Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States

SCOTUS Audio

#Government #SCOTUS Audio

28:24

In our second installment of the Small Business Starter Kit series - we’re tackling a topic that’s sometimes tricky, sometimes confusing, but ever-present: taxes. Hosts Austin and Jannese have an insightful conversation with entrepreneur Isabella Rosal who started 7th Sky Ventures , an exporter and distributor of craft spirits, beer, and wine. Having lived and worked in two different countries and started a company in a heavily-regulated field, Isabella is no stranger to navigating the paperwork-laden and jargon-infused maze of properly understanding taxes for a newly formed small business. Join us as she shares her story and provides valuable insight into how to tackle your business’ taxes - so they don’t tackle you. Learn more about how QuickBooks can help you grow your business: QuickBooks.com See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.…

2 years ago 1:35:57

MP3•Episode home

Whether U.S. district courts may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and in light of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-1611. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1450.html

80 episodes

Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States

SCOTUS Audio

published 2 years ago

MP3•Episode home

80 episodes

#Government #SCOTUS Audio

All episodes

1
Trump v. Anderson 2:09:04

1 year ago2:09:04

2:09:04

Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot?

1
Muldrow v. St. Louis 1:36:41

1 year ago1:36:41

1:36:41

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual" with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The Eighth Circuit below followed binding circuit precedent to hold that discriminatory job transfers (and denials of requested transfers) are lawful under Title VII when they do not impose "materially significant disadvantages" on employees. The question presented is: Does Title VII prohibit discrimination as to all "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," or is its reach limited to discriminatory employer conduct that courts determine causes materially significant disadvantages for employees? THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: DOES TITLE VII PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION IN TRANSFER DECISIONS ABSENT A SEPARATE COURT DETERMINATION THAT THE TRANSFER DECISION CAUSED A SIGNIFICANT DISADVANTAGE?…

1
Moore v. United States 2:04:38

1 year ago2:04:38

2:04:38

The Sixteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to lay "taxes on incomes ... without apportionment among the several States." Beginning with Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), this Court's decisions have uniformly held "income," for Sixteenth Amendment purposes, to require realization by the taxpayer. In the decision below, however, the Ninth Circuit approved taxation of a married couple on earnings that they undisputedly did not realize but were instead retained and reinvested by a corporation in which they are minority shareholders. It held that "realization of income is not a constitutional requirement" for Congress to lay an "income" tax exempt from apportionment. App.12. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit became "the first court in the country to state that an 'income tax' doesn't require that a 'taxpayer has realized income."' App.38 (Bumatay, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The question presented is: Whether the Sixteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to tax unrealized sums without apportionment among the states.…

1
Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. 1:43:34

1 year ago1:43:34

1:43:34

Whether the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a court to approve, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a release that extinguishes claims held by nondebtors against nondebtor third parties, without the claimants’ consent.

1
SEC v. Jarkesy 2:16:40

1 year ago2:16:40

2:16:40

1. Whether statutory provisions that empower the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to initiate and adjudicate administrative enforcement proceedings seeking civil penalties violate the Seventh Amendment. 2. Whether statutory provisions that authorize the SEC to choose to enforce the securities laws through an agency adjudication instead of filing a district court action violate the nondelegation doctrine. 3. Whether Congress violated Article II by granting for-cause removal protection to administrative law judges in agencies whose heads enjoy for-cause removal protection.…

1
Wilkinson v. Garland, Att'y Gen. 1:30:22

1 year ago1:30:22

1:30:22

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General has discretion to cancel removal of non-permanent residents who satisfy four eligibility criteria, including "that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to the applicant's immediate family member who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D). Congress stripped courts of jurisdiction to review cancellation-of-removal determinations, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), but expressly preserved their jurisdiction to review "questions of law." Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). And as this Court has already held, this "statutory phrase 'questions of law' includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts"—that is, a "mixed question of law and fact." Guerrero- Lasprilla u. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1068-69 (2020). The question presented is whether an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D), as three circuits have held, or whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), as the court below and two other circuits have concluded.…

1
McElrath v. Georgia 59:19

1 year ago59:19

59:19

The Georgia Supreme Court held that a jury's verdict of acquittal on one criminal charge and its verdict of guilty on a different criminal charge arising from the same facts were logically and legally impossible to reconcile. It called the verdicts "repugnant," vacated both of them, and subsequently held that the defendant could be prosecuted a second time on both charges. Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit a second prosecution for a crime of which a defendant was previously acquitted?…

1
Brown v. United States & Jackson, v. United States, Consolidated 1:24:49

1 year ago1:24:49

1:24:49

The Armed Career Criminal Act provides that felons who possess a firearm are normally subject to a maximum 10-year sentence. But if the felon already has at least three "serious drug offense" convictions, then the minimum sentence is fifteen years. Courts decide whether a prior state conviction counts as a serious drug offense using the categorical approach. That requires determining whether the elements of a state drug offense are the same as, or narrower than those of its federal counterpart. If so, the state conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. But federal drug law often changes-as here, where Congress decriminalized hemp, narrowing the federal definition of marijuana. If state law doesn't follow suit, sentencing courts face a categorical conundrum. Under an earlier version of federal law, the state and federal offenses match-and the state offense is an ACCA predicate. Under the amended version, the offenses do not match-and the state offense is not an ACCA predicate. So the version of federal law that the court chooses to consult dictates the difference between serving a 10-year maximum or a 15-year minimum. The question presented is: Which version of federal law should a sentencing court consult under ACCA's categorical approach? The Armed Career Criminal Act mandates fifteen years in prison for federal firearm offenses where the defendant has three prior "violent felonies" or "serious drug offenses." The ACCA defines a "serious drug offense" as "an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment often years or more is prescribed by law." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). Four circuits have unanimously held that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) incorporates the federal drug schedules in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense to which the ACCA applies. In the decision below, however, the Eleventh Circuit accepted the government's express invitation to reject those circuit decisions. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit held that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) instead incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the defendant's prior state drug offense. The question presented is: Whether the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense (as the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held), or the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the prior state drug offense (as the Eleventh Circuit held below).1 1 A related question is presented in Altman, et al. v. United States (No. 22-5877) (response requested Nov. 16, 2022) and Brown v. United States (No. 22-6389) (docketed Dec. 23, 2022).…

1
Rudisill v. McDonough, Sec. of VA 1:10:16

1 year ago1:10:16

1:10:16

Whether a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq., and under the Post- 9/11 GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq., is entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits as between both programs, without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit.…

1
United States v. Rahimi 1:32:40

1 year ago1:32:40

1:32:40

Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violates the Second Amendment on its face.

1
Dept. of Agric. Rural Dev. v. Kirtz 1:18:28

1 year ago1:18:28

1:18:28

Whether the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States.

1
Vidal, Under Sec. Of Comm. v. Elster 1:15:47

1 year ago1:15:47

1:15:47

Section 1052(c) of Title 15 provides in pertinent part that a trademark shall be refused registration if it "[c]onsists of or comprises a name * * * identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent." 15 U.S.C. 1052(c). The question presented is as follows: Whether the refusal to register a mark under Section 1052(c) violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure.…

1
Lindke v. Freed 1:17:21

1 year ago1:17:21

1:17:21

Courts have increasingly been called upon to determine whether a public official who selectively blocks access to his or her social media account has engaged in state action subject to constitutional scrutiny. To answer that question, most circuits consider a broad range of factors, including the account's appearance and purpose. But in the decision below, the court of appeals rejected the relevance of any consideration other than whether the official was performing a "duty of his office" or invoking the "authority of his office." App. 5a. The question presented is: Whether a public official's social media activity can constitute state action only if the official used the account to perform a governmental duty or under the authority of his or her office.…

1
O’Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier 1:40:34

1 year ago1:40:34

1:40:34

Whether a public official engages in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official's personal social-media account, when the official uses the account to feature their job and communicate about job-related matters with the public, but does not do so pursuant to any governmental authority or duty.…

1
Culley v. Marshall 1:39:55

1 year ago1:39:55

1:39:55

In determining whether the Due Process Clause requires a state or local government to provide a post seizure probable cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if so, when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the "speedy trial" test employed in United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as held by the Eleventh Circuit or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) as held by at least the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.…

SCOTUS Audio

1
Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC 1:10:53

1 year ago1:10:53

1:10:53

The questions presented are: 1. Under federal admiralty law, what is the standard for judging the enforcement of a choice of law clause in a maritime contract? 2. Under federal admiralty law, can a choice of law clause in a maritime contract be rendered unenforceable if enforcement is contrary to the "strong public policy" of the state whose law is displaced? GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 2 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.…

SCOTUS Audio

1
Alexander v. SC Conference of NAACP 2:05:04

1 year ago2:05:04

2:05:04

The three-judge district court never mentioned the presumption of the South Carolina General Assembly's good faith, analyzed Congressional District 1 as a whole, or examined the intent of the General Assembly as a whole. It also disregarded the publicly available election data used to draw District 1 and legislator testimony demonstrating that politics and traditional districting principles better explain District 1 than race. And it never identified an alternative map that achieved the General Assembly's political objectives while similarly adhering to traditional criteria. The court nonetheless held that a portion of District 1 is racially gerrymandered and discriminatory, and therefore permanently enjoined elections there. After an eight- day trial featuring more than twenty witnesses and hundreds of exhibits, the court rested this holding on its brief questioning of the experienced nonpartisan map drawer and its conclusion that he used a racial target as a proxy for politics in District 1. Plaintiffs did not pursue that theory at trial, and the court never explained why the General Assembly would use race as a proxy to draw lines for political reasons when it could (and did) use election data directly to do the job. The questions presented are: 1. Did the district court err when it failed to apply the presumption of good faith and to holistically analyze District 1 and the General Assembly's intent? 2. Did the district court err in failing to enforce the alternative-map requirement m this circumstantial case? 3. Did the district court err when it failed to disentangle race from politics? 4. Did the district court err in finding racial predominance when it never analyzed District l's compliance with traditional districting principles? 5. Did the district court clearly err in finding that the General Assembly used a racial target as a proxy for politics when the record showed only that the General Assembly was aware of race, that race and politics are highly correlated, and that the General Assembly drew districts based on election data? 6. Did the district court err in upholding the intentional discrimination claim when it never even considered whether-let alone found that-District 1 has a discriminatory effect?…

SCOTUS Audio

1
Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC 1:28:03

1 year ago1:28:03

1:28:03

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 protects whistleblowers who report financial wrongdoing at publicly traded companies. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. When a whistleblower invokes the Act and claims he was fired because of his report, his claim is "governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code." 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C). Under that incorporated framework, a whistleblowing employee meets his burden by showing that his protected activity "was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint." 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). If the employee meets that burden, the employer can prevail only if it "demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that behavior." Id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iv). The Question Presented is: Under the burden-shifting framework that governs Sarbanes-Oxley cases, must a whistleblower prove his employer acted with a "retaliatory intent" as part of his case in chief, or is the lack of "retaliatory intent" part of the affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof?…

SCOTUS Audio

1
Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer 1:24:41

1 year ago1:24:41

1:24:41

Does a self-appointed Americans with Disabilities Act "tester" have Article III standing to challenge a place of public accommodation's failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she lacks any intention of visiting that place of public accommodation?

SCOTUS Audio

1
CFPB v. Com. Fin. Services Assn 1:34:16

1 year ago1:34:16

1:34:16

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the statute providing funding to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), 12 U.S.C. 5497, violates the Appropriations Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 9, Cl. 7, and in vacating a regulation promulgated at a time when the CFPB was receiving such funding.…

SCOTUS Audio

1
Pulsifer v. United States 1:40:15

1 year ago1:40:15

1:40:15

The "safety valve" provision of the federal sentencing statute requires a district court to ignore any statutory mandatory minimum and instead follow the Sentencing Guidelines if a defendant was convicted of certain nonviolent drug crimes and can meet five sets of criteria. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5). Congress amended the first set of criteria, in§ 3553(f)(1), in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221, broad criminal justice and sentencing reform legislation designed to provide a second chance for nonviolent offenders. A defendant satisfies § 3553(f)(1), as amended, if he "does not have-(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added). The question presented is whether the "and" in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means "and," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2-point offense (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the "and" means "or," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3- point offense, or (C) a 2-point violent offense (as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold). ORDER OF 10/2/2023: THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED FURTHER HEREIN IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IS GRANTED. J. ROBERT BLACK, OF OMAHA, NEBRASKA, IS APPOINTED TO SERVE AS COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER IN THIS CASE.…

SCOTUS Audio

1
Tyler v. Hennepin County 1:40:50

2 years ago1:40:50

1:40:50

Hennepin County confiscated 93-year-old Geraldine Tyler's former home as payment for approximately $15,000 in property taxes, penalties, interest, and costs. The County sold the home for $40,000, and, consistent with a Minnesota forfeiture statute, kept all proceeds, including the $25,000 that exceeded Tyler's debt as a windfall for the public. In all states, municipalities may take real property and sell it to collect payment for property tax debts. Most states allow the government to keep only as much as it is owed; any surplus proceeds after collecting the debt belong to the former owner. But in Minnesota and a dozen other states, local governments take absolute title, extinguishing the owner's equity in exchange only for cancelling a smaller tax debt, code enforcement fine, or debt to government agencies. 1. 2. The questions presented are: Whether taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Takings Clause? Whether the forfeiture of property worth far more than needed to satisfy a debt plus, interest, penalties, and costs, is a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment?…

SCOTUS Audio

1
Yegiazaryan v. Smagin & CMB Monaco v. Smagin, consolidated 1:04:09

2 years ago1:04:09

1:04:09

In RJR Nabisco, this Court, applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, held that a civil RICO plaintiff states a cognizable claim under RICO's private right of action only if it alleges a "domestic"-not foreign-injury. 579 U.S. 325, 354 (2016). The Court left unresolved, however, what legal test determines whether an injury is foreign or domestic. Id. ("[D]isputes may arise as to whether a particular alleged in- jury is 'foreign' or 'domestic.' But we need not concern ourselves with that question in this case."). Since RJR Nabisco, the Courts of Appeals have divided three ways as to the proper legal test for assessing whether a foreign plaintiff suffers a "domestic" injury to intangible property-such as court judgments, arbitration awards, contract rights, patents, and business reputation or goodwill. The question presented is: Does a foreign plaintiff state a cognizable civil RICO claim when it suffers an injury to intangible property, and if so, under what circumstances. In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U.S. 325 (2016), this Court held that a plaintiff proceeding under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., must plead and prove a "domestic" injury to maintain a claim in U.S. court. Following RJR Nabisco, the courts of appeals have split on the issue of where a foreign plaintiff suffers its injury to its intangible property for purposes of the domestic-injury inquiry. On one hand, the Seventh Circuit correctly holds that the foreign plaintiff suffers its injury abroad. On the other, the court below and Third Circuit have adopted an open-ended balancing test to determine the location of the plaintiff’s injury. Incorrectly applying that standardless test in reference to defendants' conduct, the Ninth Circuit held below that the plaintiff had suffered a domestic injury, even though he is a foreign resident with no alleged connection to the U.S. The question presented therefore is: Whether a foreign plaintiff with no alleged connection to the United States may nevertheless allege a "domestic" injury under RJR Nabisco sufficient to maintain a RICO action based only on injury to intangible property.…

SCOTUS Audio

1
Lac du Flambeau Band v. Coughlin 58:12

2 years ago58:12

58:12

Whether the Bankruptcy Code expresses unequivocally Congress's intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes.

SCOTUS Audio

1
Dupree v. Younger 58:08

2 years ago58:08

58:08

This case presents a clear, recognized, and intractable conflict regarding an important issue related to the preservation of legal claims for appeal. Parties may appeal only from "final decisions of the district courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Thus the general rule is that "[a]n appeal from the final judgment brings up all antecedent issues," In re Kilgus, 811 F.2d 1112, 1115 (7th Cir. 1987), and that "all interlocutory orders are reviewable on appeal from the final decree," Gloria Steamship Co. v. Smith, 376 F.2d 46, 47 (5th Cir. 1967). "Interlocutory orders therefore may be stored up and raised at the end of the case." Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 1988). Notwithstanding these precepts, the circuits have squarely divided over whether purely legal claims denied at summary judgment are reviewable on appeal after a jury trial where those claims have not been reasserted in a post-trial motion. In the decision below, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the 8-3-1 circuit split. But the panel declared itself bound by Fourth Circuit precedent and held that it would "not review, under any standard, the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and final judgment on the merits, even in circumstances where the issue rejected on summary judgment and not reasserted in a post-trial motion is a purely legal one." That holding was outcome-determinative-the sole basis on which the court refused to consider petitioner's PLRA exhaustion defense-and this case is a perfect vehicle for resolving the widespread disagreement over this important question. The question presented is: Whether to preserve the issue for appellate review a party must reassert in a post-trial motion a purely legal issue rejected at summary judgment.…

SCOTUS Audio

1
Counterman v. Colorado 1:46:24

2 years ago1:46:24

1:46:24

Whether, to establish that a statement is a "true threat" unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement, or whether it is enough to show that an objective "reasonable person" would regard the statement as a threat of violence.…

SCOTUS Audio

1
U.S., ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc. (21-1326) & U.S., ex rel. Proctor v. Safeway, Inc. (22-111) 1:12:19

2 years ago1:12:19

1:12:19

The False Claims Act protects government programs from fraud by, inter alia, imposing civil liability on anybody who knowingly presents false claims for payment to the government or makes false statements that are material to such claims. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). The statute defines "knowingly" to include acting with: (1) actual knowledge; (2) deliberate ignorance; or (3) reckless disregard of the falsity of information. See id. § 3729(b)(l)(A). The question presented is: Whether and when a defendant's contemporaneous subjective understanding or beliefs about the lawfulness of its conduct are relevant to whether it "knowingly" violated the False Claims Act. CONSOLIDATED WITH 22-111 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. This case presents the same question as No. 21-1326, United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc. It also arises from the same court of appeals. The Court may wish to consider the two petitions together. The question presented is: Whether and when a defendant's contemporaneous subjective understanding or beliefs about the lawfulness of its conduct are relevant to whether it "knowingly" violated the False Claims Act. CONSOLIDATED WITH 21-1326 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT…

SCOTUS Audio

1
Groff v. DeJoy (22-174) 1:47:52

2 years ago1:47:52

1:47:52

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 generally prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual "because of such individual's * * * religion." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), (2). The statute defines "religion" to include "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." Id. § 2000e(j). In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), this Court stated that an employer suffers an "undue hardship" in accommodating an employee's religious exercise whenever doing so would require the employer "to bear more than a de minimis cost." Id. at 84. 1. 2. The questions presented are: Whether this Court should disapprove the more-than-de-minimis-cost test for refusing Title. VII religious accommodations stated in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). Whether an employer may demonstrate "undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business" under Title VII merely by showing that the requested accommodation burdens the employee's co-workers rather than the business itself.…

SCOTUS Audio

1
Slack Technologies, LLC v. Pirani (22-200) 1:10:02

2 years ago1:10:02

1:10:02

Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 permits suits alleging misrepresentations in a registration statement only if the plaintiffs "acquir[ed] such security." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). Section 12(a)(2) of the Act provides that someone who "offers or sells a security ... by means of a prospectus" may be liable for misstatements in that prospectus "to the person purchasing such security." 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2). For more than 50 years, every court of appeals to consider the question has held that "such security" in Section 11 means a share registered under the registration statement the plaintiffs claim is misleading. And this Court has held that Section 12 (a)(2) applies only when there is an obligation to distribute a prospectus-an obligation that exists only for registered shares. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 (1995); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 77e. Departing from that well-established law, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit read "such security" to mean any share, registered or unregistered, and held that plaintiffs suing under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) need not prove that they bought registered shares. The question presented is: Whether Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 require plaintiffs to plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the registration statement they claim is misleading.…

SCOTUS Audio

1
Pugin v. Garland (22-23) & Garland v. Cordero-Garcia (22-331), Consolidated 1:39:08

2 years ago1:39:08