Episode 2254: Why Trump wants to be the Godfather

Keen On America

#Business #Brexit #Democracy #Fascism #Privacy #Surveillance #Trump #Andrew Keen #History #Authoritarian

34:35

Marcia Clark, best known as the lead prosecutor in the O.J. Simpson trial, has become a trailblazer for women in law and beyond. Her journey from courtroom to bestselling author reflects her resilience and determination to redefine herself amidst intense public scrutiny. On this episode of Worth Knowing, Clark dives into her latest book, *Trial by Ambush*, which examines the 1953 Barbara Graham case—a story that highlights gender bias, media sensationalism, and the notion that all cases are subject to societal, cultural, and political winds. Clark shares how her experiences during the Simpson trial shaped her perspective on societal pressures and the role of women in high-stakes professions. Her reflections on how media, forensic science, and legal practices have evolved over decades offer valuable insights into the intersection of law and culture. This conversation is a compelling exploration of true crime, personal growth, and how Clark’s groundbreaking career continues to inspire a new generation of women to challenge norms and forge their own paths. Marcia Clark is a bestselling author and a criminal lawyer who began her career in law as a criminal defense attorney and went on to become a prosecutor in the L.A. District Attorney's Office in 1981. She spent ten years in the Special Trials Unit, where she handled a number of high-profile cases, including the prosecution of stalker/murderer Robert Bardo, whose conviction for the murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer resulted in legislation that offered victims better protection from stalkers as well as increased punishment for the offenders. She was lead prosecutor for the O.J. Simpson murder trial. In May of 1997 her book on the Simpson case, "Without a Doubt," was published and reached #1 on the New York Times, Wall St. Journal, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and Publishers Weekly bestsellers lists. In February 2016, Clark re-released the book with a new foreword. Resources Sign up for the Worth Knowing LinkedIn Newsletter to stay up to date: https://www.linkedin.com/newsletters/worth-knowing-7236433935503618048/ Follow Bonnie on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/bonnie-habyan/ Go to the Worth Knowing website: https://www.worthknowing.show Check out The Agile Brand Guide website with articles, insights, and Martechipedia, the wiki for marketing technology: https://www.agilebrandguide.com The Agile Brand is produced by Missing Link—a Latina-owned strategy-driven, creatively fueled production co-op. From ideation to creation, they craft human connections through intelligent, engaging and informative content. https://www.missinglink.company…

about a year ago 46:18

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What one word describes how Donald Trump thinks about the world? According to both the Atlantic writer Jonathan Rauch and UC Irvine professor Jeffrey Kopstein, that word is “patrimonialism” - a rather stodgy sociological term meaning that Trump wants to be the Godfather. Everything under Trump is personal, Rauch and Kopstein explain. Thus, for example, his public bullying of Zelenskyy and his vindictive announcement today of “pausing” military aid to Ukraine. The personal is the political used to be a rallying cry of the counterculture. With Trump, according to Rauch and Kopstein, the political is, by definition, personal. The public realm no long exists. And so Trump’s patrimonial ideology means that holding political power requires him to be The Godfather. The only question is whether that means becoming Don Corleone or Marlon Brando. I suspect both.

Here are the 5 Keen on America takeaways from our conversation with Rauch and Kopstein:

* Patrimonialism as Trump's governing model: The experts argue that Trump is implementing a patrimonial system of government where the state is treated as his personal property and family business. Loyalty to Trump as an individual supersedes institutional structures and processes, similar to how a mafia boss operates.

* The systematic dismantling of bureaucracy: According to Kopstein and Rauch, the current administration is in a "demolition phase" where Trump and allies like Elon Musk are working to dismantle the modern bureaucratic state. This isn't simply about reducing government size but about replacing merit-based systems with personal loyalty networks.

* The corruption inherent in patrimonial systems: In patrimonial systems, the distinction between public and private resources becomes blurred. The experts suggest that what we would call corruption (using public office for private gain) becomes normalized as the ruler sees state resources as personal property.

* Cultural reaction against modernity: Kopstein argues there's a cultural dimension to this shift, with Trump's patrimonialism appealing to those uncomfortable with rapid social changes in modern society, particularly around issues of gender, sexuality, and cultural diversity.

* The strategy for opposition: Rauch suggests that opponents should focus on exposing corruption as the most effective strategy against patrimonial systems. In the longer term, they argue for demonstrating how effective government bureaucracies actually benefit citizens' daily lives and for developing better policy ideas.

Jonathan Rauch is a contributing writer at The Atlantic and a senior fellow in the Governance Studies program at the Brookings Institution. His latest book, Cross Purposes: Christianity’s Broken Bargain with Democracy, was published in January 2025.

Jeffrey Kopstein is Dean’s Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. In his research, Professor Kopstein focuses on interethnic violence, voting patterns of minority groups, antisemitism, and anti-liberal tendencies in civil society. These interests are central topics in his latest books, Intimate Violence: Anti-Jewish Pogroms on the Eve of the Holocaust (Cornell University Press, 2018), Politics, Memory, Violence: The New Social Science of the Holocaust (Cornell University Press, 2023), and The Assault on the State: How the Global Attack on Modern Government Endangers our Future (Polity, 2024).

Named as one of the "100 most connected men" by GQ magazine, Andrew Keen is amongst the world's best known broadcasters and commentators. In addition to presenting the daily KEEN ON show, he is the host of the long-running How To Fix Democracy interview series. He is also the author of four prescient books about digital technology: CULT OF THE AMATEUR, DIGITAL VERTIGO, THE INTERNET IS NOT THE ANSWER and HOW TO FIX THE FUTURE. Andrew lives in San Francisco, is married to Cassandra Knight, Google's VP of Litigation & Discovery, and has two grown children.

Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe

1349 episodes

Episode 2254: Why Trump wants to be the Godfather

Keen On America

70 subscribers

published about a year ago

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Here are the 5 Keen on America takeaways from our conversation with Rauch and Kopstein:

Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe

1349 episodes

#Business #Brexit #Democracy #Fascism #Privacy #Surveillance #Trump #Andrew Keen #History #Authoritarian

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Keen On America

1
Episode 2545: Matthew Hongoltz-Hetling on the Death of Trust in Science 40:02

14 hours ago40:02

40:02

It would be funny if it wasn’t so tragic. According to the Pulitzer finalist Matthew Hongoltz-Hetling , the majority of Americans no longer trust standard scientific proof. As he notes in his new book, The Ghost Labs , this faith in evidence based science has been replaced by the growth of bigfoot hunters, mediums, and alien enthusiasts. Hongoltz-Hetling traces this trend from his previous work on libertarian movements and alternative medicine, noting how the pandemic accelerated distrust in traditional institutions. He argues these paranormal beliefs, while seemingly harmless, fragment communities and undermine collective problem-solving. So how to fix this crisis in scientific trust? Hongoltz-Hetling’s suggestion of licensing psychics and incorporating these beliefs into clinical settings to prevent further institutional erosion might sound a little absurd. But perhaps it’s one concrete way of addressing social cohesion in our bizarre age of bigfoot hunters, mediums, and alien enthusiasts. * Crisis of institutional trust : Americans are increasingly rejecting science, government, universities, and even churches, turning instead to individualistic paranormal beliefs as alternatives to evidence-based institutions. * COVID as a catalyst : The pandemic accelerated existing distrust, with libertarian "medical freedom" messaging providing a bridge between fringe beliefs and mainstream Republican politics, leading to figures like RFK Jr. gaining power. * Fragmented vs. collective belief : Unlike organized religion which builds community through shared doctrine, paranormal beliefs are highly individualistic and based on personal experience, ultimately driving people apart rather than together. * Real-world consequences : This isn't just harmless entertainment—it leads to defunding of universities, people avoiding medical care, and the weakening of institutions that society depends on for collective problem-solving. * Controversial solution : Hongoltz-Hetling reluctantly suggests licensing psychics and incorporating paranormal beliefs into clinical settings as a pragmatic strategy to prevent complete institutional collapse, though he acknowledges this feels like "capitulation to dark forces." Matthew Hongoltz-Hetling is a freelance journalist specializing in narrative features and investigative reporting. He has been named a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize, won a George Polk Award, and been voted Journalist of the Year by the Maine Press association, among numerous other honors. His work has appeared in Foreign Policy, USA Today, Popular Science, Atavist Magazine, Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, the Associated Press, and elsewhere. Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe…

Keen On America

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Episode 2544: Marcus Alexander Gadson on the History of Sedition in the United States 35:54

1 day ago35:54

35:54

According to the legal scholar Marcus Alexander Gadson , violence is central to the constitutional history of the United States. As American, in fact, as apple pie. In his new book Sedition , Gadson argues that America's revolutionary foundations established a precedent for political violence. Examining six 19th-century constitutional crises including the Buckshot War, Brooks-Baxter War, and Bleeding Kansas, Gadson explores how disputed elections, fraud allegations, and violent responses shaped American democracy. Gadson expresses concern about current threats to constitutional order, particularly the January 6th Capitol attack and subsequent pardons, warning that inadequate consequences may encourage future attempts to overturn elections through violence. Five Key Takeaways * Revolutionary Origins Create Precedent : America's birth through violent revolution against Britain established a template that future groups would invoke to justify political violence and rebellion. * Constitutional Crises Are Underappreciated : Gadson argues that violent constitutional crises have been more fundamental to American development than commonly recognized, with disputed elections frequently leading to armed conflict. * 19th Century Pattern : Six major incidents show recurring themes of election disputes, fraud allegations, militia involvement, and federal intervention, demonstrating fragility of democratic institutions. * January 6th Parallels : The Capitol attack fits historical patterns of insurrection, but the subsequent pardons set a dangerous precedent by failing to impose consequences. * Current Constitutional Danger : Gadson warns we may be in a constitutional crisis, citing concerns about election integrity, court order compliance, and the normalization of political violence. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe…

Keen On America

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Episode 2543: Edward Luce on the Life of Zbigniew Brzezinski 38:09

3 days ago38:09

38:09

Who was America’s great power prophet during the Cold War? Perhaps not Henry Kissinger. In Zbig , Financial Times’ U.S. editor, Edward Luce, makes the case that the Polish-American strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski was at least equal to Kissinger in his prophetic grasp of America’s role in the Cold War world. Luce explores Brzezinski's role as Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, his combination of hard and soft power strategies against the Soviet Union, and his uncannily prescient predictions about Soviet collapse and the emergence of an "alliance of the aggrieved" against the United States. five key takeaways * Brzezinski was remarkably prescient - He accurately predicted Soviet collapse decades in advance, identifying the USSR's "Achilles heel" as its suppressed internal nations and calling it a "gerontocracy" destined to fail through "reverse natural selection." * The dinner that saved Europe - Brzezinski's coordination with Pope John Paul II in 1980 helped prevent Soviet invasion of Poland by persuading Solidarity to moderate their rhetoric while warning Moscow that Poland would be "indigestible." * Post-Cold War prophet of doom - Unlike triumphalist Americans in the 1990s, Brzezinski warned that U.S. hubris would create an "alliance of the aggrieved" (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea) - a prediction that proved remarkably accurate. * Meritocracy believer with aristocratic standards - Despite his Polish noble background, Brzezinski championed American meritocracy but maintained old-world intellectual rigor, famously giving only one A per class regardless of size. * Study your adversaries - His key lesson for today: America must continue studying and understanding other nations' languages, cultures, and motivations rather than assuming everyone should simply follow the American model. Edward Luce is the US national editor and columnist at the Financial Times. Luce's biography of Zbigniew Brzezinski Zbig, The life of Zbig Brzezinski: America's great power prophet , came out this month. He is the author of three highly acclaimed books, The Retreat of Western Liberalism (2017), Time to Start Thinking: America in the Age of Descent (2012), and In Spite of the Gods: The Strange Rise of Modern India (2007). He appears regularly on CNN, NPR, MSNBC’s Morning Joe, and the BBC. Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe…

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Episode 2542: John Cassidy on Capitalism and its Critics 48:53

3 days ago48:53

48:53

Yesterday, the self-styled San Francisco “progressive” Joan Williams was on the show arguing that Democrats need to relearn the language of the American working class. But, as some of you have noted, Williams seems oblivious to the fact that politics is about more than simply aping other people’s language. What you say matters, and the language of American working class, like all industrial working classes, is rooted in a critique of capitalism. She should probably read the New Yorker staff writer John Cassidy’s excellent new book, Capitalism and its Critics , which traces capitalism's evolution and criticism from the East India Company through modern times. He defines capitalism as production for profit by privately-owned companies in markets, encompassing various forms from Chinese state capitalism to hyper-globalization. The book examines capitalism’s most articulate critics including the Luddites, Marx, Engels, Thomas Carlisle, Adam Smith, Rosa Luxemburg, Keynes & Hayek, and contemporary figures like Sylvia Federici and Thomas Piketty. Cassidy explores how major economists were often critics of their era's dominant capitalist model, and untangles capitalism's complicated relationship with colonialism, slavery and AI which he regards as a potentially unprecedented economic disruption. This should be essential listening for all Democrats seeking to reinvent a post Biden-Harris party and message. 5 key takeaways * Capitalism has many forms - From Chinese state capitalism to Keynesian managed capitalism to hyper-globalization, all fitting the basic definition of production for profit by privately-owned companies in markets. * Great economists are typically critics - Smith criticized mercantile capitalism, Keynes critiqued laissez-faire capitalism, and Hayek/Friedman opposed managed capitalism. Each generation's leading economists challenge their era's dominant model. * Modern corporate structure has deep roots - The East India Company was essentially a modern multinational corporation with headquarters, board of directors, stockholders, and even a private army - showing capitalism's organizational continuity across centuries. * Capitalism is intertwined with colonialism and slavery - Industrial capitalism was built on pre-existing colonial and slave systems, particularly through the cotton industry and plantation economies. * AI represents a potentially unprecedented disruption - Unlike previous technological waves, AI may substitute rather than complement human labor on a massive scale, potentially creating political backlash exceeding even the "China shock" that contributed to Trump's rise. Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Full Transcript Andrew Keen: Hello, everybody. A couple of days ago, we did a show with Joan Williams. She has a new book out, "Outclassed: How the Left Lost the Working Class and How to Win Them Back." A book about language, about how to talk to the American working class. She also had a piece in Jacobin Magazine, an anti-capitalist magazine, about how the left needs to speak to what she calls average American values. We talked, of course, about Bernie Sanders and AOC and their language of fighting oligarchy, and the New York Times followed that up with "The Enduring Power of Anti-Capitalism in American Politics." But of course, that brings the question: what exactly is capitalism? I did a little bit of research. We can find definitions of capitalism from AI, from Wikipedia, even from online dictionaries, but I thought we might do a little better than relying on Wikipedia and come to a man who's given capitalism and its critics a great deal of thought. John Cassidy is well known as a staff writer at The New Yorker. He's the author of a wonderful book, the best book, actually, on the dot-com insanity. And his new book, "Capitalism and its Critics," is out this week. John, congratulations on the book. So I've got to be a bit of a schoolmaster with you, John, and get some definitions first. What exactly is capitalism before we get to criticism of it? John Cassidy: Yeah, I mean, it's a very good question, Andrew. Obviously, through the decades, even the centuries, there have been many different definitions of the term capitalism and there are different types of capitalism. To not be sort of too ideological about it, the working definition I use is basically production for profit—that could be production of goods or mostly in the new and, you know, in today's economy, production of services—for profit by companies which are privately owned in markets. That's a very sort of all-encompassing definition. Within that, you can have all sorts of different types of capitalism. You can have Chinese state capitalism, you can have the old mercantilism, which industrial capitalism came after, which Trump seems to be trying to resurrect. You can have Keynesian managed capitalism that we had for 30 or 40 years after the Second World War, which I grew up in in the UK. Or you can have sort of hyper-globalization, hyper-capitalism that we've tried for the last 30 years. There are all those different varieties of capitalism consistent with a basic definition, I think. Andrew Keen: That keeps you busy, John. I know you started this project, which is a big book and it's a wonderful book. I read it. I don't always read all the books I have on the show, but I read from cover to cover full of remarkable stories of the critics of capitalism. You note in the beginning that you began this in 2016 with the beginnings of Trump. What was it about the 2016 election that triggered a book about capitalism and its critics? John Cassidy: Well, I was reporting on it at the time for The New Yorker and it struck me—I covered, I basically covered the economy in various forms for various publications since the late 80s, early 90s. In fact, one of my first big stories was the stock market crash of '87. So yes, I am that old. But it seemed to me in 2016 when you had Bernie Sanders running from the left and Trump running from the right, but both in some way offering very sort of similar critiques of capitalism. People forget that Trump in 2016 actually was running from the left of the Republican Party. He was attacking big business. He was attacking Wall Street. He doesn't do that these days very much, but at the time he was very much posing as the sort of outsider here to protect the interests of the average working man. And it seemed to me that when you had this sort of pincer movement against the then ruling model, this wasn't just a one-off. It seemed to me it was a sort of an emerging crisis of legitimacy for the system. And I thought there could be a good book written about how we got to here. And originally I thought it would be a relatively short book just based on the last sort of 20 or 30 years since the collapse of the Cold War and the sort of triumphalism of the early 90s. But as I got into it more and more, I realized that so many of the issues which had been raised, things like globalization, rising inequality, monopoly power, exploitation, even pollution and climate change, these issues go back to the very start of the capitalist system or the industrial capitalist system back in sort of late 18th century, early 19th century Britain. So I thought, in the end, I thought, you know what, let's just do the whole thing soup to nuts through the eyes of the critics. There have obviously been many, many histories of capitalism written. I thought that an original way to do it, or hopefully original, would be to do a sort of a narrative through the lives and the critiques of the critics of various stages. So that's, I hope, what sets it apart from other books on the subject, and also provides a sort of narrative frame because, you know, I am a New Yorker writer, I realize if you want people to read things, you've got to make it readable. Easiest way to make things readable is to center them around people. People love reading about other people. So that's sort of the narrative frame. I start off with a whistleblower from the East India Company back in the— Andrew Keen: Yeah, I want to come to that. But before, John, my sense is that to simplify what you're saying, this is a labor of love. You're originally from Leeds, the heart of Yorkshire, the center of the very industrial revolution, the first industrial revolution where, in your historical analysis, capitalism was born. Is it a labor of love? What's your family relationship with capitalism? How long was the family in Leeds? John Cassidy: Right, I mean that's a very good question. It is a labor of love in a way, but it's not—our family doesn't go—I'm from an Irish family, family of Irish immigrants who moved to England in the 1940s and 1950s. So my father actually did start working in a big mill, the Kirkstall Forge in Leeds, which is a big steel mill, and he left after seeing one of his co-workers have his arms chopped off in one of the machinery, so he decided it wasn't for him and he spent his life working in the construction industry, which was dominated by immigrants as it is here now. So I don't have a—it's not like I go back to sort of the start of the industrial revolution, but I did grow up in the middle of Leeds, very working class, very industrial neighborhood. And what a sort of irony is, I'll point out, I used to, when I was a kid, I used to play golf on a municipal golf course called Gotts Park in Leeds, which—you know, most golf courses in America are sort of in the affluent suburbs, country clubs. This was right in the middle of Armley in Leeds, which is where the Victorian jail is and a very rough neighborhood. There's a small bit of land which they built a golf course on. It turns out it was named after one of the very first industrialists, Benjamin Gott, who was a wool and textile industrialist, and who played a part in the Luddite movement, which I mention. So it turns out, I was there when I was 11 or 12, just learning how to play golf on this scrappy golf course. And here I am, 50 years later, writing about Benjamin Gott at the start of the Industrial Revolution. So yeah, no, sure. I think it speaks to me in a way that perhaps it wouldn't to somebody else from a different background. Andrew Keen: We did a show with William Dalrymple, actually, a couple of years ago. He's been on actually since, the Anglo or Scottish Indian historian. His book on the East India Company, "The Anarchy," is a classic. You begin in some ways your history of capitalism with the East India Company. What was it about the East India Company, John, that makes it different from other for-profit organizations in economic, Western economic history? John Cassidy: I mean, I read that. It's a great book, by the way. That was actually quoted in my chapter on these. Yeah, I remember. I mean, the reason I focused on it was for two reasons. Number one, I was looking for a start, a narrative start to the book. And it seemed to me, you know, the obvious place to start is with the start of the industrial revolution. If you look at economics history textbooks, that's where they always start with Arkwright and all the inventors, you know, who were the sort of techno-entrepreneurs of their time, the sort of British Silicon Valley, if you could think of it as, in Lancashire and Derbyshire in the late 18th century. So I knew I had to sort of start there in some way, but I thought that's a bit pat. Is there another way into it? And it turns out that in 1772 in England, there was a huge bailout of the East India Company, very much like the sort of 2008, 2009 bailout of Wall Street. The company got into trouble. So I thought, you know, maybe there's something there. And I eventually found this guy, William Bolts, who worked for the East India Company, turned into a whistleblower after he was fired for finagling in India like lots of the people who worked for the company did. So that gave me two things. Number one, it gave me—you know, I'm a writer, so it gave me something to focus on a narrative. His personal history is very interesting. But number two, it gave me a sort of foundation because industrial capitalism didn't come from nowhere. You know, it was built on top of a pre-existing form of capitalism, which we now call mercantile capitalism, which was very protectionist, which speaks to us now. But also it had these big monopolistic multinational companies. The East India Company, in some ways, was a very modern corporation. It had a headquarters in Leadenhall Street in the city of London. It had a board of directors, it had stockholders, the company sent out very detailed instructions to the people in the field in India and Indonesia and Malaysia who were traders who bought things from the locals there, brought them back to England on their company ships. They had a company army even to enforce—to protect their operations there. It was an incredible multinational corporation. So that was also, I think, fascinating because it showed that even in the pre-existing system, you know, big corporations existed, there were monopolies, they had royal monopolies given—first the East India Company got one from Queen Elizabeth. But in some ways, they were very similar to modern monopolistic corporations. And they had some of the problems we've seen with modern monopolistic corporations, the way they acted. And Bolts was the sort of first corporate whistleblower, I thought. Yeah, that was a way of sort of getting into the story, I think. Hopefully, you know, it's just a good read, I think. William Bolts's story because he was—he came from nowhere, he was Dutch, he wasn't even English and he joined the company as a sort of impoverished young man, went to India like a lot of English minor aristocrats did to sort of make your fortune. The way the company worked, you had to sort of work on company time and make as much money as you could for the company, but then in your spare time you're allowed to trade for yourself. So a lot of the—without getting into too much detail, but you know, English aristocracy was based on—you know, the eldest child inherits everything, so if you were the younger brother of the Duke of Norfolk, you actually didn't inherit anything. So all of these minor aristocrats, so major aristocrats, but who weren't first born, joined the East India Company, went out to India and made a fortune, and then came back and built huge houses. Lots of the great manor houses in southern England were built by people from the East India Company and they were known as Nabobs, which is an Indian term. So they were the sort of, you know, billionaires of their time, and it was based on—as I say, it wasn't based on industrial capitalism, it was based on mercantile capitalism. Andrew Keen: Yeah, the beginning of the book, which focuses on Bolts and the East India Company, brings to mind for me two things. Firstly, the intimacy of modern capitalism, modern industrial capitalism with colonialism and of course slavery—lots of books have been written on that. Touch on this and also the relationship between the birth of capitalism and the birth of liberalism or democracy. John Stuart Mill, of course, the father in many ways of Western democracy. His day job, ironically enough, or perhaps not ironically, was at the East India Company. So how do those two things connect, or is it just coincidental? John Cassidy: Well, I don't think it is entirely coincidental, I mean, J.S. Mill—his father, James Mill, was also a well-known philosopher in the sort of, obviously, in the earlier generation, earlier than him. And he actually wrote the official history of the East India Company. And I think they gave his son, the sort of brilliant protégé, J.S. Mill, a job as largely as a sort of sinecure, I think. But he did go in and work there in the offices three or four days a week. But I think it does show how sort of integral—the sort of—as you say, the inheritor and the servant in Britain, particularly, of colonial capitalism was. So the East India Company was, you know, it was in decline by that stage in the middle of the 19th century, but it didn't actually give up its monopoly. It wasn't forced to give up its monopoly on the Indian trade until 1857, after, you know, some notorious massacres and there was a sort of public outcry. So yeah, no, that's—it's very interesting that the British—it's sort of unique to Britain in a way, but it's interesting that industrial capitalism arose alongside this pre-existing capitalist structure and somebody like Mill is a sort of paradoxical figure because actually he was quite critical of aspects of industrial capitalism and supported sort of taxes on the rich, even though he's known as the great, you know, one of the great apostles of the free market and free market liberalism. And his day job, as you say, he was working for the East India Company. Andrew Keen: What about the relationship between the birth of industrial capitalism, colonialism and slavery? Those are big questions and I know you deal with them in some— John Cassidy: I think you can't just write an economic history of capitalism now just starting with the cotton industry and say, you know, it was all about—it was all about just technical progress and gadgets, etc. It was built on a sort of pre-existing system which was colonial and, you know, the slave trade was a central element of that. Now, as you say, there have been lots and lots of books written about it, the whole 1619 project got an incredible amount of attention a few years ago. So I didn't really want to rehash all that, but I did want to acknowledge the sort of role of slavery, especially in the rise of the cotton industry because of course, a lot of the raw cotton was grown in the plantations in the American South. So the way I actually ended up doing that was by writing a chapter about Eric Williams, a Trinidadian writer who ended up as the Prime Minister of Trinidad when it became independent in the 1960s. But when he was younger, he wrote a book which is now regarded as a classic. He went to Oxford to do a PhD, won a scholarship. He was very smart. I won a sort of Oxford scholarship myself but 50 years before that, he came across the Atlantic and did an undergraduate degree in history and then did a PhD there and his PhD thesis was on slavery and capitalism. And at the time, in the 1930s, the link really wasn't acknowledged. You could read any sort of standard economic history written by British historians, and they completely ignored that. He made the argument that, you know, slavery was integral to the rise of capitalism and he basically started an argument which has been raging ever since the 1930s and, you know, if you want to study economic history now you have to sort of—you know, have to have to address that. And the way I thought, even though the—it's called the Williams thesis is very famous. I don't think many people knew much about where it came from. So I thought I'd do a chapter on— Andrew Keen: Yeah, that chapter is excellent. You mentioned earlier the Luddites, you're from Yorkshire where Luddism in some ways was born. One of the early chapters is on the Luddites. We did a show with Brian Merchant, his book, "Blood in the Machine," has done very well, I'm sure you're familiar with it. I always understood the Luddites as being against industrialization, against the machine, as opposed to being against capitalism. But did those two things get muddled together in the history of the Luddites? John Cassidy: I think they did. I mean, you know, Luddites, when we grew up, I mean you're English too, you know to be called a Luddite was a term of abuse, right? You know, you were sort of antediluvian, anti-technology, you're stupid. It was only, I think, with the sort of computer revolution, the tech revolution of the last 30, 40 years and the sort of disruptions it's caused, that people have started to look back at the Luddites and say, perhaps they had a point. For them, they were basically pre-industrial capitalism artisans. They worked for profit-making concerns, small workshops. Some of them worked for themselves, so they were sort of sole proprietor capitalists. Or they worked in small venues, but the rise of industrial capitalism, factory capitalism or whatever, basically took away their livelihoods progressively. So they associated capitalism with new technology. In their minds it was the same. But their argument wasn't really a technological one or even an economic one, it was more a moral one. They basically made the moral argument that capitalists shouldn't have the right to just take away their livelihoods with no sort of recompense for them. At the time they didn't have any parliamentary representation. You know, they weren't revolutionaries. The first thing they did was create petitions to try and get parliament to step in, sort of introduce some regulation here. They got turned down repeatedly by the sort of—even though it was a very aristocratic parliament, places like Manchester and Leeds didn't have any representation at all. So it was only after that that they sort of turned violent and started, you know, smashing machines and machines, I think, were sort of symbols of the system, which they saw as morally unjust. And I think that's sort of what—obviously, there's, you know, a lot of technological disruption now, so we can, especially as it starts to come for the educated cognitive class, we can sort of sympathize with them more. But I think the sort of moral critique that there's this, you know, underneath the sort of great creativity and economic growth that capitalism produces, there is also a lot of destruction and a lot of victims. And I think that message, you know, is becoming a lot more—that's why I think why they've been rediscovered in the last five or ten years and I'm one of the people I guess contributing to that rediscovery. Andrew Keen: There's obviously many critiques of capitalism politically. I want to come to Marx in a second, but your chapter, I thought, on Thomas Carlyle and this nostalgic conservatism was very important and there are other conservatives as well. John, do you think that—and you mentioned Trump earlier, who is essentially a nostalgist for a—I don't know, some sort of bizarre pre-capitalist age in America. Is there something particularly powerful about the anti-capitalism of romantics like Carlyle, 19th century Englishman, there were many others of course. John Cassidy: Well, I think so. I mean, I think what is—conservatism, when we were young anyway, was associated with Thatcherism and Reaganism, which, you know, lionized the free market and free market capitalism and was a reaction against the pre-existing form of capitalism, Keynesian capitalism of the sort of 40s to the 80s. But I think what got lost in that era was the fact that there have always been—you've got Hayek up there, obviously— Andrew Keen: And then Keynes and Hayek, the two— John Cassidy: Right, it goes to the end of that. They had a great debate in the 1930s about these issues. But Hayek really wasn't a conservative person, and neither was Milton Friedman. They were sort of free market revolutionaries, really, that you'd let the market rip and it does good things. And I think that that sort of a view, you know, it just became very powerful. But we sort of lost sight of the fact that there was also a much older tradition of sort of suspicion of radical changes of any type. And that was what conservatism was about to some extent. If you think about Baldwin in Britain, for example. And there was a sort of—during the Industrial Revolution, some of the strongest supporters of factory acts to reduce hours and hourly wages for women and kids were actually conservatives, Tories, as they were called at the time, like Ashley. That tradition, Carlyle was a sort of extreme representative of that. I mean, Carlyle was a sort of proto-fascist, let's not romanticize him, he lionized strongmen, Frederick the Great, and he didn't really believe in democracy. But he also had—he was appalled by the sort of, you know, the—like, what's the phrase I'm looking for? The sort of destructive aspects of industrial capitalism, both on the workers, you know, he said it was a dehumanizing system, sounded like Marx in some ways. That it dehumanized the workers, but also it destroyed the environment. He was an early environmentalist. He venerated the environment, was actually very strongly linked to the transcendentalists in America, people like Thoreau, who went to visit him when he visited Britain and he saw the sort of destructive impact that capitalism was having locally in places like Manchester, which were filthy with filthy rivers, etc. So he just saw the whole system as sort of morally bankrupt and he was a great writer, Carlyle, whatever you think of him. Great user of language, so he has these great ringing phrases like, you know, the cash nexus or calling it the Gospel of Mammonism, the shabbiest gospel ever preached under the sun was industrial capitalism. So, again, you know, that's a sort of paradoxical thing, because I think for so long conservatism was associated with, you know, with support for the free market and still is in most of the Republican Party, but then along comes Trump and sort of conquers the party with a, you know, more skeptical, as you say, romantic, not really based on any reality, but a sort of romantic view that America can stand by itself in the world. I mean, I see Trump actually as a sort of an effort to sort of throw back to mercantile capitalism in a way. You know, which was not just pre-industrial, but was also pre-democracy, run by monarchs, which I'm sure appeals to him, and it was based on, you know, large—there were large tariffs. You couldn't import things in the UK. If you want to import anything to the UK, you have to send it on a British ship because of the navigation laws. It was a very protectionist system and it's actually, you know, as I said, had a lot of parallels with what Trump's trying to do or tries to do until he backs off. Andrew Keen: You cheat a little bit in the book in the sense that you—everyone has their own chapter. We'll talk a little bit about Hayek and Smith and Lenin and Friedman. You do have one chapter on Marx, but you also have a chapter on Engels. So you kind of cheat. You combine the two. Is it possible, though, to do—and you've just written this book, so you know this as well as anyone. How do you write a book about capitalism and its critics and only really give one chapter to Marx, who is so dominant? I mean, you've got lots of Marxists in the book, including Lenin and Luxemburg. How fundamental is Marx to a criticism of capitalism? Is most criticism, especially from the left, from progressives, is it really just all a footnote to Marx? John Cassidy: I wouldn't go that far, but I think obviously on the left he is the central figure. But there's an element of sort of trying to rebuild Engels a bit in this. I mean, I think of Engels and Marx—I mean obviously Marx wrote the great classic "Capital," etc. But in the 1840s, when they both started writing about capitalism, Engels was sort of ahead of Marx in some ways. I mean, the sort of materialist concept, the idea that economics rules everything, Engels actually was the first one to come up with that in an essay in the 1840s which Marx then published in one of his—in the German newspaper he worked for at the time, radical newspaper, and he acknowledged openly that that was really what got him thinking seriously about economics, and even in the late—in 20, 25 years later when he wrote "Capital," all three volumes of it and the Grundrisse, just these enormous outpourings of analysis on capitalism. He acknowledged Engels's role in that and obviously Engels wrote the first draft of the Communist Manifesto in 1848 too, which Marx then topped and tailed and—he was a better writer obviously, Marx, and he gave it the dramatic language that we all know it for. So I think Engels and Marx together obviously are the central sort of figures in the sort of left-wing critique. But they didn't start out like that. I mean, they were very obscure, you've got to remember. You know, they were—when they were writing, Marx was writing "Capital" in London, it never even got published in English for another 20 years. It was just published in German. He was basically an expat. He had been thrown out of Germany, he had been thrown out of France, so England was last resort and the British didn't consider him a threat so they were happy to let him and the rest of the German sort of left in there. I think it became—it became the sort of epochal figure after his death really, I think, when he was picked up by the left-wing parties, which are especially the SPD in Germany, which was the first sort of socialist mass party and was officially Marxist until the First World War and there were great internal debates. And then of course, because Lenin and the Russians came out of that tradition too, Marxism then became the official doctrine of the Soviet Union when they adopted a version of it. And again there were massive internal arguments about what Marx really meant, and in fact, you know, one interpretation of the last 150 years of left-wing sort of intellectual development is as a sort of argument about what did Marx really mean and what are the important bits of it, what are the less essential bits of it. It's a bit like the "what did Keynes really mean" that you get in liberal circles. So yeah, Marx, obviously, this is basically an intellectual history of critiques of capitalism. In that frame, he is absolutely a central figure. Why didn't I give him more space than a chapter and a chapter and a half with Engels? There have been a million books written about Marx. I mean, it's not that—it's not that he's an unknown figure. You know, there's a best-selling book written in Britain about 20 years ago about him and then I was quoting, in my biographical research, I relied on some more recent, more scholarly biographies. So he's an endlessly fascinating figure but I didn't want him to dominate the book so I gave him basically the same space as everybody else. Andrew Keen: You've got, as I said, you've got a chapter on Adam Smith who's often considered the father of economics. You've got a chapter on Keynes. You've got a chapter on Friedman. And you've got a chapter on Hayek, all the great modern economists. Is it possible, John, to be a distinguished economist one way or the other and not be a critic of capitalism? John Cassidy: Well, I don't—I mean, I think history would suggest that the greatest economists have been critics of capitalism in their own time. People would say to me, what the hell have you got Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek in a book about critics of capitalism? They were great exponents, defenders of capitalism. They loved the system. That is perfectly true. But in the 1930s, 40s, 50s, 60s, and 70s, middle of the 20th century, they were actually arch-critics of the ruling form of capitalism at the time, which was what I call managed capitalism. What some people call Keynesianism, what other people call European social democracy, whatever you call it, it was a model of a mixed economy in which the government played a large role both in propping up demand and in providing an extensive social safety net in the UK and providing public healthcare and public education. It was a sort of hybrid model. Most of the economy in terms of the businesses remained in private hands. So most production was capitalistic. It was a capitalist system. They didn't go to the Soviet model of nationalizing everything and Britain did nationalize some businesses, but most places didn't. The US of course didn't but it was a form of managed capitalism. And Hayek and Friedman were both great critics of that and wanted to sort of move back to 19th century laissez-faire model. Keynes was a—was actually a great, I view him anyway, as really a sort of late Victorian liberal and was trying to protect as much of the sort of J.S. Mill view of the world as he could, but he thought capitalism had one fatal flaw: that it tended to fall into recessions and then they can snowball and the whole system can collapse which is what had basically happened in the early 1930s until Keynesian policies were adopted. Keynes sort of differed from a lot of his followers—I have a chapter on Joan Robinson in there, who were pretty left-wing and wanted to sort of use Keynesianism as a way to shift the economy quite far to the left. Keynes didn't really believe in that. He has a famous quote that, you know, once you get to full employment, you can then rely on the free market to sort of take care of things. He was still a liberal at heart. Going back to Adam Smith, why is he in a book on criticism of capitalism? And again, it goes back to what I said at the beginning. He actually wrote "The Wealth of Nations"—he explains in the introduction—as a critique of mercantile capitalism. His argument was that he was a pro-free trader, pro-small business, free enterprise. His argument was if you get the government out of the way, we don't need these government-sponsored monopolies like the East India Company. If you just rely on the market, the sort of market forces and competition will produce a good outcome. So then he was seen as a great—you know, he is then seen as the apostle of free market capitalism. I mean when I started as a young reporter, when I used to report in Washington, all the conservatives used to wear Adam Smith badges. You don't see Donald Trump wearing an Adam Smith badge, but that was the case. He was also—the other aspect of Smith, which I highlight, which is not often remarked on—he's also a critic of big business. He has a famous section where he discusses the sort of tendency of any group of more than three businessmen when they get together to try and raise prices and conspire against consumers. And he was very suspicious of, as I say, large companies, monopolies. I think if Adam Smith existed today, I mean, I think he would be a big supporter of Lina Khan and the sort of antitrust movement, he would say capitalism is great as long as you have competition, but if you don't have competition it becomes, you know, exploitative. Andrew Keen: Yeah, if Smith came back to live today, you have a chapter on Thomas Piketty, maybe he may not be French, but he may be taking that position about how the rich benefit from the structure of investment. Piketty's core—I've never had Piketty on the show, but I've had some of his followers like Emmanuel Saez from Berkeley. Yeah. How powerful is Piketty's critique of capitalism within the context of the classical economic analysis from Hayek and Friedman? Yeah, it's a very good question. John Cassidy: It's a very good question. I mean, he's a very paradoxical figure, Piketty, in that he obviously shot to world fame and stardom with his book on capital in the 21st century, which in some ways he obviously used the capital as a way of linking himself to Marx, even though he said he never read Marx. But he was basically making the same argument that if you leave capitalism unrestrained and don't do anything about monopolies etc. or wealth, you're going to get massive inequality and he—I think his great contribution, Piketty and the school of people, one of them you mentioned, around him was we sort of had a vague idea that inequality was going up and that, you know, wages were stagnating, etc. What he and his colleagues did is they produced these sort of scientific empirical studies showing in very simple to understand terms how the sort of share of income and wealth of the top 10 percent, the top 5 percent, the top 1 percent and the top 0.1 percent basically skyrocketed from the 1970s to about 2010. And it was, you know, he was an MIT PhD. Saez, who you mentioned, is a Berkeley professor. They were schooled in neoclassical economics at Harvard and MIT and places like that. So the right couldn't dismiss them as sort of, you know, lefties or Trots or whatever who're just sort of making this stuff up. They had to acknowledge that this was actually an empirical reality. I think it did change the whole basis of the debate and it was sort of part of this reaction against capitalism in the 2010s. You know it was obviously linked to the sort of Sanders and the Occupy Wall Street movement at the time. It came out of the—you know, the financial crisis as well when Wall Street disgraced itself. I mean, I wrote a previous book on all that, but people have sort of, I think, forgotten the great reaction against that a decade ago, which I think even Trump sort of exploited, as I say, by using anti-banker rhetoric at the time. So, Piketty was a great figure, I think, from, you know, I was thinking, who are the most influential critics of capitalism in the 21st century? And I think you'd have to put him up there on the list. I'm not saying he's the only one or the most eminent one. But I think he is a central figure. Now, of course, you'd think, well, this is a really powerful critic of capitalism, and nobody's going to pick up, and Bernie's going to take off and everything. But here we are a decade later now. It seems to be what the backlash has produced is a swing to the right, not a swing to the left. So that's, again, a sort of paradox. Andrew Keen: One person I didn't expect to come up in the book, John, and I was fascinated with this chapter, is Silvia Federici. I've tried to get her on the show. We've had some books about her writing and her kind of—I don't know, you treat her critique as a feminist one. The role of women. Why did you choose to write a chapter about Federici and that feminist critique of capitalism? John Cassidy: Right, right. Well, I don't think it was just feminist. I'll explain what I think it was. Two reasons. Number one, I wanted to get more women into the book. I mean, it's in some sense, it is a history of economics and economic critiques. And they are overwhelmingly written by men and women were sort of written out of the narrative of capitalism for a very long time. So I tried to include as many sort of women as actual thinkers as I could and I have a couple of early socialist feminist thinkers, Anna Wheeler and Flora Tristan and then I cover some of the—I cover Rosa Luxemburg as the great sort of tribune of the left revolutionary socialist, communist whatever you want to call it. Anti-capitalist I think is probably also important to note about. Yeah, and then I also have Joan Robinson, but I wanted somebody to do something in the modern era, and I thought Federici, in the world of the Wages for Housework movement, is very interesting from two perspectives. Number one, Federici herself is a Marxist, and I think she probably would still consider herself a revolutionary. She's based in New York, as you know now. She lived in New York for 50 years, but she came from—she's originally Italian and came out of the Italian left in the 1960s, which was very radical. Do you know her? Did you talk to her? I didn't talk to her on this. No, she—I basically relied on, there has been a lot of, as you say, there's been a lot of stuff written about her over the years. She's written, you know, she's given various long interviews and she's written a book herself, a version, a history of housework, so I figured it was all there and it was just a matter of pulling it together. But I think the critique, why the critique is interesting, most of the book is a sort of critique of how capitalism works, you know, in the production or you know, in factories or in offices or you know, wherever capitalist operations are working, but her critique is sort of domestic reproduction, as she calls it, the role of unpaid labor in supporting capitalism. I mean it goes back a long way actually. There was this moment, I sort of trace it back to the 1940s and 1950s when there were feminists in America who were demonstrating outside factories and making the point that you know, the factory workers and the operations of the factory, it couldn't—there's one of the famous sort of tire factory in California demonstrations where the women made the argument, look this factory can't continue to operate unless we feed and clothe the workers and provide the next generation of workers. You know, that's domestic reproduction. So their argument was that housework should be paid and Federici took that idea and a couple of her colleagues, she founded the—it's a global movement, but she founded the most famous branch in New York City in the 1970s. In Park Slope near where I live actually. And they were—you call it feminists, they were feminists in a way, but they were rejected by the sort of mainstream feminist movement, the sort of Gloria Steinems of the world, who Federici was very critical of because she said they ignored, they really just wanted to get women ahead in the sort of capitalist economy and they ignored the sort of underlying from her perspective, the underlying sort of illegitimacy and exploitation of that system. So they were never accepted as part of the feminist movement. They're to the left of the Feminist Movement. Andrew Keen: You mentioned Keynes, of course, so central in all this, particularly his analysis of the role of automation in capitalism. We did a show recently with Robert Skidelsky and I'm sure you're familiar— John Cassidy: Yeah, yeah, great, great biography of Keynes. Andrew Keen: Yeah, the great biographer of Keynes, whose latest book is "Mindless: The Human Condition in the Age of AI." You yourself wrote a brilliant book on the last tech mania and dot-com capitalism. I used it in a lot of my writing and books. What's your analysis of AI in this latest mania and the role generally of manias in the history of capitalism and indeed in critiquing capitalism? Is AI just the next chapter of the dot-com boom? John Cassidy: I think it's a very deep question. I think I'd give two answers to it. In one sense it is just the latest mania the way—I mean, the way capitalism works is we have these, I go back to Kondratiev, one of my Russian economists who ended up being killed by Stalin. He was the sort of inventor of the long wave theory of capitalism. We have these short waves where you have sort of booms and busts driven by finance and debt etc. But we also have long waves driven by technology. And obviously, in the last 40, 50 years, the two big ones are the original deployment of the internet and microchip technology in the sort of 80s and 90s culminating in the dot-com boom of the late 90s, which as you say, I wrote about. Thanks very much for your kind comments on the book. If you just sort of compare it from a financial basis I think they are very similar just in terms of the sort of role of hype from Wall Street in hyping up these companies. The sort of FOMO aspect of it among investors that they you know, you can't miss out. So just buy the companies blindly. And the sort of lionization in the press and the media of, you know, of AI as the sort of great wave of the future. So if you take a sort of skeptical market based approach, I would say, yeah, this is just another sort of another mania which will eventually burst and it looked like it had burst for a few weeks when Trump put the tariffs up, now the market seemed to be recovering. But I think there is, there may be something new about it. I am not, I don't pretend to be a technical expert. I try to rely on the evidence of or the testimony of people who know the systems well and also economists who have studied it. It seems to me the closer you get to it the more alarming it is in terms of the potential shock value that there is there. I mean Trump and the sort of reaction to a larger extent can be traced back to the China shock where we had this global shock to American manufacturing and sort of hollowed out a lot of the industrial areas much of it, like industrial Britain was hollowed out in the 80s. If you, you know, even people like Altman and Elon Musk, they seem to think that this is going to be on a much larger scale than that and will basically, you know, get rid of the professions as they exist. Which would be a huge, huge shock. And I think a lot of the economists who studied this, who four or five years ago were relatively optimistic, people like Daron Acemoglu, David Autor— Andrew Keen: Simon Johnson, of course, who just won the Nobel Prize, and he's from England. John Cassidy: Simon, I did an event with Simon earlier this week. You know they've studied this a lot more closely than I have but I do interview them and I think five, six years ago they were sort of optimistic that you know this could just be a new steam engine or could be a microchip which would lead to sort of a lot more growth, rising productivity, rising productivity is usually associated with rising wages so sure there'd be short-term costs but ultimately it would be a good thing. Now, I think if you speak to them, they see since the, you know, obviously, the OpenAI—the original launch and now there's just this huge arms race with no government involvement at all I think they're coming to the conclusion that rather than being developed to sort of complement human labor, all these systems are just being rushed out to substitute for human labor. And it's just going, if current trends persist, it's going to be a China shock on an even bigger scale. You know what is going to, if that, if they're right, that is going to produce some huge political backlash at some point, that's inevitable. So I know—the thing when the dot-com bubble burst, it didn't really have that much long-term impact on the economy. People lost the sort of fake money they thought they'd made. And then the companies, obviously some of the companies like Amazon and you know Google were real genuine profit-making companies and if you bought them early you made a fortune. But AI does seem a sort of bigger, scarier phenomenon to me. I don't know. I mean, you're close to it. What do you think? Andrew Keen: Well, I'm waiting for a book, John, from you. I think you can combine dot-com and capitalism and its critics. We need you probably to cover it—you know more about it than me. Final question, I mean, it's a wonderful book and we haven't even scratched the surface everyone needs to get it. I enjoyed the chapter, for example, on Karl Polanyi and so much more. I mean, it's a big book. But my final question, John, is do you have any regrets about anyone you left out? The one person I would have liked to have been included was Rawls because of his sort of treatment of capitalism and luck as a kind of casino. I'm not sure whether you gave any thought to Rawls, but is there someone in retrospect you should have had a chapter on that you left out? John Cassidy: There are lots of people I left out. I mean, that's the problem. I mean there have been hundreds and hundreds of critics of capitalism. Rawls, of course, incredibly influential and his idea of the sort of, you know, the veil of ignorance that you should judge things not knowing where you are in the income distribution and then— Andrew Keen: And it's luck. I mean the idea of some people get lucky and some people don't. John Cassidy: It is the luck of the draw, obviously, what card you pull. I think that is a very powerful critique, but I just—because I am more of an expert on economics, I tended to leave out philosophers and sociologists. I mean, you know, you could say, where's Max Weber? Where are the anarchists? You know, where's Emma Goldman? Where's John Kenneth Galbraith, the sort of great mid-century critic of American industrial capitalism? There's so many people that you could include. I mean, I could have written 10 volumes. In fact, I refer in the book to, you know, there's always been a problem. G.D.H. Cole, a famous English historian, wrote a history of socialism back in the 1960s and 70s. You know, just getting to 1850 took him six volumes. So, you've got to pick and choose, and I don't claim this is the history of capitalism and its critics. That would be a ridiculous claim to make. I just claim it's a history written by me, and hopefully the people are interested in it, and they're sufficiently diverse that you can address all the big questions. Andrew Keen: Well it's certainly incredibly timely. Capitalism and its critics—more and more of them. Sometimes they don't even describe themselves as critics of capitalism when they're talking about oligarchs or billionaires, they're really criticizing capitalism. A must read from one of America's leading journalists. And would you call yourself a critic of capitalism, John? John Cassidy: Yeah, I guess I am, to some extent, sure. I mean, I'm not a—you know, I'm not on the far left, but I'd say I'm a center-left critic of capitalism. Yes, definitely, that would be fair. Andrew Keen: And does the left need to learn? Does everyone on the left need to read the book and learn the language of anti-capitalism in a more coherent and honest way? John Cassidy: I hope so. I mean, obviously, I'd be talking my own book there, as they say, but I hope that people on the left, but not just people on the left. I really did try to sort of be fair to the sort of right-wing critiques as well. I included the Carlyle chapter particularly, obviously, but in the later chapters, I also sort of refer to this emerging critique on the right, the sort of economic nationalist critique. So hopefully, I think people on the right could read it to understand the critiques from the left, and people on the left could read it to understand some of the critiques on the right as well. Andrew Keen: Well, it's a lovely book. It's enormously erudite and simultaneously readable. Anyone who likes John Cassidy's work from The New Yorker will love it. Congratulations, John, on the new book, and I'd love to get you back on the show as anti-capitalism in America picks up steam and perhaps manifests itself in the 2028 election. Thank you so much. John Cassidy: Thanks very much for inviting me on, it was fun. Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe…

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Episode 2541: Joan Williams on How the Democrats Must Win Back the American Working Class 42:02

5 days ago42:02

42:02

Why are the Democrats losing the American working class? According to Joan Williams , it’s because they are failing to prioritize economic concerns of working-class Americans. In her new book Outclassed: How the Left Lost the Working Class and How to Win Them Back , Williams argues that Democrats lost the 2024 election because of their over-preoccupation with the interests of college educated Americans. Williams notes significant shifts among non-college voters of color toward Republicans and believes Democrats must develop what she calls "cultural competence" to connect with working-class voters. She emphasizes that economic struggle, and not just racism, drove Trump's victory. Williams advocates for a messaging that resonates with working-class values while maintaining progressive goals on issues like climate change. Democrats, she suggests, must return to their traditional language and prioritize economic stability for all Americans if they are to win back power in 2028. Five Key Takeaways * Democrats lost working-class voters across racial groups in 2024, with significant shifts among non-college voters of color (35-point shift among Latinos and 30-point shift among Black voters) and even larger shifts among younger voters of color. * Williams argues that economic factors, not just racism, drove Trump's victory. She believes Democrats failed to prioritize inflation and economic issues that matter most to working-class Americans, focusing instead on issues that primarily resonate with college-educated elites. * The "class-culture gap" between college-educated elites and working-class Americans requires Democrats to develop "cultural competence" - understanding and connecting with the values, communication styles, and priorities of non-college educated voters. * Williams believes Democrats must center economic messaging on the principle that "anybody who works hard in America deserves a stable middle-class standard of living" while connecting progressive policies to working-class values. * Unlike some critics, Williams doesn't believe Democrats must abandon identity politics or progressive causes, but rather must present these causes in ways that connect with working-class values while prioritizing economic issues. Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Described as having "something approaching rock star status” in her field by The New York Times Magazine , Joan C. Williams is an award-winning scholar of social inequality. She is the author of White Working Class, and has published on class dynamics in The New York Times, Washington Post, The Atlantic, The New Republic and more. She is Distinguished Professor of Law and Hastings Foundation Chair (emerita) at University of California College of the Law San Francisco. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe…

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Episode 2540: Anna Malaika Tubbs Reveals the Secret History of American Patriarchy 44:44

5 days ago44:44

44:44

In Erased: What American Patriarchy Has Hidden From Us , best selling writer Anna Malaika Tubbs reveals the secret history of American patriarchal values. Tubbs argues this patriarchy is the central narrative thread of American history. She emphasizes that patriarchy affects everyone differently according to their race, class, and gender - thereby creating a "gendered hierarchy" that excludes many from traditional gender roles. Tubbs maintains that this patriarchy persists. Indeed, she presents the Trump administration’s Project 2025 as a reactionary attempt to return to this central narrative of American history. Five Key Takeaways * American patriarchy was intentionally built into the nation's founding documents, with women deliberately excluded from the Constitution. This systemic design continues to influence modern American society and politics. * Patriarchy affects different groups in varying ways—white women experience oppression differently than women of color, who historically weren't even afforded the "protections" of traditional gender roles. Understanding these distinctions is crucial for building effective coalitions. * Agency is central to resistance against patriarchal systems. Throughout history, marginalized groups have consistently demonstrated alternative ways of living despite systemic constraints. * Current political movements like Project 2025 represent a conscious return to traditional patriarchal values, particularly in their emphasis on women's reproductive roles. * According to Tubbs, addressing patriarchy requires multi-level approaches: personal reflection, reimagining relationships, mindful parenting, and policy change. Understanding how patriarchy operates helps explain voting patterns and can inform strategies for social change. Anna Malaika Tubbs is a New York Times bestselling author and multidisciplinary expert on current and historical understandings of race, gender, and equity. With a Ph.D. in Sociology and a Masters in Multidisciplinary Gender Studies from the University of Cambridge in addition to a Bachelors in Medical Anthropology from Stanford University, Anna translates her academic knowledge into stories that are clear and engaging. Her articles have been published by TIME Magazine, New York Magazine, CNN, Motherly, the Huffington Post, For Harriet, The Guardian, Darling Magazine, and Blavity . Anna’s storytelling also takes form in her talks, including her TED Talk that has been viewed 2 million times, as well as the scripted and unscripted screen projects she has in development. She lives in Los Angeles with her husband and their three kids. Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe…

Keen On America

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Episode 2539: Marshall Poe on why Gaza is becoming Israel's Vietnam 38:36

6 days ago38:36

38:36

History, Marshall Poe wrote in December 2023, shows that Israel will never win a “war of occupation”. Eighteen months later, with Israel on the brink of a full scale occupation of Gaza, Poe’s argument is even more relevant. the Gaza war, the historian warns, is turning into Israel’s Vietnam - an unwinnable occupation that will only bring shame on the invaders. Trust Poe on the Vietnam analogy. His last book was about the Mai Lai massacre in Vietnam, so he’s all too familiar with the catastrophic consequences of imperial wars of counter-insurgency. Five Takeaways * Counterinsurgency operations typically evolve into prolonged occupations, as forces cannot easily identify and eliminate insurgents without alienating the local population. * Military occupations historically fail when the entire civilian population becomes hostile to occupying forces, leading to ethical compromises and potential atrocities. * The My Lai massacre in Vietnam exemplifies how poor intelligence and leadership can result in civilian casualties when soldiers cannot distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. * Population relocation, a strategy being discussed for Gaza, has historically been catastrophic whenever attempted in the 20th century. * The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has limited viable solutions, with Poe suggesting the two-state solution is no longer realistic and expressing skepticism that external powers like the US can resolve the situation. Marshall Tillbrook Poe is an American historian, writer, editor, and founder of the New Books Network, an online collection of podcast interviews with a wide range of nonfiction authors. He has taught Russian, European, Eurasian, and world history at various universities including Harvard, Columbia, University of Iowa, and, currently, the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Poe is the author or editor of a number of books for children and adults. Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Named as one of the "100 most connected men" by GQ magazine, Andrew Keen is amongst the world's best known broadcasters and commentators. In addition to presenting the daily KEEN ON show, he is the host of the long-running How To Fix Democracy interview series. He is also the author of four prescient books about digital technology: CULT OF THE AMATEUR, DIGITAL VERTIGO, THE INTERNET IS NOT THE ANSWER and HOW TO FIX THE FUTURE. Andrew lives in San Francisco, is married to Cassandra Knight, Google's VP of Litigation & Discovery, and has two grown children. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe…

Keen On America

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Episode 2538: Biden, Harris & the Exhausted Democratic Establishment 38:00

7 days ago38:00

38:00

So why did Harris lose in 2024? For one very big reason , according to the progressive essayist Bill Deresiewicz : “because she represented the exhausted Democratic establishment”. This rotting establishment, Deresiewicz believes, is symbolized by both the collective denial of Biden’s mental decline and by Harris’ pathetically rudderless Presidential campaign. But there’s a much more troubling problem with the Democratic party, he argues. It has become “the party of institutionalized liberalism, which is itself exhausted”. So how to reinvent American liberalism in the 2020’s? How to make the left once again, in Deresiewicz words, “the locus of openness, playfulness, productive contention, experiment, excess, risk, shock, camp, mirth, mischief, irony and curiosity"? That’s the question for all progressives in our MAGA/Woke age. 5 Key Takeaways * Deresiewicz believes the Democratic establishment and aligned media engaged in a "tacit cover-up" of Biden's condition and other major issues like crime, border policies, and pandemic missteps rather than addressing them honestly. * The liberal movement that began in the 1960s has become "exhausted" and the Democratic Party is now an uneasy alliance of establishment elites and working-class voters whose interests don't align well. * Progressive institutions suffer from a repressive intolerance characterized by "an unearned sense of moral superiority" and a fear of vitality that leads to excessive rules, bureaucracy, and speech codes. * While young conservatives are creating new movements with energy and creativity, the progressive establishment stifles innovation by purging anyone who "violates the code" or criticizes their side. * Rebuilding the left requires creating conditions for new ideas by ending censoriousness, embracing true courage that risks something real, and potentially building new institutions rather than trying to reform existing ones. Full Transcript Andrew Keen: Hello, everyone. It's the old question on this show, Keen on America, how to make sense of this bewildering, frustrating, exciting country in the wake, particularly of the last election. A couple of years ago, we had the CNN journalist who I rather like and admire, Jake Tapper, on the show. Arguing in a piece of fiction that he thinks, to make sense of America, we need to return to the 1970s. He had a thriller out a couple of years ago called All the Demons Are Here. But I wonder if Tapper's changed his mind on this. His latest book, which is a sensation, which he co-wrote with Alex Thompson, is Original Sin, President Biden's Decline, its Cover-up and His Disastrous Choice to Run Again. Tapper, I think, tells the truth about Biden, as the New York Times notes. It's a damning portrait of an enfeebled Biden protected by his inner circle. I would extend that, rather than his inner circle protected by an elite, perhaps a coastal elite of Democrats, unable or unwilling to come to terms with the fact that Biden was way, way past his shelf life. My guest today, William Deresiewicz—always get his last name wrong—it must be... William Deresiewicz: No, that was good. You got it. Andrew Keen: Probably because I'm anti-semitic. He has a new piece out called "Post-Election" which addresses much of the rottenness of the American progressive establishment in 2025. Bill, congratulations on the piece. William Deresiewicz: Thank you. Andrew Keen: Have you had a chance to look at this Tapper book or have you read about Original Sin? William Deresiewicz: Yeah, I read that piece. I read the piece that's on the screen and I've heard some people talking about it. And I mean, as you said, it's not just his inner circle. I don't want to blame Tapper. Tapper did the work. But one immediate reaction to the debate debacle was, where have the journalists been? For example, just to unfairly call one person out, but they're just so full of themselves, the New Yorker dripping with self-congratulations, especially in its centennial year, its boundless appetite for self-celebration—to quote something one of my students once said about Yale—they've got a guy named Evan Osnos, who's one of their regulars on their political... Andrew Keen: Yeah, and he's been on the show, Evan, and in fact, I rather like his, I was going to say his husband, his father, Peter Osnos, who's a very heavy-hitting ex-publisher. But anyway, go on. And Evan's quite a nice guy, personally. William Deresiewicz: I'm sure he's a nice guy, but the fact is he's not only a New Yorker journalist, but he wrote a book about Biden, which means that he's presumably theoretically well-sourced within Biden world. He didn't say anything. I mean, did he not know or did he know? Andrew Keen: Yeah, I agree. I mean you just don't want to ask, right? You don't know. But you're a journalist, so you're supposed to know. You're supposed to ask. So I'm sure you're right on Osnos. I mean, he was on the show, but all journalists are progressives, or at least all the journalists at the Times and the New Yorker and the Atlantic. And there seemed to be, as Jake Tapper is suggesting in this new book, and he was part of the cover-up, there seemed to be a cover-up on the part of the entire professional American journalist establishment, high-end establishment, to ignore the fact that the guy running for president or the president himself clearly had no idea of what was going on around him. It's just astonishing, isn't it? I mean, hindsight's always easy, of course, 2020 in retrospect, but it was obvious at the time. I made it clear whenever I spoke about Biden, that here was a guy clearly way out of his depth, that he shouldn't have been president, maybe shouldn't have been president in the first place, but whatever you think about his ideas, he clearly was way beyond his shelf date, a year or two into the presidency. William Deresiewicz: Yeah, but here's the thing, and it's one of the things I say in the post-election piece, but I'm certainly not the only person to say this. There was an at least tacit cover-up of Biden, of his condition, but the whole thing was a cover-up, meaning every major issue that the 2024 election was about—crime, at the border, woke excess, affordability. The whole strategy of not just the Democrats, but this media establishment that's aligned with them is to just pretend that it wasn't happening, to explain it away. And we can also throw in pandemic policy, right? Which people were still thinking about and all the missteps in pandemic policy. The strategy was effectively a cover-up. We're not gonna talk about it, or we're gonna gaslight you, or we're gonna make excuses. So is it a surprise that people don't trust these establishment institutions anymore? I mean, I don't trust them anymore and I want to trust them. Andrew Keen: Were there journalists? I mean, there were a handful of journalists telling the truth about Biden. Progressives, people on the left rather than conservatives. William Deresiewicz: Ezra Klein started to talk about it, I remember that. So yes, there were a handful, but it wasn't enough. And you know, I don't say this to take away from Ezra Klein what I just gave him with my right hand, take away with my left, but he was also the guy, as soon as the Kamala succession was effected, who was talking about how Kamala in recent months has been going from strength to strength and hasn't put a foot wrong and isn't she fantastic. So all credit to him for telling the truth about Biden, but it seems to me that he immediately pivoted to—I mean, I'm sure he thought he was telling the truth about Harris, but I didn't believe that for one second. Andrew Keen: Well, meanwhile, the lies about Harris or the mythology of Harris, the false—I mean, all mythology, I guess, is false—about Harris building again. Headline in Newsweek that Harris would beat Donald Trump if an election was held again. I mean I would probably beat—I would beat Trump if an election was held again, I can't even run for president. So anyone could beat Trump, given the situation. David Plouffe suggested that—I think he's quoted in the Tapper book—that Biden totally fucked us, but it suggests that somehow Harris was a coherent progressive candidate, which she wasn't. William Deresiewicz: She wasn't. First of all, I hadn't seen this poll that she would beat Trump. I mean, it's a meaningless poll, because... Andrew Keen: You could beat him, Bill, and no one can even pronounce your last name. William Deresiewicz: Nobody could say what would actually happen if there were a real election. It's easy enough to have a hypothetical poll. People often look much better in these kinds of hypothetical polls where there's no actual election than they do when it's time for an election. I mean, I think everyone except maybe David Plouffe understands that Harris should never have been a candidate—not just after Biden dropped out way too late, but ever, right? I mean the real problem with Biden running again is that he essentially saddled us with Harris. Instead of having a real primary campaign where we could have at least entertained the possibility of some competent people—you know, there are lots of governors. I mean, I'm a little, and maybe we'll get to this, I'm little skeptical that any normal democratic politician is going to end up looking good. But at least we do have a whole bunch of what seem to be competent governors, people with executive experience. And we never had a chance to entertain any of those people because this democratic establishment just keeps telling us who we're going to vote for. I mean, it's now three elections in a row—they forced Hillary on us, and then Biden. I'm not going to say they forced Biden on us although elements of it did. It probably was a good thing because he won and he may have been the only one who could have won. And then Harris—it's like reductio ad absurdum. These candidates they keep handing us keep getting worse and worse. Andrew Keen: But it's more than being worse. I mean, whatever one can say about Harris, she couldn't explain why she wanted to be president, which seems to me a disqualifier if you're running for president. The point, the broader point, which I think you bring out very well in the piece you write, and you and I are very much on the same page here, so I'm not going to criticize you in your post-election— William Deresiewicz: You can criticize me, Andrew, I love— Andrew Keen: I know I can criticize you, and I will, but not in this particular area—is that these people are the establishment. They're protecting a globalized world, they're the coast. I mean, in some ways, certainly the Bannonite analysis is right, and it's not surprising that they're borrowing from Lenin and the left is borrowing from Edmund Burke. William Deresiewicz: Yeah, I mean I think, and I think this is the real problem. I mean, part of what I say in the piece is that it just seems, maybe this is too organicist, but there just seems to be an exhaustion that the liberal impulse that started, you know, around the time I was born in 1964, and I cite the Dylan movie just because it's a picture of that time where you get a sense of the energy on the left, the dawning of all this exciting— Andrew Keen: You know that movie—and we've done a show on that movie—itself was critical I guess in a way of Dylan for not being political. William Deresiewicz: Well, but even leaving that aside, just the reminder you get of what that time felt like. That seems in the movie relatively accurate, that this new youth culture, the rights revolution, the counterculture, a new kind of impulse of liberalism and progressivism that was very powerful and strong and carried us through the 60s and 70s and then became the establishment and has just become completely exhausted now. So I just feel like it's just gotten to the end of its possibility. Gotten to the end of its life cycle, but also in a less sort of mystical way. And I think this is a structural problem that the Democrats have not been able to address for a long time, and I don't see how they're going to address it. The party is now the party, as you just said, of the establishment, uneasily wedded to a mainly non-white sort of working class, lower class, maybe somewhat middle class. So it's sort of this kind of hybrid beast, the two halves of which don't really fit together. The educated upper middle class, the professional managerial class that you and I are part of, and then sort of the average Black Latino female, white female voter who doesn't share the interests of that class. So what are you gonna do about that? How's that gonna work? Andrew Keen: And the thing that you've always given a lot of thought to, and it certainly comes out in this piece, is the intolerance of the Democratic Party. But it's an intolerance—it's not a sort of, and I don't like this word, it's not the fascist intolerance of the MAGA movement or of Trump. It's a repressive intolerance, it's this idea that we're always right and if you disagree with us, then there must be something wrong with you. William Deresiewicz: Yeah, right. It's this, at this point, completely unearned sense of moral superiority and intellectual superiority, which are not really very clearly distinguished in their mind, I think. And you know, they just reek of it and people hate it and it's understandable that they hate it. I mean, it's Hillary in a word. It's Hillary in a word and again, I'm wary of treading on this kind of ground, but I do think there's an element of—I mean, obviously Trump and his whole camp is very masculinist in a very repulsive way, but there is also a way to be maternalist in a repulsive way. It's this kind of maternal control. I think of it as the sushi mom voice where we're gonna explain to you in a calm way why you should listen to us and why we're going to control every move you make. And it's this fear—I mean what my piece is really about is this sort of quasi-Nietzschean argument for energy and vitality that's lacking on the left. And I think it's lacking because the left fears it. It fears sort of the chaos of the life force. So it just wants to shackle it in all of these rules and bureaucracy and speech codes and consent codes. It just feels lifeless. And I think everybody feels that. Andrew Keen: Yeah, and it's the inability to imagine you can be wrong. It's the moral greediness of some people, at least, who think of themselves on the left. Some people might be listening to this, thinking it's just these two old white guys who think themselves as progressives but are actually really conservative. And all this idea of nature is itself chilling, that it's a kind of anti-feminism. William Deresiewicz: Well, that's b******t. I mean, let me have a chance to respond. I mean I plead guilty to being an old white man— Andrew Keen: I mean you can't argue with that one. William Deresiewicz: I'm not arguing with it. But the whole point rests on this notion of positionality, like I'm an older white man, therefore I think this or I believe that, which I think is b******t to begin with because, you know, down the street there's another older white guy who believes the exact opposite of me, so what's the argument here? But leaving that aside, and whether I am or am not a progressive—okay, my ideal politician is Bernie Sanders, so I'll just leave it at that. The point is, I mean, one point is that feminism hasn't always been like this. Second wave feminism that started in the late sixties, when I was a little kid—there was a censorious aspect to it, but there was also this tremendous vitality. I mean I think of somebody like Andrea Dworkin—this is like, "f**k you" feminism. This is like, "I'm not only not gonna shave my legs, I'm gonna shave my armpits and I don't give a s**t what you think." And then the next generation when I was a young man was the Mary Gates, Camille Paglia, sex-positive power feminism which also had a different kind of vitality. So I don't think feminism has to be the feminism of the women's studies departments and of Hillary Clinton with "you can't say this" and "if you want to have sex with me you have to follow these 10 rules." I don't think anybody likes that. Andrew Keen: The deplorables! William Deresiewicz: Yes, yes, yes. Like I said, I don't just think that the enemies don't like it, and I don't really care what they think. I think the people on our side don't like it. Nobody is having fun on our side. It's boring. No one's having sex from what they tell me. The young—it just feels dead. And I think when there's no vitality, you also have no creative vitality. And I think the intellectual cul-de-sac that the left seems to be stuck in, where there are no new ideas, is related to that. Andrew Keen: Yeah, and I think the more I think about it, I think you're right, it's a generational war. All the action seems to be coming from old people, whether it's the Pelosis and the Bidens, or it's people like Richard Reeves making a fortune off books about worrying about young men or Jonathan Haidt writing about the anxious generation. Where are, to quote David Bowie, the young Americans? Why aren't they—I mean, Bill, you're in a way guilty of this. You made your name with your book, Excellent Sheep about the miseducation... William Deresiewicz: Yeah, so what am I guilty of exactly? Andrew Keen: I'm not saying you're all, but aren't you and Reeves and Haidt, you're all involved in this weird kind of generational war. William Deresiewicz: OK, let's pump the brakes here for a second. Where the young people are—I mean, obviously most people, even young people today, still vote for Democrats. But the young who seem to be exploring new things and having energy and excitement are on the right. And there was a piece—I'm gonna forget the name of the piece and the author—Daniel Oppenheimer had her on the podcast. I think it appeared in The Point. Young woman. Fairly recent college graduate, went to a convention of young republicans, I don't know what they call themselves, and also to democrats or liberals in quick succession and wrote a really good piece about it. I don't think she had ever written anything before or published anything before, but it got a lot of attention because she talked about the youthful vitality at this conservative gathering. And then she goes to the liberals and they're all gray-haired men like us. The one person who had anything interesting to say was Francis Fukuyama, who's in his 80s. She's making the point—this is the point—it's not a generational war, because there are young people on the right side of the spectrum who are doing interesting things. I mean, I don't like what they're doing, because I'm not a rightist, but they're interesting, they're different, they're new, there's excitement there, there's creativity there. Andrew Keen: But could one argue, Bill, that all these labels are meaningless and that whatever they're doing—I'm sure they're having more sex than young progressives, they're having more fun, they're able to make jokes, they are able, for better or worse, to change the system. Does it really matter whether they claim to be MAGA people or leftists? They're the ones who are driving change in the country. William Deresiewicz: Yes, they're the ones who are driving change in the country. The counter-cultural energy that was on the left in the sixties and seventies is now on the right. And it does matter because they are operating in the political sphere, have an effect in the political sphere, and they're unmistakably on the right. I mean, there are all these new weird species on the right—the trads and the neo-pagans and the alt-right and very sort of anti-capitalist conservatives or at least anti-corporate conservatives and all kinds of things that you would never have imagined five years ago. And again, it's not that I like these things. It's that they're new, there's ferment there. So stuff is coming out that is going to drive, is already driving the culture and therefore the politics forward. And as somebody who, yes, is progressive, it is endlessly frustrating to me that we have lost this kind of initiative, momentum, energy, creativity, to what used to be the stodgy old right. Now we're the stodgy old left. Andrew Keen: What do you want to go back to? I mean you brought up Dylan earlier. Do you just want to resurrect... William Deresiewicz: No, I don't. Andrew Keen: You know another one who comes to mind is another sort of bundle of contradictions, Bruce Springsteen. He recently talked about the corrupt, incompetent, and treasonous nature of Trump. I mean Springsteen's a billionaire. He even acknowledged that he mythologized his own working-class status. He's never spent more than an hour in a factory. He's never had a job. So aren't all the pigeons coming back to roost here? The fraud of men like Springsteen are merely being exposed and young people recognize it. William Deresiewicz: Well, I don't know about Springsteen in particular... Andrew Keen: Well, he's a big deal. William Deresiewicz: No, I know he's a big deal, and I love Springsteen. I listened to him on repeat when I was young, and I actually didn't know that he'd never worked in a factory, and I quite frankly don't care because he's an artist, and he made great art out of those experiences, whether they were his or not. But to address the real issue here, he is an old guy. It sounds like he's just—I mean, I'm sure he's sincere about it and I would agree with him about Trump. But to have people like Springsteen or Robert De Niro or George Clooney... Andrew Keen: Here it is. William Deresiewicz: Okay, yes, it's all to the point that these are old guys. So you asked me, do I want to go back? The whole point is I don't want to go back. I want to go forward. I'm not going to be the one to bring us forward because I'm older. And also, I don't think I was ever that kind of creative spirit, but I want to know why there isn't sort of youthful creativity given the fact that most young people do still vote for Democrats, but there's no youthful creativity on the left. Is it just that the—I want to be surprised is the point. I'm not calling for X, Y, or Z. I'm saying astonish me, right? Like Diaghilev said to Cocteau. Astonish me the way you did in the 60s and 70s. Show me something new. And I worry that it simply isn't possible on the left now, precisely because it's so locked down in this kind of establishment, censorious mode that there's no room for a new idea to come from anywhere. Andrew Keen: As it happens, you published this essay in Salmagundi—and that predates, if not even be pre-counterculture. How many years old is it? I think it started in '64. Yeah, so alongside your piece is an interesting piece from Adam Phillips about influence and anxiety. And he quotes Montaigne from "On Experience": "There is always room for a successor, even for ourselves, and a different way to proceed." Is the problem, Bill, that we haven't, we're not willing to leave the stage? I mean, Nancy Pelosi is a good example of this. Biden's a good example. In this Salmagundi piece, there's an essay from Martin Jay, who's 81 years old. I was a grad student in Berkeley in the 80s. Even at that point, he seemed old. Why are these people not able to leave the stage? William Deresiewicz: I am not going to necessarily sign on to that argument, and not just because I'm getting older. Biden... Andrew Keen: How old are you, by the way? William Deresiewicz: I'm 61. So you mentioned Pelosi. I would have been happy for Pelosi to remain in her position for as long as she wanted, because she was effective. It's not about how old you are. Although it can be, obviously as you get older you can become less effective like Joe Biden. I think there's room for the old and the young together if the old are saying valuable things and if the young are saying valuable things. It's not like there's a shortage of young voices on the left now. They're just not interesting voices. I mean, the one that comes immediately to mind that I'm more interested in is Ritchie Torres, who's this congressman who's a genuinely working-class Black congressman from the Bronx, unlike AOC, who grew up the daughter of an architect in Northern Westchester and went to a fancy private university, Boston University. So Ritchie Torres is not a doctrinaire leftist Democrat. And he seems to speak from a real self. Like he isn't just talking about boilerplate. I just feel like there isn't a lot of room for the Ritchie Torres. I think the system that produces democratic candidates militates against people like Ritchie Torres. And that's what I am talking about. Andrew Keen: In the essay, you write about Andy Mills, who was one of the pioneers of the New York Times podcast. He got thrown out of The New York Times for various offenses. It's one of the problems with the left—they've, rather like the Stalinists in the 1930s, purged all the energy out of themselves. Anyone of any originality has been thrown out for one reason or another. William Deresiewicz: Well, because it's always the same reason, because they violate the code. I mean, yes, this is one of the main problems. And to go back to where we started with the journalists, it seems like the rationale for the cover-up, all the cover-ups was, "we can't say anything bad about our side. We can't point out any of the flaws because that's going to help the bad guys." So if anybody breaks ranks, we're going to cancel them. We're going to purge them. I mean, any idiot understands that that's a very short-term strategy. You need the possibility of self-criticism and self-difference. I mean that's the thing—you asked me about old people leaving the stage, but the quotation from Montaigne said, "there's always room for a successor, even ourselves." So this is about the possibility of continuous self-reinvention. Whatever you want to say about Dylan, some people like him, some don't, he's done that. Bowie's done that. This was sort of our idea, like you're constantly reinventing yourself, but this is what we don't have. Andrew Keen: Yeah, actually, I read the quote the wrong way, that we need to reinvent ourselves. Bowie is a very good example if one acknowledges, and Dylan of course, one's own fundamental plasticity. And that's another problem with the progressive movement—they don't think of the human condition as a plastic one. William Deresiewicz: That's interesting. I mean, in one respect, I think they think of it as too plastic, right? This is sort of the blank slate fallacy that we can make—there's no such thing as human nature and we can reshape it as we wish. But at the same time, they've created a situation, and this really is what Excellent Sheep is about, where they're turning out the same human product over and over. Andrew Keen: But in that sense, then, the excellent sheep you write about at Yale, they've all ended up now as neo-liberal, neo-conservative, so they're just rebelling... William Deresiewicz: No, they haven't. No, they are the backbone of this soggy liberal progressive establishment. A lot of them are. I mean, why is, you know, even Wall Street and Silicon Valley sort of by preference liberal? It's because they're full of these kinds of elite college graduates who have been trained to be liberal. Andrew Keen: So what are we to make of the Musk-Thiel, particularly the Musk phenomenon? I mean, certainly Thiel, very much influenced by Rand, who herself, of course, was about as deeply Nietzschean as you can get. Why isn't Thiel and Musk just a model of the virility, the vitality of the early 21st century? You might not like what they say, but they're full of vitality. William Deresiewicz: It's interesting, there's a place in my piece where I say that the liberal can't accept the idea that a bad person can do great things. And one of my examples was Elon Musk. And the other one— Andrew Keen: Zuckerberg. William Deresiewicz: But Musk is not in the piece, because I wrote the piece before the inauguration and they asked me to change it because of what Musk was doing. And even I was beginning to get a little queasy just because the association with Musk is now different. It's now DOGE. But Musk, who I've always hated, I've never liked the guy, even when liberals loved him for making electric cars. He is an example, at least the pre-DOGE Musk, of a horrible human being with incredible vitality who's done great things, whether you like it or not. And I want—I mean, this is the energy that I want to harness for our team. Andrew Keen: I actually mostly agreed with your piece, but I didn't agree with that because I think most progressives believe that actually, the Zuckerbergs and the Musks, by doing, by being so successful, by becoming multi-billionaires, are morally a bit dodgy. I mean, I don't know where you get that. William Deresiewicz: That's exactly the point. But I think what they do is when they don't like somebody, they just negate the idea that they're great. "Well, he's just not really doing anything that great." You disagree. Andrew Keen: So what about ideas, Bill? Where is there room to rebuild the left? I take your points, and I don't think many people would actually disagree with you. Where does the left, if there's such a term anymore, need to go out on a limb, break some eggs, offend some people, but nonetheless rebuild itself? It's not going back to Bernie Sanders and some sort of nostalgic New Deal. William Deresiewicz: No, no, I agree. So this is, this may be unsatisfying, but this is what I'm saying. If there were specific new ideas that I thought the left should embrace, I would have said so. What I'm seeing is the left needs, to begin with, to create the conditions from which new ideas can come. So I mean, we've been talking about a lot of it. The censoriousness needs to go. I would also say—actually, I talk about this also—you know, maybe you would consider yourself part of, I don't know. There's this whole sort of heterodox realm of people who did dare to violate the progressive pieties and say, "maybe the pandemic response isn't going so well; maybe the Black Lives Matter protests did have a lot of violence"—maybe all the things, right? And they were all driven out from 2020 and so forth. A lot of them were people who started on the left and would even still describe themselves as liberal, would never vote for a Republican. So these people are out there. They're just, they don't have a voice within the Democratic camp because the orthodoxy continues to be enforced. So that's what I'm saying. You've got to start with the structural conditions. And one of them may be that we need to get—I don't even know that these institutions can reform themselves, whether it's the Times or the New Yorker or the Ivy League. And it may be that we need to build new institutions, which is also something that's happening. I mean, it's something that's happening in the realm of publishing and journalism on Substack. But again, they're still marginalized because that liberal establishment does not—it's not that old people don't wanna give up power, it's that the established people don't want to give up the power. I mean Harris is, you know, she's like my age. So the establishment as embodied by the Times, the New Yorker, the Ivy League, foundations, the think tanks, the Democratic Party establishment—they don't want to move aside. But it's so obviously clear at this point that they are not the solution. They're not the solutions. Andrew Keen: What about the so-called resistance? I mean, a lot of people were deeply disappointed by the response of law firms, maybe even universities, the democratic party as we noted is pretty much irrelevant. Is it possible for the left to rebuild itself by a kind of self-sacrifice, by lawyers who say "I don't care what you think of me, I'm simply against you" and to work together, or university presidents who will take massive pay cuts and take on MAGA/Trump world? William Deresiewicz: Yeah, I mean, I don't know if this is going to be the solution to the left rebuilding itself, but I think it has to happen, not just because it has to happen for policy reasons, but I mean you need to start by finding your courage again. I'm not going to say your testicles because that's gendered, but you need to start—I mean the law firms, maybe that's a little, people have said, well, it's different because they're in a competitive business with each other, but why did the university—I mean I'm a Columbia alumnus. I could not believe that Columbia immediately caved. It occurs to me as we're talking that these are people, university presidents who have learned cowardice. This is how they got to be where they got and how they keep their jobs. They've learned to yield in the face of the demands of students, the demands of alumni, the demands of donors, maybe the demands of faculty. They don't know how to be courageous anymore. And as much as I have lots of reasons, including personal ones, to hate Harvard University, good for them. Somebody finally stood up, and I was really glad to see that. So yeah, I think this would be one good way to start. Andrew Keen: Courage, in other words, is the beginning. William Deresiewicz: Courage is the beginning. Andrew Keen: But not a courage that takes itself too seriously. William Deresiewicz: I mean, you know, sure. I mean I don't really care how seriously—not the self-referential courage. Real courage, which means you're really risking losing something. That's what it means. Andrew Keen: And how can you and I then manifest this courage? William Deresiewicz: You know, you made me listen to Jocelyn Benson. Andrew Keen: Oh, yeah, I forgot and I actually I have to admit I saw that on the email and then I forgot who Jocelyn Benson is, which is probably reflects the fact that she didn't say very much. William Deresiewicz: For those of you who don't know what we're talking about, she's the Secretary of State of Michigan. She's running for governor. Andrew Keen: Oh yeah, and she was absolutely diabolical. She was on the show, I thought. William Deresiewicz: She wrote a book called Purposeful Warrior, and the whole interview was just this salad of cliches. Purpose, warrior, grit, authenticity. And part of, I mentioned her partly because she talked about courage in a way that was complete nonsense. Andrew Keen: Real courage, yeah, real courage. I remember her now. Yeah, yeah. William Deresiewicz: Yeah, she got made into a martyr because she got threatened after the 2020 election. Andrew Keen: Well, lots to think about, Bill. Very good conversation, as always. I think we need to get rid of old white men like you and I, but what do I know? William Deresiewicz: I mean, I am going to keep a death grip on my position, which is no good whatsoever. Andrew Keen: As I half-joked, Bill, maybe you should have called the piece "Post-Erection." If you can't get an erection, then you certainly shouldn't be in public office. That would have meant that Joe Biden would have had to have retired immediately. William Deresiewicz: I'm looking forward to seeing the test you devise to determine whether people meet your criterion. Andrew Keen: Yeah, maybe it will be a public one. Bread and circuses, bread and elections. We shall see, Bill, I'm not even going to do your last name because I got it right once. I'm never going to say it again. Bill, congratulations on the piece "Post-Election," not "Post-Erection," and we will talk again. This story is going to run and run. We will talk again in the not too distant future. Thank you so much. William Deresiewicz: That's good. Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe…

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Episode 2537: How to Survive our Age of Technological Mayhem 36:04

8 days ago36:04

36:04

“That he not busy being born is busy dying”, Dylan noted in “It’s Alright, Ma (I’m Only Bleeding)” , his grim 1965 masterpiece about reinvention. Sixty years later, at a time when “ everything is technology ”, these words have particular resonance in Silicon Valley. As That Was The Week publisher Keith Teare and I discuss in our weekly roundup of tech news, every Big Tech firm - from OpenAI and Airbnb to YouTube and Netflix — is in the perpetual business of radical reinvention. It’s what Keith identifies as “the truth” of our technological age. Surviving this mayhem, then, requires not just perpetual birth, but also a lot of conscious dying. 5 takeaways * Keith Teare argues that "truth" can only meaningfully apply to facts and past events, not to opinions or future possibilities. He suggests that what becomes "true" is created after the fact through human actions and choices. * Our discussion explores how technological change is accelerating, with Paki McCormick's article "Everything is Technology" framing technology broadly as "the process of human ingenuity transforming conditions and creating change" rather than just gadgets. * We discuss AI's impact on education, with Keith sharing an example of a professor who allegedly resigned in real-time after discovering students had created a website with AI-generated lecture summaries and essay responses, highlighting the disruption to traditional academic models. * Our conversation covers how established companies like Airbnb and Netflix are evolving their business models, with Netflix adding an ad-supported tier alongside its subscription service and Airbnb expanding from accommodations to curated experiences. * We discuss economic differences between regions, referencing Yascha Mounk's article on the "great divergence" between the US and Europe in terms of GDP per capita, noting that the US has roughly three times the GDP per capita of Europe (approximately $85,000 versus $30,000). This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe…

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Episode 2536: Is Spying an Un-American activity? 39:38

8 days ago39:38

39:38

Is spying an un-American activity? Not according to Jeffrey Rogg , whose new book, The Spy and the State, tells the story of American intelligence from the Revolutionary War to the present day. Rogg explores America's ambivalent relationship with espionage, arguing that spying is often viewed as "un-American" and yet necessary. he discusses key figures in American intelligence history such as OSS founder “Wild” Bill Donovan as well as shameful episodes like the botched Bay of Pigs invasion. Rogg highlights how these agencies reflect American society's strengths and weaknesses, and warns against over-politicizing intelligence. Throughout history, he emphasizes, Americans have gotten the intelligence community they've "bargained for." Which is certainly one way of thinking about SignalGate and the current state of American intelligence. 5 take-aways * Americans have historically viewed spying as a "necessary evil" that contradicts core American values of transparency and forthrightness, creating an inherent tension in the intelligence community. * Intelligence agencies often reflect the broader society - during crises, they tend to surveil minority groups, showing how America's fears manifest in intelligence operations. * Major intelligence failures (like the Bay of Pigs) and domestic surveillance represent dark chapters that have eroded public trust in intelligence institutions. * Political polarization of intelligence agencies is dangerous - when appointed leaders and career officials are at odds, it creates a toxic environment for effective intelligence work. * The intelligence community struggles to keep pace with technological advances, creating challenges for modern operations (as seen in the Signal Crisis and COVID work-from-home limitations). * Jeffrey P. Rogg is Senior Research Fellow at the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida. He previously held academic positions at the Joint Special Operations University at US Special Operations Command, the Department of Intelligence and Security Studies at The Citadel, and the National Security Affairs Department at the US Naval War College. He has a BA from Swarthmore College, a JD from Villanova University, an MA in Security Studies from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and a PhD in history from The Ohio State University. He serves on the boards of the International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence and the Society for Intelligence History. He lives in Tampa, Florida. Named as one of the "100 most connected men" by GQ magazine, Andrew Keen is amongst the world's best known broadcasters and commentators. In addition to presenting the daily KEEN ON show, he is the host of the long-running How To Fix Democracy interview series. He is also the author of four prescient books about digital technology: CULT OF THE AMATEUR, DIGITAL VERTIGO, THE INTERNET IS NOT THE ANSWER and HOW TO FIX THE FUTURE. Andrew lives in San Francisco, is married to Cassandra Knight, Google's VP of Litigation & Discovery, and has two grown children. Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe…

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Episode 2535: Tim Minshall on How We Manufacture Things, Why It Matters and How We Can Do It Better 43:27

9 days ago43:27

43:27

Walmart just announced it would be raising prices because of tariffs. So is that a good argument against Trump’s autarkic trade policies? Perhaps. But, as the Professor of Innovation at the University of Cambridge, Tim Minshall, points out, the global system of manufacturing is a complex thing. He argues that while countries shouldn't attempt complete manufacturing self-sufficiency, maintaining some domestic capability is crucial for innovation and resilience. Minshall, whose new book How Things Are Made , explores the hidden world of manufacturing, explains how the industrial manufacturing and knowledge economies are deeply interconnected, and how relocating production isn't simple due to complex supplier networks and specialized skills. He addresses challenges facing manufacturing powers like Germany and examines China's rising dominance. Minshall concludes that manufacturing must become both better (less environmentally harmful) and focused on creating better products, while consumers must recognize both their role and responsibility in this complex system. Five takeaways * Manufacturing is essential for national "sovereign capability" but countries don't need to make everything themselves - a balanced approach is better than complete self-sufficiency or total offshoring. * Knowledge economies and manufacturing are interdependent - research and development require tight coupling with production, and letting manufacturing disappear overseas can damage innovation capabilities. * Manufacturing supply chains are incredibly complex - components for products like iPhones travel "around six times around the world" and factories can't simply be relocated overnight as skills, suppliers and infrastructure take years to develop. * Modern manufacturing faces two major problems: fragility (as demonstrated during COVID) and environmental damage from production and logistics. * We need both "better manufacturing" (less harmful processes) and "manufacturing better things" (like clean energy systems), while recognizing our role as consumers in driving manufacturing choices. Tim Minshall is the inaugural Dr John C. Taylor Professor of Innovation at the University of Cambridge, the head of the Engineering Department’s Institute for Manufacturing and a fellow of Churchill College. His research, teaching and outreach are focused on the links between manufacturing and innovation. He lives in Cambridge with his scientist wife, Nicola. Named as one of the "100 most connected men" by GQ magazine, Andrew Keen is amongst the world's best known broadcasters and commentators. In addition to presenting the daily KEEN ON show, he is the host of the long-running How To Fix Democracy interview series. He is also the author of four prescient books about digital technology: CULT OF THE AMATEUR, DIGITAL VERTIGO, THE INTERNET IS NOT THE ANSWER and HOW TO FIX THE FUTURE. Andrew lives in San Francisco, is married to Cassandra Knight, Google's VP of Litigation & Discovery, and has two grown children. Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe…

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Episode 2534: Why Generative AI is a Technological Dead End 36:12

10 days ago36:12

36:12

Something doesn’t smell right about generative AI. Earlier this week, we had a featuring a former Google researcher who described large language models (LLMs) as a “con”. Then, of course, there’s OpenAI CEO Sam Altman who critics both inside and outside OpenAI, see as a little more than a persuasive conman. Scam or not, the biggest technical problem with LLMs, according to Peter Vos, who invented the term Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), is that it lacks memory and thus are inherently incapable of incremental learning. Voss, the current CEO of Aigo.ai , argues that LLMs therefore represent a technological “dead end” for AI. The industry, Voss argues, has gone “fundamentally wrong” with generative AI. It’s a classic economic mania, he says. And, as with all bubbles in the past - like Dutch tulips, internet DotComs or Japanese real-estate - it will eventually burst with devastating consequences. Peter Voss is a pioneer in AI who coined the term 'AGI' (Artificial General Intelligence) in 2001. As an engineer, scientist, inventor, and serial entrepreneur, he developed a comprehensive ERP package, growing his company from zero to a 400-person IPO in seven years. For the past 20 years, he has studied intelligence and AI, leading to the creation of the Aigo engine, a proto-AGI natural language intelligence that is revolutionizing call centers and advancing towards human-level intelligence. Named as one of the "100 most connected men" by GQ magazine, Andrew Keen is amongst the world's best known broadcasters and commentators. In addition to presenting the daily KEEN ON show, he is the host of the long-running How To Fix Democracy interview series. He is also the author of four prescient books about digital technology: CULT OF THE AMATEUR, DIGITAL VERTIGO, THE INTERNET IS NOT THE ANSWER and HOW TO FIX THE FUTURE. Andrew lives in San Francisco, is married to Cassandra Knight, Google's VP of Litigation & Discovery, and has two grown children. Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe…

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Episode 2533: Leah Litman on the Bad Vibes of the Supreme Court 39:21

11 days ago39:21

39:21

It’s probably not news that today’s Supreme Court runs on crazy conservative grudges and even crazier patrimonial fringe theories. But according to Leah Litman , Crooked Media podcaster and author of Lawless, the Supreme Court in Trump’s America is most defined by what she memorably identifies as “bad vibes” (ie: feelings and anxieties). Litman argues these vibes r eflect Republican anxieties about America's increasing cultural diversity and long term shift to a more progressive consensus. Litman characterizes the Roberts’ Supreme Court as implementing a "vindictive patriarchy" that seeks to return women to traditional roles. She criticizes Court decisions on voting rights, presidential immunity, and reproductive freedom as serving the minority interests of wealthy white men. The Court’s bad vibes, Litman says, extend to America's current constitutional crisis, particularly regarding Trump's executive overreach and the legal profession's pathetic response to this authoritarian power grab. five key takeaways * Litman argues that today's Supreme Court decisions are based on "vibes" (feelings and anxieties) rather than objective legal principles, leading her to characterize it as "lawless." * She positions the Court as part of a longer Republican project to use judicial power to implement conservative social policies, particularly regarding women's roles and reproductive rights. * Litman describes the current situation as a "vindictive patriarchy," where conservative men feel entitled to women's time and companionship, evidenced by backlash against women's independence. * Litman, who teaches law at Michigan, expresses disappointment in how large law firms have capitulated to Trump's administration instead of engaging in collective resistance to protect the rule of law. * Litman believes America is experiencing a constitutional crisis, with Congress failing to check executive power and the courts inconsistently resisting presidential overreach, particularly regarding deportations and executive actions. Leah Litman is a professor of law at the University of Michigan and a former Supreme Court clerk. In addition to cohosting Strict Scrutiny , she writes frequently about the Court for media outlets including The Washington Post , Slate , and The Atlantic , among others, and has appeared as a commentator on NPR and MSNBC, in addition to other venues. She has received the Ruth Bader Ginsburg award for her “scholarly excellence” from the American Constitution Society and published in top law reviews. Follow her on X @LeahLitman and Instagram @ProfLeahLitman. Named as one of the "100 most connected men" by GQ magazine, Andrew Keen is amongst the world's best known broadcasters and commentators. In addition to presenting the daily KEEN ON show, he is the host of the long-running How To Fix Democracy interview series. He is also the author of four prescient books about digital technology: CULT OF THE AMATEUR, DIGITAL VERTIGO, THE INTERNET IS NOT THE ANSWER and HOW TO FIX THE FUTURE. Andrew lives in San Francisco, is married to Cassandra Knight, Google's VP of Litigation & Discovery, and has two grown children. Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe…

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Episode 2532: Mattea Kramer on how Addiction has replaced Apple Pie as the most American of things 38:20

12 days ago38:20

38:20

Rather than apple pie, addiction might be defining quality of 21st century American life. That, at least, is the view of Mattea Kramer , author of Untended , a contemporary novel about addiction in small town America. She argues that individualistic American capitalism has caused an plague of addiction - in everything from drugs and alcohol to technology and egoism. Kramer sees community as the only real antidote to this epidemic. She connects addiction to broader social issues like economic exploitation and discusses how small-town America has been ravaged by this epidemic and by what she calls “late-stage capitalism”. So how to address this epidemic of addiction in contemporary America? Kramer has no simple fix, but emphasizes the importance of recognizing the humanity in those struggling with addiction and suggests that moral agency and human connection offer hope amid these challenges. Five Key Takeaways * American individualism and capitalism create fertile ground for addiction by fostering isolation and disconnection, leading people to seek substances or behaviors that fill this void. * Addiction extends beyond substances to include work, devices, shopping, and even the pursuit of feeling "special and successful," which Kramer identifies as her family's particular "quintessentially American" addiction. * The opioid crisis has created intergenerational trauma as children are left "untended" when parents struggle with addiction, perpetuating cycles of harm. * Stigma surrounding addiction makes recovery more difficult, especially for parents who face amplified shame that prevents them from seeking help. * Kramer believes reconnecting with our shared humanity and exercising moral agency through compassion offer the best path forward amid societal challenges, rather than focusing solely on individual willpower. Mattea Kramer is an American writer. She writes about drugs , power and powerlessness , and the voice in your head . She's been published in The Guardian, The Nation, Mother Jones, Guernica, and The Washington Post , and she has appeared on MSNBC and on radio stations across the country. Her first novel The Untended has just been published. Named as one of the "100 most connected men" by GQ magazine, Andrew Keen is amongst the world's best known broadcasters and commentators. In addition to presenting the daily KEEN ON show, he is the host of the long-running How To Fix Democracy interview series. He is also the author of four prescient books about digital technology: CULT OF THE AMATEUR, DIGITAL VERTIGO, THE INTERNET IS NOT THE ANSWER and HOW TO FIX THE FUTURE. Andrew lives in San Francisco, is married to Cassandra Knight, Google's VP of Litigation & Discovery, and has two grown children. Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe…

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Episode 2531: Emily Bender and Alex Hanna on the AI Con 43:12

13 days ago43:12