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- 125 - Pacific War - Defense of India , April 9-16, 1944
Manage episode 411545508 series 3001964
Last time we spoke about the battle for Kohima and the mop up of the Admiralty islands. The battle for Kohima led to battles raging over the Kohima Ridge. At one point only 2500 allied defenders were facing nearly 15,000 Japanese. Numerous features fell to the Japanese top Kohima ridge. The Japanese were taking heavy casualties while pushing the defenders close to Kohima. A decisive moment presented itself, the Japanese had an open shot against Dimapur. However, mostly because of animosity towards General Mutaguchi the chance to deliver a kill blow was lost. If Dimapur had been taken, it may have changed the entire Burma War. Over in the Admiralty Islands, Los Negros and Manus were finally all mopped up and now the allies had forward airfields to further smash the inner Japanese perimeter. General MacArthurs triumphant return to the Philippines was on its way.
This episode is the Defense of India
Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
Last we spoke, General Mutaguchi had initiated a grand offensive against Kohima. General Slim, knew the seizure of Kohima would be attempted only in conjunction with the seizure of the much more important target, Dimapur. It was at Dimapur where an enormous allied supply dump lied over the Ledo-Imphal line, it was the hub for which all allied activity in the region revolved. If Dimapur fell, the province of Manipur would be impossible to defend and the Brahmaputra valley would be interdicted thus cutting off all overland supply to China. To everyone's shock the Japanese instead invested an entire division to attack Kohima. Slim thought this was a enormous blunder on the part of General Sato Kotoku, going as far as to ask the RAF not to bomb the Generals HQ as “it never struck him that he could inflict terrible damage on us without taking Kohima at all”. In truth it was not really Sato at fault, it was more so upon his superior General Kawabe Mazakazu who did not trust nor like Mutaguchi and rightly suspected the man’s megalomaniac plan to invade India.
Thus Mutaguchi’s Operation U-Go, the intended invasion of India saw the 33rd and 15th divisions closing in on Imphal by the end of March as the 31st Division attacked Kohima. General Cowan’s 17th Division was able to effectively retreat to Imphal by April 4th, with the 49th Brigade acting as rearguard. Meanwhile General Yanagida had just replenished ammunition and provisions after the battle at Tonzang and now ordered the 214th and 215th Regiments to resume their advance. Colonel Sasahara Masahiko’s 215th regiment departed Singgel on March 27th and crossed the India-Burma border by April 3rd. They advanced to Churachandpur by the 7th as the 214th followed closely behind them.
Meanwhile, the Right Assault Unit, the Yamamoto unit had been in hot pursuit of General Gracey’s 20th division since the start of April, and the 3rd battalion, 213th regiment of the Mitsui Unit had just captured the town Chamol. Additionally the 1st battalion, 60th regiment attempted, but failed to break through Laiching Hill in late March. Afterwords the unit was ordered to turn back and attempt a development of Gravey’s left flank by Moving through Lamlong and then Kampang in early April. To the north, General Yamauchi’s Divisional Headquarters advanced to Kasom on March 28. Yamauchi ordered two companies of the 1st Battalion, 67th Infantry to attack and occupy Kameng, which presented an easy approach route to Imphal. The 123rd Indian Brigade, 5th Indian Division had closed the gap with barbed wire and set up defensive positions in the hills to the immediate north and south of the road. The attack was made on the night of April 3 against the positions held by the 1/17th Dogras of the 123rd Indian Brigade on a hill off the Ukhrul Road, south of the village of Kameng, but failed to achieve its objective. They were then furiously counter-attacked by the guns of the 28th Field Regiment and by the Dogras themselves. A troop of tanks each of the 3rd Carabiniers and 7th Cavalry were also positioned on either side of the hill and fired on what were easy targets. By the next morning, almost 100 Japanese bodies were found; the few survivors had withdrawn. It is believed that the ultimate objective of this attack had been the fair-weather Kangla Airfield farther south. It was now felt the 15th Division’s strength was spreed too thinly, thus the Japanese believed their detachments holding along the Imphal-Ukhrul road were badly in need of reinforcement. As such, Yamauchi ordered the 60th and 51st regiments to get into closer contact and by the 4th of April they were moving into positions north of Imphal.
On that same day, Colonel Matsumura started moving down the road to seize the supply depot known as the 221 Advance Ordnance Depot, the largest in the Imphal Area justnorth of Kanglatongbi. As Japanese pressure on the road increased, its men and some of the most valuable supplies, including ammunition and explosives, were moved into a defensive area at Kanglatongbi known as Lion Box. The 2nd battalion managed to take Hill 3813 by April 6th, the 3rd battalion was less fortunate facing the Lion Box. The Lion Box had very few fighting troops among the several thousand men within its perimeter. The box was defended against mounting Japanese assaults from 4 to 7 April, while the evacuation of the supplies to Imphal continued apace. Its defense was assisted by units of the 9th Indian Brigade and tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers, who would travel up from Sekmai in the south during the day. On the 5th while the 9th Indian BRigade and tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers were patrolling forward to help out the Lion Box, Cowan’s 63rd Brigade arrived to Sekmai to reinforce the northern defenses, and this in turn allowed the 9th Brigade to take up a position to defend Nungshigum.
On the 6th, Colonel Omoto’s 3rd battalion attacked Nungshigum’s northern Hill, known as Hill 3833, successfully overrunning the hastily developed Indian defenses there, while the 1st battalion marched upon Hill 4057. There was a heroic counter attack by a platoon led by 18 year old Jemadar Abdul Hafiz serving as Naib Subedar, Junior Commissioned Officer in the 9th Jat Regiment, British Indian Army. His platoon managed to recover Hill 3833 by the end of the day. Jemadar Abdul Hafiz was tasked with recovering it with two sections of his platoon. He fearlessly led the way and recovered the feature in the face of a hail of machine-gun fire and grenade attacks, killing several Japanese in the process. Injured by now, Hafiz continued the attack, fought to his death and was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. The hill became known as Runaway Hill because of the way the Japanese had fled from Hafiz’s brave actions.
April the 7th saw a follow-up charge with Omoto’s 3rd battalion re-seizing the hills around Nungshigum. In the four days that followed, Nungshigum exchanged hands a couple of times: the 3/9th Jats recovered it, only to lose it again to the Japanese of the 3/51st Battalion by 11 April who dug in well on the northern and southern bumps around Nungshigum. Meanwhile Matsumura was continuing to exert heavy pressure upon the Lion Box, finally forcing the battle weary defenders to evacuate the box as the position became impossible to defend. The valiant efforts of the Lion Box defenders had earned the British-Indian troops valuable time to evacuate a large amount of critical supplies back to Imphal, preventing their use to the Japanese. Do remember Mutaguchi literally planned the entire offensive on the basis their logistical supply line was simply seizing the allies supply depots. That is what we call a bold strategy. Matsumura’s troops had suffered heavy casualties in their efforts against the Lion Box. Now he ordered the 60th regiment east to reassemble around the villages of Tingsat, Molvom and their surrounding heights by April 8th. They would be reinforced by the honda raiding units coming from the north.
On the 9th, Omoto’s 1st battalion assaulted Hill 4057 taking it from elements of the 123rd Indian Brigade, as the 3rd battalion secured Nungshigum. This breakthrough posed an unacceptable threat to the British, leaving the 4th Corps HQ, the Imphal Main and Kangla airfield vulnerable to further Japanese attacks. This prompted General Brigg’s to get forces together to evict the Japanese from their recently gained heights. Brigg’s was reinforced with the 254th Indian Tank Brigades armor for the job. An unrelenting artillery and aerial bombardment began against the 51st regiment, greatly reducing the strength of Omoto’s companies. Suffering such horrific losses, Omoto was forced to retreat over to the eastern side of the Iril River. At around dusk on the 12th, Omoto’s 3rd battalion withdrew from Nungshigum to take up better positions in the hills north of Hill 4057. From this position the 3rd battalion was able to cover the 1st battalion's withdrawal from Hill 4057 during the night.
Simultaneously, Briggs launched his main counteroffensive, tossing two companies of the 1/17th Dogras and B Squadron of the 3rd Carabiniers. That morning, the infantry and tanks began climbing up via two spurs on the south-eastern side of Nungshigum. On each spur was a troop of M3 Lee-Grant tanks, together with a company of Dogras. The division’s artillery, together with another troop of tanks, had been placed to the east and west of Nungshigum on the plain. As the infantry and armor climbed, the Vengeance dive-bombers and Hurricanes bombed and strafed the peaks. Soon thereafter, the 88 pieces of artillery and tanks on the plain plastered the same area. The two groups of infantry and tanks joined up at the peak named Pyramid and proceeded in a single file up a narrow ridge towards the Japanese on Southern Bump. As they approached the Japanese defenses, fierce fighting erupted. The tanks were sprayed with machine-gun and rifle fire, and grenades were thrown at them. But there was only so much the Japanese could do. The use of armor on Nungshigum, which rose over 1,000ft above the valley floor, was a masterstroke. The Japanese had never expected to encounter tanks and they had nothing to counter them effectively. The British had to pay a high price, too. All of the British tank officers were killed and the infantry officers wounded later that day. The former had been shot as they stuck their heads out of their tanks’ turrets to guide them safely on the narrow and steep ridgeline. It was finally left to the VCO of the Dogras, Subadar Ranbir Singh, and Squadron Sergeant-Major Craddock of the 3rd Carabiniers to complete the battle. They rose to the occasion; the tanks finally destroyed the main bunkers and the infantry charged at and killed any survivors. There were casualties on both sides, but Japanese losses were especially heavy, leaving 250 bodies. This was the closest the Japanese would come to Imphal as a large, organized force in 1944. Yamauchi’s 15th Division would never be able to pose such an urgent threat from the north again.
On April 13th, the Honda unit and 2nd battalion, 60th infantry launched an unsuccessful attack against Sengmai. In another attack on the 18th, the 2nd battalion gained a foothold in the enemy positions on the eastern hill of Sengmai, but would be forced off it quickly losing 150 men. The failure to breach the defenders at Sengmai marked a turning point in the operation, forcing the Right Assault Unit onto the defensive. Meanwhile Omoto’s withdrawal had opened a gap between his units and Matsumura’s, leaving Matsumura isolated around the Imphal-Kohima road and the Mapao-Molvom range. This also left Matsumura’s supply lines increasingly vulnerable to attacks by Brigg’s 5th Division. General Scoones ordered the 23rd Indian Division to push back on the Ukhrul Road to regain control over the area, while Briggs cleared the Japanese out of the Imphal-Kohima and Mapao-Molvom Range. For this Major-General Ouvry Roberts dispatched the 37th Brigade up the Ukhrul Road while the 1st Brigade made a wide flanking maneuver to the right to swing north in an attempt to capture Yamauchi’s HQ.
A composite unite of the 51st regiment known as the Suzuta unit formed out of two companies and Suzuta’s HQ managed to resist the Indian attacks at Yaingangpokpi. Their mission was to hold the pass near Hill 3524 and they were met by numerous enemy counterattacking groups. The Suzuta Unit was faced with a serious crisis when it was attacked by a strong enemy tank force on 18 April. Meanwhile back on the 15th, the sudden appearance of the 1st Brigade at Hill 5515.. With his headquarters threatened by this new enemy maneuver, Yamauchi decided to move 15th Division headquarters and the Suzuta Unit to the rear of the Right and Center Assault Units. This move was complicated in that it entailed the evacuation of large numbers of casualties, among whom was General Yamanouchi himself. Upon arriving in the vicinity of Nungga intense enemy activity was encountered. It was found impossible to move west, to the desired destination and the headquarters was forced to move toward Lungshong via Ukhrul. The Suzuta Unit troops reverted to their parent organizations. The command post of the Division was finally established at a point about three miles southwest of Lungshong on 29 April.
By april 22nd, Robert’s Brigades made contact over the Ukhrul Road near Litan and began hunting down Yamauchi’s HQ. They searched for it around Shongphel to the north. They converged on the spot, only to find Yamauchi was not there. To the east the 9th Brigade attacked the Mapao-Molvom Range on the 23rd, making some initial gains at Mapao. Their field guns with Hurricane bombers smashed Mapao, allowing the Jats and Punjabis to fight their way up and capture it in two days. But farther north, the heights around Molvom were better defended and the Japanese defied attempts to infiltrate these positions. The brigade soon got bogged down. Further east the 123rd Brigade advanced up the Iril River Valley facing some of Omoto’s retreating men and would reach Sengmai by mid-may.
The Japanese at this point were also preparing to continue their offensive further south. General Yanagida received reports on the progress of the 15th Division and that Kohima had already fallen. So he decided to bypass the expected resistance in the Moirang vicinity and advance directly upon Imphal. This prompted Colonel Sasagara to send his 2nd battalions of the 215th and 213th regiment to attack the Torbung positions on the 9th. They managed to successfully outflank the 49th brigade and exerted so much pressure in the area, the 49th brigade were forced to withdraw over the next few days. With the Japanese in hot pursuit, Cowan dispatched the 32nd Indian Brigade to defend the Tiddim Road with Brigadier David MacKenzie shifting his main position further back to Bishenpur. The Bishenpur village was well located: it was where the hills touched the Tiddim Road to its west; to the east lay the upper reaches of the Loktak Lake. Bishenpur was considered the best place to position a defense of the southwestern approach to Imphal. It was also important because from here a track wriggled west over the mountains to Silchar in Assam. Besides the Imphal–Kohima Road, the Bishenpur–Silchar Track was the only other navigable route back out to the rest of India. Unsurprisingly then, it was also of interest to the Japanese.
On April 12th the Japanese attacked Potsangbam, but the 2nd battalion, 213th regiment was held up by heavy artillery and aerial bombardment from Bishenpur. The Japanese forayed into the villages of Kwa Siphai and Khoijuman to the northeast, but they were rebuffed. To counter them, aerial bombardments were called in on Potsangbam and the next large village, Ningthoukhong. Strategic Air Force Liberators pattern-bombed the two villages with 1,000lb bombs. The British sent tanks, together with infantry units, across the paddy fields towards Potsangbam, but their advance was held up by fierce opposition. Unlike at Nungshigum, the Japanese here were armed with anti-tank guns. Evicting them would require that much more effort. The 4th Independent Engineer Regiment was brought up to reinforce the 2nd Battalion, 213th Infantry at Potsangbam about 20 April, but it would be unable to break through nonetheless. To the west Sasahara’s men tried to break through Kokadan on the 14th. They made repeated attacks for over a month, but would be unable to penetrate Mackenzie’s defenses.
The 214th regiment tossed three attacks against Hill 5846 from their position on Ingourok by April 24th. Hand-to-hand fighting ensued as each side sought to gain possession of these hills. The British had brought up a troop of Lee-Grant tanks of the 150th Regiment Royal Armoured Corps from Bishenpur and these were pressed into battle, firing in close support of the infantry. By 26 April, Point 5846 and Wooded Ridge were under their firm control, while the Japanese had Wireless Hill. Meanwhile the 2nd battalion reinforced the 214th regiment to skirt around Hill 5846 from the west, going just due north of the track. This endeavor ultimately failed in the end, and the men would have to turn back by the end of the month. Due to his failures and disagreements, General Mutaguchi consequently lost faith in Yanagida, who was ignored from this point onwards while his chief-of-staff, Colonel Tanaka Tetsujiro, effectively commanded the 33rd Division.
Meanwhile over on the hill of the Shenam Saddle, the battle for Nippon Hill had been raging since early April. Gracey’s initial piecemeal attempts to retake the feature only saw his men fail. On the other side, the Yamamoto Detachment launched a general attack from Chamol on the 8th, trying to make a breakthrough to Nippon Hill, to relieve the outnumbered 11th company, 213th regiment. While the Japanese were held up by crossfire from Tengnoupal, the 80th Brigade sent three companies of the 1st Devon’s to recapture Nippon Hill on the 11th. Following heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, the British troops stormed the hill with a fierce lobing of grenades and machine gun fire, seizing the feature by the end of the day. Nonetheless the Japanese, General Yamamoto kept committing troops to continuous attacks over the next few days. What was witnessed on Nippon Hill was to be repeated on many occasions around Imphal. Japanese defensive positions would be subjected to intense bombardments, which it was hard to imagine anyone surviving. And yet, time and again, the Japanese would emerge out of the targeted positions and counter-attack. In fact, Nippon Hill was one such place where, even days after it had been recaptured by the British, a lone Japanese soldier would emerge from the rubble and attack. This after being buried for hours, or even days, usually without recourse to food or water. This behavior was a measure of the extraordinary capabilities of the Japanese, as defenders in particular, and of their dedication to their cause in general. It was also a testament to the strength of their defenses. On features like Nippon Hill, the Japanese had shown themselves to be adept at digging an extensive, deep network of underground tunnels and holes within their positions. These allowed them to withstand bombardments, while the small openings allowed for a sustained fire to be kept up on anyone who approached.
After a week of fighting, the 3rd Battalion, 213th Regiment finally recaptured Nippon Hill on April 16, and this time it was to stay with the Japanese until the end of July. The hill would allow the Japanese to observe allied movements over the Shenam Saddle and the road below, so accurate firing from well-sited guns on this hill and the adjacent ridge would cause many casualties among the defenders. Yamamoto ramped up his efforts trying to break through towards Imphal. With additional tank and artillery support the 3rd battalion, 213th regiment managed to overrun Crete East on the 22nd as the 80th Brigade evacuated to the isolated Cyprus. Pressing onwards, Yamamoto attacked Crete West, tossing multiple attacks at the feature over the next two weeks. Despite the ferocity of the invaders, the defenders would manage to hold on until the end of April.
Meanwhile the 1st battalion, 60th regiment was unable to break through Hill 5240 near Kampang, so on the 20th they were redirected to hit the northern sector of Palel. The battalion had suffered 300 casualties, unable to pose much of a threat any longer to Gracey’s men. To their left was the 1st INA Division’s 2nd Gandhi Brigade, deployed on the left flank of Yamamoto Force and an initial group that had rushed through the hills towards Palel. They were targeting the airfield from the south in coordination with the Japanese closing in via Langgol from the east. They clashed with Indian and Gurkha defenders at Purum Chumban on May 2nd. There are differing accounts of what happened during the battle of Purum Chumbang. One has the INA group reaching very close to the airfield, while another has it reach some 8km short of it. What is common to both, however, is the reaction of the Fourteenth Army units (Indian and Gurkha) to the INA’s effort. A parley between the two is supposed to have taken place at some point, where the latter tried to convince their brethren on the British side not to fight. This being rejected, the INA attacked and was repulsed. At least 50 INA men were killed in the retaliatory response. It has been argued that these attacks by their fellow Indians affected INA morale. They had not expected to be considered traitors by their former comrades of the Indian Army. Several hundred INA men deserted before the end of the battle, although the majority of the force remained in the hills around the Tamu–Palel Road, wracked by disease and hunger.
In the meantime, the Kohima Garrison received relief on their ridge positions, now General Grover was formulating a plan to recapture lost territory in the Kohima area and to annhilate the 31st division. His plan was to hold Zubza and Periphema in the rear while Brigadier John Shapland’s 6th Brigade would launch an attack against the Japanese center and gradually push them towards the southern and southwestern flanks of the Kohima Ridge. Brigadier Victor Hawkins 5th Brigade would would perform a flanking maneuver to the north while Brigadier William Goshcens 4th Brigade did the same in the south. On April 18, Hawkins thus dispatched his first units across the deep Zubza nullah to the Merema Ridge to cut the Kohima-Merema-Bokajan road, with the rest of the brigade following in an excruciating march and finally assembling at the Merema Ridge by April 27.
Further to the north, in parallel with the 2nd Divisions advance, Brigadier Perowne’s men have been performing an extremely difficult march into the Naga Hills. Their task was to prevent the Japanese from escaping the Brahmaputra Valley, taking a track leading from Merema to Bokajan. For weeks the Chindit Brigade had conducted an effective operation, ambushing Japanese supply routes, denying them territory, encouraging local Naga resistance efforts and causing general havoc. General Mutaguchi and ordered Sato to send his 124th Infantry Regiment to support the struggling 15th Division in the south. Sato decided to occupy Garrison Hill prior to complying with Mutaguchi’s directive, immediately sending the 1st Battalion, 138th Regiment to support the attacks of the 58th Regiment. The assault failed on the 23rd and this further convinced Sato he would be unable to hold Kohima if he sent the reinforcements Mutaguchi requested. His decision was also heavily influenced by his increasing anger at his superior as Mutaguchi was completely failing to supply his men. He had been promised at least 250 tons of resupplies would arrive by April 8, Sato testily demanded food and ammunition. In fact, very few supplies ever reached the 31st Division from Burma, the men having to survive on what they had brought with them, what they could beg or steal from Naga villages, or what 'Churchill Rations' they could capture from British stockpiles. Sato's fury at the lack of promised supplies reaching Kohima was fuelled by his belief that the 31st Division was being let down by Mutaguchi's abject failure to break into Imphal. In response to Mutaguchi's demand that he send troops to assist in the Imphal battle, on April 20 Sato sent the first of a number of increasingly tetchy signals to the army commander: 'We captured Kohima in three weeks as promised. How about Imphal?' Mutaguchi replied: 'Probable date for capture of Imphal April 29', which was the Emperor's birthday. Sato plainly did not believe him. On April 30, Sato signaled again: '31st Division at the limit of its endurance. When are you going to destroy Imphal?' To this he received no reply.
The relationship between Sato and Mutaguchi had never been good, but now it was really bad. Over the next two weeks, the battles on Kohima Ridge were not seeing results. Repeated attacks were made against Garrison Hill as Shapland’s men tossed desperate attacks at the extreme northern edge of the ridge allowing for a troop of Lee/Grant tanks to lumber up the western end of Naga Hill in order to provide armored support for the 5th Brigade. The plan to get tanks onto the back of Naga Hill by driving through the Japanese positions overlooking the TCP finally succeeded on April 27, the Lee/Grants trundling along the track, wary of mines, but taking the Japanese entirely by surprise at this stroke of legerdemain. Peppered on all sides futilely by bullets, they joined 5th Brigade on Naga Hill, albeit at the cost of 28 Dorset dead, who had kept intense pressure on the TCP end of the Kohima Ridge to distract the Japanese during the operation. In the fighting for control of the tennis court no means of overcoming Japanese bunkers could be discovered using infantry alone, and attempts were made to bulldoze a path up to the remains of the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow to allow a Lee/Grant tank to move onto the tennis court and engage the bunkers directly with its 75mm gun. Unhappily the first effort failed when the Lee/Grant went into reverse, pulling the bulldozer to which it was attached back down the steep slope in a heap of crashing, twisted metal. Four days later a similar attempt with a Stuart Light tank of the 45th Indian Light Cavalry also failed, as the Japanese had brought up a 3.7in. anti-tank gun that put the tank out of action, fortunately with no loss to the crew.By the 27th, the tanks made a break through to the Naga Hill. The Japanese suffered terrible casualties causing them to suspend operations against Garrison Hill. The 31st división was not fully adopting a defensive stance.
Meanwhile, Goschen’s men had set out on a long march to cut the Imphal Road below the Aradura Spur on the night of April 25. They were advancing through some of the worst terrain of the entire region, it was deep, nearly vertical jungle-covered gullies falling between Mount Pulebadze and the face of Mount Japfu. The 4th Brigade would reach the valley between Pulebadze and Japfu in three days. One there, General Stopford ordered Goschen to climb over Pulebadze Ridge then come down into Kohima to hit the Japanese position on the GPT ridge, which were giving serious problems to Shaplands men. The brigade accordingly turned left, climbing up and over the Pulebadze Ridge and beginning the slow descent through the jungle down onto the Kohima side. A prominent pimple above the GPT Ridge known as Oaks Hill, sitting at 6,000ft, was occupied by the Norfolks and the 143rd Company on 1 May, the presence of British troops 1,500ft above the Japanese positions becoming known to them for the first time. But that is all for today for India, as there is something else cooking up in the CBI theater.
Since early 1943, the United States had steadily increased its air force in China. By the beginning of 1944 there were more than 500 US planes in this area, whereas, in spite of the organization of the 5th Air Army,the Japanese Air Force had less than half this number of planes in China. Furthermore, with the war situation rapidly growing worse in the Pacific, the Japanese Air Force in China could not hope for any replenishment. Enemy planes not only interfered with Japanese ground operations, but also harassed the lines of communication and attacked the occupied areas. General Chennault's 14th Air Force had been causing such problems, the Japanese were forced to act. The catalyst for their future action was because of a raid against Formosa carried out by 14 B-25s, 8 P-38s and 8 P-51s on November 25, 1943, which caught the Japanese by surprise as the Chinese-American aircraft strafed and dropped bombs over Shinchiku airfield, successfully destroying its installations along with 42 planes on the ground at the cost of three fighters lost.
This prompted the Japanese commanders to target strategic points along the Hunan-Guangxi, Guangzhou-Hankou and Southern Beijing-Hankou Railways. Thus the infamous Operation Ichi-Go was born. Ichi-Go’s primary targets were Guilin and Liuzhou’s airfields where the US was developing bases for B-29’s to launch strikes against the Japanese home islands. If you are interested in a in-depth talk about this by the way, over on the Pacific War Channel on Youtube or Spotify, I did an interview with Dave from the Coldwar about the bombing of Japan and we talked about this very subject. Pretty neat episode I recommend it! Now in general the main objectives were to link railways in Beijing and Hankou in northern China to the southern Chinese coast at Guangzhou. This would spare shipping and avoid the pesky American submarine force who were now ruining havoc; it was also to take out airfields in Sichuan and Guangxi to thwart further US bombing of Formosa and the Japanese home islands. This also in turn would open a land route to Indochina and hopefully would destroy enough NRA units to collapse Chiang Kai-Sheks government, finally solving the China Problem.
Ichi-Go would start in late April with an offensive by the 12th Army of Lt General Kita Seiichi, later replaced by Lt General Uchiyama Eitaro. This was codenamed Operation Kogo, tasked with capturing the areas along the South Beijing-Hankou railway, centered around Zhengzhou and Luoyang, and destroying the main strength of the 1st War Area. Then, early in June, the 11th Army of General Yokoyama would launch Operation Togo, with the objective of capturing Changsha and Hengyang and destroying the main force of the 6th and 9th War Areas. Following the conclusion of the first phase, late in July, the 11th Army would be assisted by the 23rd Army of Lt General Tanaka Hisaichi and the Indochina Garrison Army of Lt General Viscount Machiiji Kazumoto would capture Guilin and Liuzhou and the destruction of the 4th War Area.
Finally, the third phase of Operation Togo would see the 23rd Army capture the strategic areas along the south Canton-Hankou railway, centered around Nanning, by destroying the 7th War Area in September while the 11th Army continued the advance south towards Suichwan Arfield to link with the Indochina forces. For the entire operation, the 5th Air Army of Lt General Shimoyama Takuma would support the offensives from the skies, tasked with annihilating the American-Chinese air force and attaining air supremacy over China. The logistics of Operation Ichi-Go constituted was one of the most notable examples of the IJA’s offensive preparations. Between some of the measures taken was the emplacement of dozens of anti-air batteries throughout the Yangtze River to limit the Chinese-American air activity against troop concentrations at its southern channel; the transfer of dozens of thousands of troops by railway without interference from Chinese guerrillas because security at the railway lines was increased; the monthly river transport of 40000 tons of supplies; the secret storage of 600 pontoons; and the constructions of hideouts for a munitions arsenal that should last for two years and of hundreds of deposits that harbored 50 million liters of gasoline that should last for eight months: 40 million for land vehicles and 10 million for planes.By early April General Hata had amassed 62,000 men, 52,000 Japanese and 10,000 collaborationist units alongside 800 tanks, 1550 artillery pieces, 250 aircraft, 15550 motorized vehicles and 100000 horses.
Meanwhile the British Eastern Fleet had been receiving more naval resources due to the successes in the Mediterranean and Northern Europe and could now carry out more aggressive actions in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Agreement had been reached, after objections from Admiral Ernest King, but new procedures would need to be learnt by naval crews and Fleet Air Arm aircrew. To this end, Operation Diplomat, a training exercise, took place in late March 1944. The objective was for the fleet to rendezvous with a group of tankers, escorted by the Dutch cruiser HNLMS Tromp and practice refueling at sea procedures. The ships then rendezvoused with USN Task Group 58.5 built around aircraft carrier USS Saratoga and three destroyers.
To further support the coming Hollandia and Aitape landings, Admiral King requested that, during April, the Eastern Fleet should engage Japanese forces in their area and hold them there to reduce the opposition that could be encountered by the Americans at Western New Guinea. In response, Admiral Somerville launched Operation Cockpit on April 16, an air attack against Sabang off Sumatra. The fleet sailed from Trincomalee on 16 April, and two days later the Gambia and Ceylon were detached from Force 69 to strengthen the anti-aircraft defense of the carrier force. On the morning of April 19, 17 Barracudas and 13 Corsairs from the carrier Illustrious and 29 Dauntless and Avenger bombers and 24 Hellcats from Saratoga took off towards Sumatra and subsequently caught the Japanese completely by surprise, finding no opposition there. Thirty Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the airfield and a direct hit by a 1000-pound bomb set a large oil tank on fire. The power-station, barracks and wireless station were badly damaged. The submarine HMS Tactician reported large fires in the dockyard burning fiercely hours after the fleet had left the area. The raid was a clear success, with Somerville later saying that the Japanese "had been caught with their kimonos up".
I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.
The invaders it seems bit off more than they could chew when they attacked India. General Mutaguchi was facing a determined enemy and very pissed off and somewhat insubordinate colleagues. Operation Ichi-Go was being prepared and the Royal Navy was sending forces into the Indian and Pacific Oceans adding to the IJN’s misery.
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Manage episode 411545508 series 3001964
Last time we spoke about the battle for Kohima and the mop up of the Admiralty islands. The battle for Kohima led to battles raging over the Kohima Ridge. At one point only 2500 allied defenders were facing nearly 15,000 Japanese. Numerous features fell to the Japanese top Kohima ridge. The Japanese were taking heavy casualties while pushing the defenders close to Kohima. A decisive moment presented itself, the Japanese had an open shot against Dimapur. However, mostly because of animosity towards General Mutaguchi the chance to deliver a kill blow was lost. If Dimapur had been taken, it may have changed the entire Burma War. Over in the Admiralty Islands, Los Negros and Manus were finally all mopped up and now the allies had forward airfields to further smash the inner Japanese perimeter. General MacArthurs triumphant return to the Philippines was on its way.
This episode is the Defense of India
Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
Last we spoke, General Mutaguchi had initiated a grand offensive against Kohima. General Slim, knew the seizure of Kohima would be attempted only in conjunction with the seizure of the much more important target, Dimapur. It was at Dimapur where an enormous allied supply dump lied over the Ledo-Imphal line, it was the hub for which all allied activity in the region revolved. If Dimapur fell, the province of Manipur would be impossible to defend and the Brahmaputra valley would be interdicted thus cutting off all overland supply to China. To everyone's shock the Japanese instead invested an entire division to attack Kohima. Slim thought this was a enormous blunder on the part of General Sato Kotoku, going as far as to ask the RAF not to bomb the Generals HQ as “it never struck him that he could inflict terrible damage on us without taking Kohima at all”. In truth it was not really Sato at fault, it was more so upon his superior General Kawabe Mazakazu who did not trust nor like Mutaguchi and rightly suspected the man’s megalomaniac plan to invade India.
Thus Mutaguchi’s Operation U-Go, the intended invasion of India saw the 33rd and 15th divisions closing in on Imphal by the end of March as the 31st Division attacked Kohima. General Cowan’s 17th Division was able to effectively retreat to Imphal by April 4th, with the 49th Brigade acting as rearguard. Meanwhile General Yanagida had just replenished ammunition and provisions after the battle at Tonzang and now ordered the 214th and 215th Regiments to resume their advance. Colonel Sasahara Masahiko’s 215th regiment departed Singgel on March 27th and crossed the India-Burma border by April 3rd. They advanced to Churachandpur by the 7th as the 214th followed closely behind them.
Meanwhile, the Right Assault Unit, the Yamamoto unit had been in hot pursuit of General Gracey’s 20th division since the start of April, and the 3rd battalion, 213th regiment of the Mitsui Unit had just captured the town Chamol. Additionally the 1st battalion, 60th regiment attempted, but failed to break through Laiching Hill in late March. Afterwords the unit was ordered to turn back and attempt a development of Gravey’s left flank by Moving through Lamlong and then Kampang in early April. To the north, General Yamauchi’s Divisional Headquarters advanced to Kasom on March 28. Yamauchi ordered two companies of the 1st Battalion, 67th Infantry to attack and occupy Kameng, which presented an easy approach route to Imphal. The 123rd Indian Brigade, 5th Indian Division had closed the gap with barbed wire and set up defensive positions in the hills to the immediate north and south of the road. The attack was made on the night of April 3 against the positions held by the 1/17th Dogras of the 123rd Indian Brigade on a hill off the Ukhrul Road, south of the village of Kameng, but failed to achieve its objective. They were then furiously counter-attacked by the guns of the 28th Field Regiment and by the Dogras themselves. A troop of tanks each of the 3rd Carabiniers and 7th Cavalry were also positioned on either side of the hill and fired on what were easy targets. By the next morning, almost 100 Japanese bodies were found; the few survivors had withdrawn. It is believed that the ultimate objective of this attack had been the fair-weather Kangla Airfield farther south. It was now felt the 15th Division’s strength was spreed too thinly, thus the Japanese believed their detachments holding along the Imphal-Ukhrul road were badly in need of reinforcement. As such, Yamauchi ordered the 60th and 51st regiments to get into closer contact and by the 4th of April they were moving into positions north of Imphal.
On that same day, Colonel Matsumura started moving down the road to seize the supply depot known as the 221 Advance Ordnance Depot, the largest in the Imphal Area justnorth of Kanglatongbi. As Japanese pressure on the road increased, its men and some of the most valuable supplies, including ammunition and explosives, were moved into a defensive area at Kanglatongbi known as Lion Box. The 2nd battalion managed to take Hill 3813 by April 6th, the 3rd battalion was less fortunate facing the Lion Box. The Lion Box had very few fighting troops among the several thousand men within its perimeter. The box was defended against mounting Japanese assaults from 4 to 7 April, while the evacuation of the supplies to Imphal continued apace. Its defense was assisted by units of the 9th Indian Brigade and tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers, who would travel up from Sekmai in the south during the day. On the 5th while the 9th Indian BRigade and tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers were patrolling forward to help out the Lion Box, Cowan’s 63rd Brigade arrived to Sekmai to reinforce the northern defenses, and this in turn allowed the 9th Brigade to take up a position to defend Nungshigum.
On the 6th, Colonel Omoto’s 3rd battalion attacked Nungshigum’s northern Hill, known as Hill 3833, successfully overrunning the hastily developed Indian defenses there, while the 1st battalion marched upon Hill 4057. There was a heroic counter attack by a platoon led by 18 year old Jemadar Abdul Hafiz serving as Naib Subedar, Junior Commissioned Officer in the 9th Jat Regiment, British Indian Army. His platoon managed to recover Hill 3833 by the end of the day. Jemadar Abdul Hafiz was tasked with recovering it with two sections of his platoon. He fearlessly led the way and recovered the feature in the face of a hail of machine-gun fire and grenade attacks, killing several Japanese in the process. Injured by now, Hafiz continued the attack, fought to his death and was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. The hill became known as Runaway Hill because of the way the Japanese had fled from Hafiz’s brave actions.
April the 7th saw a follow-up charge with Omoto’s 3rd battalion re-seizing the hills around Nungshigum. In the four days that followed, Nungshigum exchanged hands a couple of times: the 3/9th Jats recovered it, only to lose it again to the Japanese of the 3/51st Battalion by 11 April who dug in well on the northern and southern bumps around Nungshigum. Meanwhile Matsumura was continuing to exert heavy pressure upon the Lion Box, finally forcing the battle weary defenders to evacuate the box as the position became impossible to defend. The valiant efforts of the Lion Box defenders had earned the British-Indian troops valuable time to evacuate a large amount of critical supplies back to Imphal, preventing their use to the Japanese. Do remember Mutaguchi literally planned the entire offensive on the basis their logistical supply line was simply seizing the allies supply depots. That is what we call a bold strategy. Matsumura’s troops had suffered heavy casualties in their efforts against the Lion Box. Now he ordered the 60th regiment east to reassemble around the villages of Tingsat, Molvom and their surrounding heights by April 8th. They would be reinforced by the honda raiding units coming from the north.
On the 9th, Omoto’s 1st battalion assaulted Hill 4057 taking it from elements of the 123rd Indian Brigade, as the 3rd battalion secured Nungshigum. This breakthrough posed an unacceptable threat to the British, leaving the 4th Corps HQ, the Imphal Main and Kangla airfield vulnerable to further Japanese attacks. This prompted General Brigg’s to get forces together to evict the Japanese from their recently gained heights. Brigg’s was reinforced with the 254th Indian Tank Brigades armor for the job. An unrelenting artillery and aerial bombardment began against the 51st regiment, greatly reducing the strength of Omoto’s companies. Suffering such horrific losses, Omoto was forced to retreat over to the eastern side of the Iril River. At around dusk on the 12th, Omoto’s 3rd battalion withdrew from Nungshigum to take up better positions in the hills north of Hill 4057. From this position the 3rd battalion was able to cover the 1st battalion's withdrawal from Hill 4057 during the night.
Simultaneously, Briggs launched his main counteroffensive, tossing two companies of the 1/17th Dogras and B Squadron of the 3rd Carabiniers. That morning, the infantry and tanks began climbing up via two spurs on the south-eastern side of Nungshigum. On each spur was a troop of M3 Lee-Grant tanks, together with a company of Dogras. The division’s artillery, together with another troop of tanks, had been placed to the east and west of Nungshigum on the plain. As the infantry and armor climbed, the Vengeance dive-bombers and Hurricanes bombed and strafed the peaks. Soon thereafter, the 88 pieces of artillery and tanks on the plain plastered the same area. The two groups of infantry and tanks joined up at the peak named Pyramid and proceeded in a single file up a narrow ridge towards the Japanese on Southern Bump. As they approached the Japanese defenses, fierce fighting erupted. The tanks were sprayed with machine-gun and rifle fire, and grenades were thrown at them. But there was only so much the Japanese could do. The use of armor on Nungshigum, which rose over 1,000ft above the valley floor, was a masterstroke. The Japanese had never expected to encounter tanks and they had nothing to counter them effectively. The British had to pay a high price, too. All of the British tank officers were killed and the infantry officers wounded later that day. The former had been shot as they stuck their heads out of their tanks’ turrets to guide them safely on the narrow and steep ridgeline. It was finally left to the VCO of the Dogras, Subadar Ranbir Singh, and Squadron Sergeant-Major Craddock of the 3rd Carabiniers to complete the battle. They rose to the occasion; the tanks finally destroyed the main bunkers and the infantry charged at and killed any survivors. There were casualties on both sides, but Japanese losses were especially heavy, leaving 250 bodies. This was the closest the Japanese would come to Imphal as a large, organized force in 1944. Yamauchi’s 15th Division would never be able to pose such an urgent threat from the north again.
On April 13th, the Honda unit and 2nd battalion, 60th infantry launched an unsuccessful attack against Sengmai. In another attack on the 18th, the 2nd battalion gained a foothold in the enemy positions on the eastern hill of Sengmai, but would be forced off it quickly losing 150 men. The failure to breach the defenders at Sengmai marked a turning point in the operation, forcing the Right Assault Unit onto the defensive. Meanwhile Omoto’s withdrawal had opened a gap between his units and Matsumura’s, leaving Matsumura isolated around the Imphal-Kohima road and the Mapao-Molvom range. This also left Matsumura’s supply lines increasingly vulnerable to attacks by Brigg’s 5th Division. General Scoones ordered the 23rd Indian Division to push back on the Ukhrul Road to regain control over the area, while Briggs cleared the Japanese out of the Imphal-Kohima and Mapao-Molvom Range. For this Major-General Ouvry Roberts dispatched the 37th Brigade up the Ukhrul Road while the 1st Brigade made a wide flanking maneuver to the right to swing north in an attempt to capture Yamauchi’s HQ.
A composite unite of the 51st regiment known as the Suzuta unit formed out of two companies and Suzuta’s HQ managed to resist the Indian attacks at Yaingangpokpi. Their mission was to hold the pass near Hill 3524 and they were met by numerous enemy counterattacking groups. The Suzuta Unit was faced with a serious crisis when it was attacked by a strong enemy tank force on 18 April. Meanwhile back on the 15th, the sudden appearance of the 1st Brigade at Hill 5515.. With his headquarters threatened by this new enemy maneuver, Yamauchi decided to move 15th Division headquarters and the Suzuta Unit to the rear of the Right and Center Assault Units. This move was complicated in that it entailed the evacuation of large numbers of casualties, among whom was General Yamanouchi himself. Upon arriving in the vicinity of Nungga intense enemy activity was encountered. It was found impossible to move west, to the desired destination and the headquarters was forced to move toward Lungshong via Ukhrul. The Suzuta Unit troops reverted to their parent organizations. The command post of the Division was finally established at a point about three miles southwest of Lungshong on 29 April.
By april 22nd, Robert’s Brigades made contact over the Ukhrul Road near Litan and began hunting down Yamauchi’s HQ. They searched for it around Shongphel to the north. They converged on the spot, only to find Yamauchi was not there. To the east the 9th Brigade attacked the Mapao-Molvom Range on the 23rd, making some initial gains at Mapao. Their field guns with Hurricane bombers smashed Mapao, allowing the Jats and Punjabis to fight their way up and capture it in two days. But farther north, the heights around Molvom were better defended and the Japanese defied attempts to infiltrate these positions. The brigade soon got bogged down. Further east the 123rd Brigade advanced up the Iril River Valley facing some of Omoto’s retreating men and would reach Sengmai by mid-may.
The Japanese at this point were also preparing to continue their offensive further south. General Yanagida received reports on the progress of the 15th Division and that Kohima had already fallen. So he decided to bypass the expected resistance in the Moirang vicinity and advance directly upon Imphal. This prompted Colonel Sasagara to send his 2nd battalions of the 215th and 213th regiment to attack the Torbung positions on the 9th. They managed to successfully outflank the 49th brigade and exerted so much pressure in the area, the 49th brigade were forced to withdraw over the next few days. With the Japanese in hot pursuit, Cowan dispatched the 32nd Indian Brigade to defend the Tiddim Road with Brigadier David MacKenzie shifting his main position further back to Bishenpur. The Bishenpur village was well located: it was where the hills touched the Tiddim Road to its west; to the east lay the upper reaches of the Loktak Lake. Bishenpur was considered the best place to position a defense of the southwestern approach to Imphal. It was also important because from here a track wriggled west over the mountains to Silchar in Assam. Besides the Imphal–Kohima Road, the Bishenpur–Silchar Track was the only other navigable route back out to the rest of India. Unsurprisingly then, it was also of interest to the Japanese.
On April 12th the Japanese attacked Potsangbam, but the 2nd battalion, 213th regiment was held up by heavy artillery and aerial bombardment from Bishenpur. The Japanese forayed into the villages of Kwa Siphai and Khoijuman to the northeast, but they were rebuffed. To counter them, aerial bombardments were called in on Potsangbam and the next large village, Ningthoukhong. Strategic Air Force Liberators pattern-bombed the two villages with 1,000lb bombs. The British sent tanks, together with infantry units, across the paddy fields towards Potsangbam, but their advance was held up by fierce opposition. Unlike at Nungshigum, the Japanese here were armed with anti-tank guns. Evicting them would require that much more effort. The 4th Independent Engineer Regiment was brought up to reinforce the 2nd Battalion, 213th Infantry at Potsangbam about 20 April, but it would be unable to break through nonetheless. To the west Sasahara’s men tried to break through Kokadan on the 14th. They made repeated attacks for over a month, but would be unable to penetrate Mackenzie’s defenses.
The 214th regiment tossed three attacks against Hill 5846 from their position on Ingourok by April 24th. Hand-to-hand fighting ensued as each side sought to gain possession of these hills. The British had brought up a troop of Lee-Grant tanks of the 150th Regiment Royal Armoured Corps from Bishenpur and these were pressed into battle, firing in close support of the infantry. By 26 April, Point 5846 and Wooded Ridge were under their firm control, while the Japanese had Wireless Hill. Meanwhile the 2nd battalion reinforced the 214th regiment to skirt around Hill 5846 from the west, going just due north of the track. This endeavor ultimately failed in the end, and the men would have to turn back by the end of the month. Due to his failures and disagreements, General Mutaguchi consequently lost faith in Yanagida, who was ignored from this point onwards while his chief-of-staff, Colonel Tanaka Tetsujiro, effectively commanded the 33rd Division.
Meanwhile over on the hill of the Shenam Saddle, the battle for Nippon Hill had been raging since early April. Gracey’s initial piecemeal attempts to retake the feature only saw his men fail. On the other side, the Yamamoto Detachment launched a general attack from Chamol on the 8th, trying to make a breakthrough to Nippon Hill, to relieve the outnumbered 11th company, 213th regiment. While the Japanese were held up by crossfire from Tengnoupal, the 80th Brigade sent three companies of the 1st Devon’s to recapture Nippon Hill on the 11th. Following heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, the British troops stormed the hill with a fierce lobing of grenades and machine gun fire, seizing the feature by the end of the day. Nonetheless the Japanese, General Yamamoto kept committing troops to continuous attacks over the next few days. What was witnessed on Nippon Hill was to be repeated on many occasions around Imphal. Japanese defensive positions would be subjected to intense bombardments, which it was hard to imagine anyone surviving. And yet, time and again, the Japanese would emerge out of the targeted positions and counter-attack. In fact, Nippon Hill was one such place where, even days after it had been recaptured by the British, a lone Japanese soldier would emerge from the rubble and attack. This after being buried for hours, or even days, usually without recourse to food or water. This behavior was a measure of the extraordinary capabilities of the Japanese, as defenders in particular, and of their dedication to their cause in general. It was also a testament to the strength of their defenses. On features like Nippon Hill, the Japanese had shown themselves to be adept at digging an extensive, deep network of underground tunnels and holes within their positions. These allowed them to withstand bombardments, while the small openings allowed for a sustained fire to be kept up on anyone who approached.
After a week of fighting, the 3rd Battalion, 213th Regiment finally recaptured Nippon Hill on April 16, and this time it was to stay with the Japanese until the end of July. The hill would allow the Japanese to observe allied movements over the Shenam Saddle and the road below, so accurate firing from well-sited guns on this hill and the adjacent ridge would cause many casualties among the defenders. Yamamoto ramped up his efforts trying to break through towards Imphal. With additional tank and artillery support the 3rd battalion, 213th regiment managed to overrun Crete East on the 22nd as the 80th Brigade evacuated to the isolated Cyprus. Pressing onwards, Yamamoto attacked Crete West, tossing multiple attacks at the feature over the next two weeks. Despite the ferocity of the invaders, the defenders would manage to hold on until the end of April.
Meanwhile the 1st battalion, 60th regiment was unable to break through Hill 5240 near Kampang, so on the 20th they were redirected to hit the northern sector of Palel. The battalion had suffered 300 casualties, unable to pose much of a threat any longer to Gracey’s men. To their left was the 1st INA Division’s 2nd Gandhi Brigade, deployed on the left flank of Yamamoto Force and an initial group that had rushed through the hills towards Palel. They were targeting the airfield from the south in coordination with the Japanese closing in via Langgol from the east. They clashed with Indian and Gurkha defenders at Purum Chumban on May 2nd. There are differing accounts of what happened during the battle of Purum Chumbang. One has the INA group reaching very close to the airfield, while another has it reach some 8km short of it. What is common to both, however, is the reaction of the Fourteenth Army units (Indian and Gurkha) to the INA’s effort. A parley between the two is supposed to have taken place at some point, where the latter tried to convince their brethren on the British side not to fight. This being rejected, the INA attacked and was repulsed. At least 50 INA men were killed in the retaliatory response. It has been argued that these attacks by their fellow Indians affected INA morale. They had not expected to be considered traitors by their former comrades of the Indian Army. Several hundred INA men deserted before the end of the battle, although the majority of the force remained in the hills around the Tamu–Palel Road, wracked by disease and hunger.
In the meantime, the Kohima Garrison received relief on their ridge positions, now General Grover was formulating a plan to recapture lost territory in the Kohima area and to annhilate the 31st division. His plan was to hold Zubza and Periphema in the rear while Brigadier John Shapland’s 6th Brigade would launch an attack against the Japanese center and gradually push them towards the southern and southwestern flanks of the Kohima Ridge. Brigadier Victor Hawkins 5th Brigade would would perform a flanking maneuver to the north while Brigadier William Goshcens 4th Brigade did the same in the south. On April 18, Hawkins thus dispatched his first units across the deep Zubza nullah to the Merema Ridge to cut the Kohima-Merema-Bokajan road, with the rest of the brigade following in an excruciating march and finally assembling at the Merema Ridge by April 27.
Further to the north, in parallel with the 2nd Divisions advance, Brigadier Perowne’s men have been performing an extremely difficult march into the Naga Hills. Their task was to prevent the Japanese from escaping the Brahmaputra Valley, taking a track leading from Merema to Bokajan. For weeks the Chindit Brigade had conducted an effective operation, ambushing Japanese supply routes, denying them territory, encouraging local Naga resistance efforts and causing general havoc. General Mutaguchi and ordered Sato to send his 124th Infantry Regiment to support the struggling 15th Division in the south. Sato decided to occupy Garrison Hill prior to complying with Mutaguchi’s directive, immediately sending the 1st Battalion, 138th Regiment to support the attacks of the 58th Regiment. The assault failed on the 23rd and this further convinced Sato he would be unable to hold Kohima if he sent the reinforcements Mutaguchi requested. His decision was also heavily influenced by his increasing anger at his superior as Mutaguchi was completely failing to supply his men. He had been promised at least 250 tons of resupplies would arrive by April 8, Sato testily demanded food and ammunition. In fact, very few supplies ever reached the 31st Division from Burma, the men having to survive on what they had brought with them, what they could beg or steal from Naga villages, or what 'Churchill Rations' they could capture from British stockpiles. Sato's fury at the lack of promised supplies reaching Kohima was fuelled by his belief that the 31st Division was being let down by Mutaguchi's abject failure to break into Imphal. In response to Mutaguchi's demand that he send troops to assist in the Imphal battle, on April 20 Sato sent the first of a number of increasingly tetchy signals to the army commander: 'We captured Kohima in three weeks as promised. How about Imphal?' Mutaguchi replied: 'Probable date for capture of Imphal April 29', which was the Emperor's birthday. Sato plainly did not believe him. On April 30, Sato signaled again: '31st Division at the limit of its endurance. When are you going to destroy Imphal?' To this he received no reply.
The relationship between Sato and Mutaguchi had never been good, but now it was really bad. Over the next two weeks, the battles on Kohima Ridge were not seeing results. Repeated attacks were made against Garrison Hill as Shapland’s men tossed desperate attacks at the extreme northern edge of the ridge allowing for a troop of Lee/Grant tanks to lumber up the western end of Naga Hill in order to provide armored support for the 5th Brigade. The plan to get tanks onto the back of Naga Hill by driving through the Japanese positions overlooking the TCP finally succeeded on April 27, the Lee/Grants trundling along the track, wary of mines, but taking the Japanese entirely by surprise at this stroke of legerdemain. Peppered on all sides futilely by bullets, they joined 5th Brigade on Naga Hill, albeit at the cost of 28 Dorset dead, who had kept intense pressure on the TCP end of the Kohima Ridge to distract the Japanese during the operation. In the fighting for control of the tennis court no means of overcoming Japanese bunkers could be discovered using infantry alone, and attempts were made to bulldoze a path up to the remains of the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow to allow a Lee/Grant tank to move onto the tennis court and engage the bunkers directly with its 75mm gun. Unhappily the first effort failed when the Lee/Grant went into reverse, pulling the bulldozer to which it was attached back down the steep slope in a heap of crashing, twisted metal. Four days later a similar attempt with a Stuart Light tank of the 45th Indian Light Cavalry also failed, as the Japanese had brought up a 3.7in. anti-tank gun that put the tank out of action, fortunately with no loss to the crew.By the 27th, the tanks made a break through to the Naga Hill. The Japanese suffered terrible casualties causing them to suspend operations against Garrison Hill. The 31st división was not fully adopting a defensive stance.
Meanwhile, Goschen’s men had set out on a long march to cut the Imphal Road below the Aradura Spur on the night of April 25. They were advancing through some of the worst terrain of the entire region, it was deep, nearly vertical jungle-covered gullies falling between Mount Pulebadze and the face of Mount Japfu. The 4th Brigade would reach the valley between Pulebadze and Japfu in three days. One there, General Stopford ordered Goschen to climb over Pulebadze Ridge then come down into Kohima to hit the Japanese position on the GPT ridge, which were giving serious problems to Shaplands men. The brigade accordingly turned left, climbing up and over the Pulebadze Ridge and beginning the slow descent through the jungle down onto the Kohima side. A prominent pimple above the GPT Ridge known as Oaks Hill, sitting at 6,000ft, was occupied by the Norfolks and the 143rd Company on 1 May, the presence of British troops 1,500ft above the Japanese positions becoming known to them for the first time. But that is all for today for India, as there is something else cooking up in the CBI theater.
Since early 1943, the United States had steadily increased its air force in China. By the beginning of 1944 there were more than 500 US planes in this area, whereas, in spite of the organization of the 5th Air Army,the Japanese Air Force had less than half this number of planes in China. Furthermore, with the war situation rapidly growing worse in the Pacific, the Japanese Air Force in China could not hope for any replenishment. Enemy planes not only interfered with Japanese ground operations, but also harassed the lines of communication and attacked the occupied areas. General Chennault's 14th Air Force had been causing such problems, the Japanese were forced to act. The catalyst for their future action was because of a raid against Formosa carried out by 14 B-25s, 8 P-38s and 8 P-51s on November 25, 1943, which caught the Japanese by surprise as the Chinese-American aircraft strafed and dropped bombs over Shinchiku airfield, successfully destroying its installations along with 42 planes on the ground at the cost of three fighters lost.
This prompted the Japanese commanders to target strategic points along the Hunan-Guangxi, Guangzhou-Hankou and Southern Beijing-Hankou Railways. Thus the infamous Operation Ichi-Go was born. Ichi-Go’s primary targets were Guilin and Liuzhou’s airfields where the US was developing bases for B-29’s to launch strikes against the Japanese home islands. If you are interested in a in-depth talk about this by the way, over on the Pacific War Channel on Youtube or Spotify, I did an interview with Dave from the Coldwar about the bombing of Japan and we talked about this very subject. Pretty neat episode I recommend it! Now in general the main objectives were to link railways in Beijing and Hankou in northern China to the southern Chinese coast at Guangzhou. This would spare shipping and avoid the pesky American submarine force who were now ruining havoc; it was also to take out airfields in Sichuan and Guangxi to thwart further US bombing of Formosa and the Japanese home islands. This also in turn would open a land route to Indochina and hopefully would destroy enough NRA units to collapse Chiang Kai-Sheks government, finally solving the China Problem.
Ichi-Go would start in late April with an offensive by the 12th Army of Lt General Kita Seiichi, later replaced by Lt General Uchiyama Eitaro. This was codenamed Operation Kogo, tasked with capturing the areas along the South Beijing-Hankou railway, centered around Zhengzhou and Luoyang, and destroying the main strength of the 1st War Area. Then, early in June, the 11th Army of General Yokoyama would launch Operation Togo, with the objective of capturing Changsha and Hengyang and destroying the main force of the 6th and 9th War Areas. Following the conclusion of the first phase, late in July, the 11th Army would be assisted by the 23rd Army of Lt General Tanaka Hisaichi and the Indochina Garrison Army of Lt General Viscount Machiiji Kazumoto would capture Guilin and Liuzhou and the destruction of the 4th War Area.
Finally, the third phase of Operation Togo would see the 23rd Army capture the strategic areas along the south Canton-Hankou railway, centered around Nanning, by destroying the 7th War Area in September while the 11th Army continued the advance south towards Suichwan Arfield to link with the Indochina forces. For the entire operation, the 5th Air Army of Lt General Shimoyama Takuma would support the offensives from the skies, tasked with annihilating the American-Chinese air force and attaining air supremacy over China. The logistics of Operation Ichi-Go constituted was one of the most notable examples of the IJA’s offensive preparations. Between some of the measures taken was the emplacement of dozens of anti-air batteries throughout the Yangtze River to limit the Chinese-American air activity against troop concentrations at its southern channel; the transfer of dozens of thousands of troops by railway without interference from Chinese guerrillas because security at the railway lines was increased; the monthly river transport of 40000 tons of supplies; the secret storage of 600 pontoons; and the constructions of hideouts for a munitions arsenal that should last for two years and of hundreds of deposits that harbored 50 million liters of gasoline that should last for eight months: 40 million for land vehicles and 10 million for planes.By early April General Hata had amassed 62,000 men, 52,000 Japanese and 10,000 collaborationist units alongside 800 tanks, 1550 artillery pieces, 250 aircraft, 15550 motorized vehicles and 100000 horses.
Meanwhile the British Eastern Fleet had been receiving more naval resources due to the successes in the Mediterranean and Northern Europe and could now carry out more aggressive actions in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Agreement had been reached, after objections from Admiral Ernest King, but new procedures would need to be learnt by naval crews and Fleet Air Arm aircrew. To this end, Operation Diplomat, a training exercise, took place in late March 1944. The objective was for the fleet to rendezvous with a group of tankers, escorted by the Dutch cruiser HNLMS Tromp and practice refueling at sea procedures. The ships then rendezvoused with USN Task Group 58.5 built around aircraft carrier USS Saratoga and three destroyers.
To further support the coming Hollandia and Aitape landings, Admiral King requested that, during April, the Eastern Fleet should engage Japanese forces in their area and hold them there to reduce the opposition that could be encountered by the Americans at Western New Guinea. In response, Admiral Somerville launched Operation Cockpit on April 16, an air attack against Sabang off Sumatra. The fleet sailed from Trincomalee on 16 April, and two days later the Gambia and Ceylon were detached from Force 69 to strengthen the anti-aircraft defense of the carrier force. On the morning of April 19, 17 Barracudas and 13 Corsairs from the carrier Illustrious and 29 Dauntless and Avenger bombers and 24 Hellcats from Saratoga took off towards Sumatra and subsequently caught the Japanese completely by surprise, finding no opposition there. Thirty Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the airfield and a direct hit by a 1000-pound bomb set a large oil tank on fire. The power-station, barracks and wireless station were badly damaged. The submarine HMS Tactician reported large fires in the dockyard burning fiercely hours after the fleet had left the area. The raid was a clear success, with Somerville later saying that the Japanese "had been caught with their kimonos up".
I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.
The invaders it seems bit off more than they could chew when they attacked India. General Mutaguchi was facing a determined enemy and very pissed off and somewhat insubordinate colleagues. Operation Ichi-Go was being prepared and the Royal Navy was sending forces into the Indian and Pacific Oceans adding to the IJN’s misery.
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