Dr. Daniel DeCaro on “Synergistic effects of voting and enforcement on internalized motivation to cooperate in a resource dilemma.”

Psychological Research Stories

In this episode, I speak with Dr. Daniel DeCaro about his article titled “Synergistic effects of voting and enforcement on internalized motivation to cooperate in a resource dilemma.” Dr. DeCaro is an assistant professor at the University of Louisville in the department of Psychological and Brain Sciences. The basic idea discussed in the episode is that solving major societal problems, like conservation of a limited resource, requires a balance between people who cooperate and follow environmental rules because of external reasons (e.g., enforcement, monetary rewards/punishments) and people who cooperate and obey the rules because of internal reasons (e.g., believe the rule is important, useful, morally right thing to do).

This experiment examined how voting (participatory decision making) and enforcement affected the motivational balance. The problem is that enforcement can sometimes undermine people’s internal motivations for obeying rules, causing them to cooperate only because of fear of punishment or anticipation of financial reward. Thus, if enforcement ever stops, or isn’t strong enough, cooperation may actually get worse. In this study, voting on rules prior to enforcement (Voted-Enforce condition) struck a good balance of motivations, because it was able to encourage both internal motivation and external motivation. In contrast, enforcing rules that were imposed (Imposed-Enforce condition), emphasized or external motivations too much (people were coerced both on what rule to use and by enforcement); thus, it was difficult for even intrinsically motivated people to remain voluntary motivated to obey the rules.

This topic is the primary thing that different disciplines, and theories within theories disagree about: the extent to which people can be internally versus externally motivated by different governmental interventions (e.g., enforcement), and still cooperate well. The abstract for the article is provided below for your convenience. To share comments or questions, please share them in the comment section below, or send me a message by going to methodologyforpsychology.org/contact. Thank you for listening.

Mentioned Resources

Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

• Hardin, G. (1968). Tragedy of the commons. Science,162(13), 1243–1248. This a classic paper on the topic. Everyone working in this area has read it. It sets up the core cooperative problem that everyone is trying to solve.
• Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
  University Press. This is Nobelist Elinor Ostrom’s seminal work on the topic. Elinor was my postdoc mentor on this research project, and we worked together to conduct this experiment.
• Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel Prize Speech: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2009/ostrom-lecture.html (Ostrom describes her core theory and research findings)
• Parks, C., Joireman, J., & Lange, P. (2013). Cooperation, trust, and antagonism: how public goods are promoted.
  Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 14(3), 119–165. This is comprehensive review
• Website on Social Dilemmas: www.socialdilemma.com

Internalized Motivation

• Video: “The Surprising Truth about What Motivates Us.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6XAPnuFjJc (This video does a great job of describing the core topic of intrinsic versus extrinsic sources of motivation. It’s a good introduction to the “Internalized Motivation” aspect of my study)
• Website on Self-Determination Theory: http://www.selfdeterminationtheory.org/ (This is the major motivational framework that inspired my work. This site has a lot of resources, including free published papers and survey instruments)

Abstract

“We used psychological methods to investigate how two prominent interventions, participatory decision making and enforcement, influence voluntary cooperation in a common-pool resource dilemma. Groups (N=40) harvested resources from a shared resource pool. Individuals in the Voted-Enforce condition voted on conservation rules and could use economic sanctions to enforce them. In other conditions, individuals could not vote (Imposed-Enforce condition), lacked enforcement (Voted condition), or both (Imposed condition). Cooperation was strongest in the Voted-Enforce condition (Phase 2). Moreover, these groups continued to cooperate voluntarily after enforcement was removed later in the experiment. Cooperation was weakest in the Imposed-Enforce condition and degraded after enforcement ceased. Thus, enforcement improved voluntary cooperation only when individuals voted. Perceptions of procedural justice, self-determination, and security were highest in the VotedEnforced condition. These factors (legitimacy, security) increased voluntary cooperation by promoting rule acceptance and internalized motivation. Voted-Enforce participants also felt closer to one another (i.e., self-other merging), further contributing to their cooperation. Neither voting nor enforcement produced these sustained psychological conditions alone. Voting lacked security without enforcement (Voted condition), so the individuals who disliked the rule (i.e., the losing voters) pillaged the resource. Enforcement lacked legitimacy without voting (Imposed-Enforce condition), so it crowded out internal reasons for cooperation. Governance interventions should carefully promote security without stifling fundamental needs (e.g., procedural justice) or undermining internal motives for cooperation.”

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