followed by two platoons charged Katika under artillery support. The Japanese defender were taken by complete surprise when the Australians hit them from the north, so quickly after losing the position. The battalion diaristwrote "Enemy… appear slightly peeved and evidently had not appreciated the possibility of our reoccupation of these positions.” The Japanese bitterly gave up the vital area and this was couple with a sudden unexpected Australian presence south of Siki. Hayashia in response had to reorganise his units.

By nightfall Brigadier Whitehead’s 26th brigade reinforce with a tank squadron landed at Langemak Bay by midnight thanks to admiral barbey. The next morning, Norman ordered a company to dislodge the Japanese at Siki cove. At 8:38 am on the 20th, two platoons charged the cove and were met with japanese fire from a razorback to the south. By 9:26am the platoons became pinned down. Lt Wedgewoods platoon attempted an encirclement maneuver but was also pinned down. The Australians took too many casualties forcing Norman to withdraw them. Although the assault on Siki cove was unsuccessful, the Japanese machine gun positions were now located, so at 2:30pm some Vickers were placed forward to hit the cove. The 2/28th diaries wrote "This caused considerable retaliation by the enemy, and terrific fire-fight ensued causing mild panic amongst beach defense personnel who thought enemy were breaking through." Eventually the Japanese machine-guns were silenced, mainly by 3-inch mortar fire. Throughout the rest of the day the Australians repulsed a number of attacks on Katika and the Sattelberg road.

After days of resisting tooth and nail, the isolated Pioneer companies along the Katika Track were forced to pull back towards the beach. At 9:15am a Boomerang dropped a message on the Pioneers stating "You will rejoin main body North Hill, Scarlet Beach or Zag. Suggest route crossing Song River moving along it to North Hill." Nearly an hour later another plan dropped 3 canister of ammunition, though the men had hoped for rations. The men buried their surplus ammunition and began marching single file north. The Pioneers had borne the brunt of the main attack, and their mere presence had caused concern for the advancing enemy. The Japanese counter attack halted just when Wootten received his 3rd brigade. He therefor believed the time was ripe to steal the initiative and issued orders to Whitehead and Evans to drive the enemy from Siki Creek, while the entire 2/13th would advance up the Sattelberg road to support the 2/17th.

On October 21st, Hayashida’s battered forces prepared to abandon Siki cove retreating westwards. The 79th regiment had sustained huge losses, the men were exhausted, food was running low leaving many to live on a few potatoes. On the 22nd, reports came in that the Japanese could be seen withdrawing, prompting Norman to push further west of Katika while one of his other companies hit Siki Cove. During the afternoon, the Japanese launched a surprising counter attack against Katika, but were repulsed. Despite fighting them off, the Australians would be unable to advance further for the day. Katagiri then decided to reinforce Hayashia with two companies of the 1st battalion, 79th regiment trying to break the allies hold over Katika. On October 23rd, Evans men finally got some breathing space so they could reorganise the forces. The 2/43rd were ordered to hold the area from the coast through north Hill to the Song river while the 2/28th would hold the area from the Song going south 1000 yards and the 2/32nd would hold the Katika and Siki areas

At this point the 79th regiment had suffered so many losses, Katagiri began to seriously consider calling off the counteroffensive. On the Katika front, the Australians reported numerous piles of Japanese dead, the 2/28th estimated 308 corpses were on the north side of the track alone. Hayashida continued his resolve and ordered attacks during the night, but none held any significant success. Morshead preparing to bring the 4th brigade over to Finschhafen and the American 808th engineer battalion would also land at Langemak bay. A constant stream of American units, vehicles and stores began to pour unto Dreger Harbour to construct new airfields. On the 24th, the Japanese would launch their last attacks west of Katika. While the Australians continue their advance. Wootten and Morshead visited the 24th brigade HQ and began lambasting Evans for his decision to abandon Katika. Evans was sure had had done the right thing pulling back to the perimeter around Scarlet Beach, but Wootten and Morsehead felt he had sacrifice vital ground for no reason. They argued the enemy had concentrated most of its attack on a continuous line which did not include Katika. Evans had neglected to keep up an adequate reserve, which could have been used to punch any Japanese force breaking through around Scarlet Beach. In the end it was Woottens prerogative as divisional commander to determine tactical objects and Evans duty to conform. It was not the first time Evans used his own judgement. For this Evans would be sacked by November 1st and replaced by Brigadier Selwyn Porter.

Finally on October 25th, Katagiri ordered his battered men to concentrate at Sattelberg and reorganise for future counter offensive. For the next three days, the 24th and 26th brigades pushed forward their defensive perimeters, giving a depth of over 1200 yard inland from Scarlet beach and Katika. The Sattelberg road situation remained unchanged, with each side exerting pressure, but unable to shift the other. Katagiri’s counteroffensive had failed. The Australians estimated 679 Japanese had died, with many more killed by artillery and mortar fire. Wootten’s staff estimated the overall casualties for the Japanese to be around 1500. The Japanese would officially report 422 killed, 662 wounded. For the Australians they had 228 casualties of which 49 were dead.

On October 28th, Wootten received the 4th brigade at Finschhafen and prepared a offensive against Sattelberg and Wareo yet again. This time Windeyers forces would regain full control over the Sattelberg road up to Jiveveaneng. The 2/13th advanced to Coconut Grove by October 29th in an effort to support the 2/17th as they attacked east of Jivevaneng. For the next few days the Australians pressed upon Jivevaneng with a series of assaults, but Yamada’s men held on tenaciously. By the end of the month, the 2/17th were suffering from sniping attacks, sickness and a precarious supply line. The battalions diarist wrote this “The battalion at present is rather uncomfortable owing to the almost incessant rain over the past 48 hours. This afternoon mist obscured the whole area and seriously hampered vision. Everyone presents rather sorry spectacle as we are now reduced to one set of clothing. A relief will be welcome when it arrives. The main Sattelberg Road has been cut now for 13 days but it is hoped that this situation will be rectified in the very near future.” On November 1st, the 2/17th and 2/13th resumed their attacks against the Japanese pocket, but were repelled each time suffering terrible casualties. On November 2nd, pandemonium broke out when the 2/13th fired all of their weapons for 15 minutes in a grand diversionary demonstration as the 2/17th successfully launched an attack taking a position north of the road, around 150 yards from the 2/13th. The enemy was now firmly wedged between them. Also on November 2nd, it was expected the 20th and 26th brigades plus their tank squadron would relieve them. Wootten ordered WIndeyere to reopen the Sattelberg road so another fierce attack could occur. Just as this was about to happen, the Japanese were preparing to evacuate their pocket. Finally on November 3rd, after abandoning their positions, the road was opened and the vanguard of the 26th began to arrive and Windeyers battered men began to pull back.

Meanwhile Whitehead assembled his forces along the Sattelberg road preparing for the new offensive. Wootten’s intention was for the 26th brigade to capture the high ground of Sattelberg-Palanko and to subsequently advance to the Gusika-Wareo line. He had 18 tanks to toss up the Sattelberg road and he stressed to all his men to conceal them until the attack occurred. He also sent advance patrols who discovered a number of the enemy had posts west of Jivevaneng, such as a prominent feature called Steeple Tree Hill. Brigadier Porter's 24th brigade patrols would also find Japanese defending Bonga and Pino Hill.

General Adachi visited the frontlines in late October where he found most of Katagiri’s units had been reduced to below half strength and the division was suffering from supply difficulties. Despite this, Katagiri was confident his men could pull through and planned to gradually annihilate the enemy via a series of smaller limited attacks. Thus the 80th regiment would secure Sattelberg heights and the 79th would secure Nongora just in front of Wareo. Adachi also visited Kirai where the 51st division had just arrived. There he ordered Nakano to deploy his forces along the coast between Madang and Sio. The Japanese were going to make the road to sattelberg a road to hell.

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The Australian and Americans managed to thwart General Katagiri’s large counteroffensive against Finschhafen. It was some brutal fighting that greatly hurt the Japanese, now they were again on the defensive and the road to sattelberg would soon be covered in more blood.